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Abstract
This is not a thesis about the Abyssinian Crisis or even, for that 
matter, Britain and the Abyssinian Crisis. Rather, it is about British 
foreign policy and the Foreign Office during the crisis. While a 
considerable amount of scholarship dealing with the Abyssinian Crisis 
has appeared, there has not been, at least to my knowledge, a full-scale 
study of this particular aspect of the crisis. That the subject warrants 
such scrutiny is, in my mind, without question. Indeed, the crisis 
shattered British foreign policy. At the end of the day, the League of 
Nations was crippled, and Italy, once Britain's ally against Nazi Germany, 
was alienated. In the process, Britain's Foreign Secretary was forced to 
resign.
I have written this thesis as a functional analysis designed to 
address the question of how British policy evolved and was implemented 
during the Abyssinian Crisis. The assumptions upon which that policy 
was based, the long and short-term goals of that policy, and the Foreign 
Office's day-to-day management of policy, w ill all be examined. The 
personalities of those in charge of British policy, and policy disputes 
between the Foreign Office staff w ill also be given full coverage. 
Drawing primarily from Foreign Office documents, I w ill look at British 
policy leading up to, and culminating in, Sir Samuel Hoare's trip to Paris 
and the so-called Hoare-Laval "Pact." Thi^s l  w ill examine Hoare-Laval 
as a case-study.
Since British foreign policy during the Abyssinian Crisis originated 
in. and was carried out by the Foreign Office, then it is there that an 
explanation for Britain's behavior during the crisis w ill be found. 
However, since a study of British policy during the Abyssinian Crisis 
would be incomplete without some elucidation of the Cabinet and 
Cabinet subcommittees' role in the policy-making process. I have 
devoted one chapter to this purpose.
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Chapter 1
The Abyssinian Crisis: An Introduction
From the historical perspective of fifty  years, the Italo-Ethiopian War 
or Abyssinian Crisis casts a long shadow. It was certainly one of the major 
events—some would say turning points—of the 1930s. * The Crisis 
destroyed the Stresa front, discredited the League of Nations as a force in 
the arena of international politics, and helped ease Mussolini into Hitler's 
arms. In reference to Wal-Wal, the clash that triggered the war, Sir Robert 
Vansittart, Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, 
wrote in his memoirs:
Thus, because a few ûsJtâr/s had died by brackish water- 
holes in an African waste, was taken the first step to the 
second German holocaust. The pretext was more trivial than 
the murder of Franz Ferdinand. One searched in vain for 
sense on God's earth.2
In the context of British diplomacy during the 1930s, the Abyssinian 
Crisis stands out as one of the crucial moments of the decade. In 1935 the 
foreign policy of the National Government was geared towards one main 
objective: to bring peace to Europe by bringing Germany back into the 
League of Nations and by obtaining lasting arms control agreements w ith 
the Nazi regime.^ Underlying this objective was a second, multi-faceted 
strategy involving rearmament and improving relations w ith France and 
Italy. The two strategies were seen as complementary; although at various 
times the British Government chose to emphasize one or the other 
according to circumstances. The foundation for both, and indeed for British 
policy in general, was the League of Nations which, the government 
believed, provided a useful forum for international debate and conflict 
management.^
From the beginning, the Abyssinian Crisis challenged British policy 
and the assumptions on which that policy had been built. The long-held |
belief that good relations w ith Italy and France could be maintained within i
the framework of the League—a belief taken for granted in BHWh I
diplomatic circles—was suddenly threatened. Italy's bellicose attitude j
towards Abyssinia, and later her invasion of that country, posed a direct |
threat to the authority of the League. In short, the crisis became a "test- 
case" for the League and the principle of collective security. For British 
foreign policy, the Italo-Abyssinian conflict created a major dilemma: 
Britain could not afford to lose Italy as an ally, but nor could she sit by and 
watch Mussolini violate the League Covenant. Adding to the complexity of 
the problem was the attitude of the French Government which had no 
desire to jeopardize its relations w ith Italy, and did not share Britain's 
passionate concern for the fate of the League.^ Thus British foreign policy 
strategists were confronted w ith the uncomfortable choice of having to side 
w ith either Mussolini or the League.
How British policy-makers faced that choice, and why British policy 
during the crisis evolved as it did, are the two main focal points of this 
thesis.
When Italian troops crossed the Abyssinian frontier on the 3rd of 
October 1935, the Italo-Abyssinian War officially began. The Italian 
invasion came as little surprise, however.^ For nine months the two sides 
had exchanged demands, counter-demands and threats. By the summer of 
1935, what had originally been a territorial dispute began to take on the 
proportions of a full-scale international crisis. Mussolini publicly professed 
his desire to conquer Abyssinia even if  that meant a confrontation w ith the 
League of Nations, For the League this posed a considerable dilemma: if  
the Italians violated the Covenant in such a flagrant manner, then the 
League would have no choice but to respond w ith the only realistic weapon 
at its disposal—economic sanctions. Had the League been strong in 1935, 
this might not have been such problem. But having failed to stop the 
Japanese in Manchuria in 1931, and w ith three major powers—Germany, 
Japan and the United States—outside the League, the League was in a 
precarious position. I f  the League could not stop Italy from conquering 
another member-state, then the League would be rendered meaningless."^ 
Britain was equally ill-equipped to deal w ith such a crisis. The 
Foreign Office had not foreseen any desire on Italy's part to conquer 
Abyssinia. British foreign policy makers had had their eyes fixed on an 
expansionist Germany, not Italy. Indeed, relations between Britain and 
Italy had been improving since 1933, and in April 1935 the relationship 
was strengthened further at the Stresa Conference. When it finally became
clear that Mussolini would not back down, that he was intent on taking 
Abyssinia at all costs, the strategists In the Foreign Office were forced to 
put together a policy.
For both the League of Nations and Britain the most logical way to 
deal w ith the situation was to try and prevent a confrontation w ith the 
Italians. This, they hoped, could best be achieved through some kind of 
territorial exchange acceptable to all parties. The first attempt was made 
by Britain in June, when Anthony Eden, Minister for League of Nations 
Affairs, was sent to Rome w ith the Zeila plan. When Mussolini rejected the 
plan as too meagre, the British were forced back to the drawing board. A 
second attempt was made jointly by Britain and France and w ith the 
backing of the League, in mid-August. Once again, the Italians rejected the 
plan; Mussolini now demanded complete control over Abyssinia. For the 
British Government, the Italian de- mands were impossible to meet; public 
opinion in Britain was already turning against Italy, and acceptance of the 
Italian position would be seen as capitulation and a betrayal of the League.^
The only alternative left, however, were sanctions, and the British 
Government was reluctant to take that step without the support of France. 
Moreover, sanctions ran the risk of dragging Britain into a costly war w ith 
Italy. The French Government, anxious to preserve its relations with 
Mussolini, refused to give Britain full support. When war broke out in 
October, however, the British Government went along w ith the League in 
imposing sanctions. Sanctions, despite the risks, at least meant action; 
neither Britain nor the League could afford to stand idle.
To minimize the possibility of the conflict escalating into a war 
between Italy and the League-powers, however, Britain and France, as the 
two leading powers at the League, made sure that the sanctions imposed 
were mild. Severe sanctions that might choke the Italian economy were 
seen as too risky. At the same time, both Britain and France held out hope 
that a peaceful solution could be found through yet another territorial 
settlement. But by mid-November, pressure was building in Geneva for 
stronger sanctions, and particularly an oil sanction which, many believed, 
would bring the Italian war effort to a halt. Worried that such a sanction 
might provoke Mussolini into military retaliation, the British and French 
Governments redoubled their efforts to find a compromise solution. After a 
month of high- level negotiations, Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign 
Secretary, travelled to Paris to meet w ith the head of the French 
Government, Pierre Laval.
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Hoare’s weekend trip to Paris produced the Hoare-Laval agreement, a 
territorial settlement which both men believed had an excellent chance to 
end the war. But it was not to be. Before the plan could be presented to 
Italy, Abyssinia and the League, details were leaked in the Paris press. The 
agreement was assailed from all sides: in Geneva, League representatives 
complained about the amount of territory Italy was to receive at Abyssinia's 
expense; in London, public outcry led to a revolt among Conservative back­
benchers, forcing Sir Samuel Hoare to resign.
The failure of the Hoare-Laval Plan marked a turning point in the 
crisis. For the British Government, Hoare's defeat meant also the defeat of 
British policy.9 In the months that followed, few in Foreign Office had any 
desire to tangle further w ith Abyssinian problem. No more attempts were 
made to find a settlement, nor was an oil sanction ever imposed. Five 
months later, the war ended w ith Abyssinia's surrender.
For the historian, the Abyssinian Crisis presents a number of challenges. 
Foremost among these, is the sheer immensity of the subject which, for 
practical purposes, can be divided into five major facets each representing 
the five key actors in the Crisis: Italy, Abyssinia, the League of Nations, 
Britain and France. Since it would be impossible to treat all five facets 
thoroughly in a thesis of this size, I have limited my focus to British foreign 
policy during the crisis, and specifically, the Foreign Office.
British foreign policy during the 1930s has been covered by a vast 
amount of scholarship, and there are numerous accounts—both direct and 
indirect—of British policy during the Abyssinian Crisis.io Why then another 
study of the crisis? My reasons are quite simple. To date, there has not 
been a thorough account of British policy during the Abyssinian crisis. One 
study has focused almost exclusively on the Cabinet's role in the crisis, n 
Another examines British public opinion during the crisis. 12 Others
examine the role of the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet subcommittees 
during the crisis.i^ While these studies provide a valuable supplement to 
our understanding of the crisis, they do not fully illuminate British foreign 
policy and the policy-making process during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. 
Because the Cabinet took a "hands-off approach to the problem, foreign 
policy originated in. and was carried out by the Foreign Office. It was the 
Foreign Office that set the tone of British policy and implemented that
policy on a day-to-day basis. Thus if  answers are to be found, then it is in 
the Foreign Office.
That British policy during the Abyssinian Crisis failed can hardly be 
questioned. Indeed, Britain neither stopped Mussolini nor retained his 
friendship. In the process, a Foreign Secretary was forced to resign and 
British foreign policy was discredited. Too often, however, historians have 
tried to explain Britain's behavior during the Abyssinian Crisis w ithin the 
wider framework of the policy of "Appeasement" during the 1930s.*'* 
While this approach may help to place the crisis in perspective, it does little 
to explain the complex forces at work w ithin the policy-making process in 
Britain at the time. British policy, and especially the Hoare-Laval affair, 
has been explained as an abberation or, in A.J.P. Taylor's words, "the 
betrayal of the League Another scholar has described British policy 
during the crisis as "the first great act of appeasement.'"*^ Such remarks, 
however, represent a search for culpability rather than understanding. 
British foreign policy during the Abyssinian Crisis is far too complex for 
such generalizations.
* Frank Hardie, The Âbyssmian Crisis (London: 1974), pp.3-5.
2Vansittart, The Mist Procession, (London:1957), pp.514-15.
^For a concise account of this see Norton Medlicott, "Britain and Germany: the Search 
for Agreement", in David Dilks (ed.), Retreat from Power VoL I  (London: 1981), 
pp.78-101.
4See R.A.C. Parker, "Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis, 1935-36", English 
Historicai Review, 89 (April, 1974), pp.293-332.
^For the best accounts of France and the Abyssinian Crisis, see Geoffrey Warner. 
Pierre Lavai and the Eciipse o f France (London: 1968), and Nicholas Rostow, Anglo- 
French Relations, 1934-36 (London: 1984). F.O. Laurens', France and the Italo- 
Abyssinian Crisis (The Hague: 1967) is also good, but concentrates mainly on domestic 
aspects of the crisis.
^in fact, many diplomatic observèrir were surpriséd at how late the Italian attack 
was. The long-awaited Italian advance had been expected to take place in September 
when the rainy-season ended.
7The best study of the League and the Abyssinian Crisis is probably George Baer's 
second book on the Italo-Abyssinian War, Test Case: Italy Ethiopia and the League of 
Nations (Stanford; 1976).
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^For a full-scale study of public opinion in Britain during the Abyssinian Crisis, see 
D. Waley, British Puttie Opinion iuuitthe Abyssinan Witn t935-M  (London: 1975).
^It was less of a defeat for Laval's policy. Laval and the French Foreign Ministry 
came under fire for their part in the agreement, but not to the same extent as their 
British counterparts. Laval's defeat came a month later during a parliamentary battle. 
For more on Laval and the Paris agreements, see Geoffrey Warner, op.cit., and also 
F.O. Laurens, op.cit.
lOFor specialized studies of the Abyssinian Crisis see George Baer, The Coming o f the 
Italo-Ethiopisn War (Harvard: 1967), and Test Case: Itaty, Ethiopia, and the League 
o f Nations (Stanford: 1976): Frank Hardie, The Abyssinian Crisis (London: 1974); 
Henderson B. Braddick, "The Hoare-Laval Plan: A Study in International Diplomacy", 
in Hans W. Gatzke (ed ), European Biptomacy Between Two Wars (Chicago: 1972); 
David Carlton, "The Dominions and British Policy in the Abyssinian Crisis", Journal 
o f Common weatth and Imperial History, 1,1 (1979); Norton Medlicott. "The Hoare- 
Laval Plan Reconsidered", in David Dilks (ed.), Retreat from Power, VoL t  (London; 
1981); R.A.C. Parker, "Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis", English 
Historical Review, 89 (1974); Gaines Post, "The Making of British Policy in the 
Ethiopian Crisis", International History Review, 1, 4 (1979); James Robertson. "The 
Origins of British Opposition to Mussolini over Ethiopia", Journal o f British Studies, 
9,1 (1969), and "The Hoare Laval-Plan", Journal o f Contemporary History, 10 (1975); 
and Mario Toscano, "Eden's Mission to Rome on the Eve of the Italo-Ethiopian 
Conflict", in A.O. Sarkissian (ed.), Studies in Dipiomatic History and Historiography 
in Honour o f G.P. Gooch (New York: 1%1). For excellent, indirect accounts of the 
crisis see A.R. Peters, Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office (New York: 1986);
Nicholas Rostow, Anglo-French Relations, 1934-36 (London: 1984); and Aaron 
Goldman, "Sir Robert Vansittart's Search for Italian Cooperation against Hitler, 1933- 
36", Journal o f Contemporary History, 9,3 (1974). For studies of the military aspects 
of the crisis see Arthur Marder, "The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis",
American Historical Review, 75, 5 (1970); and Rosaria Quartararo, "Imperial Defense 
in the Mediterranean on the Eve of the Ethiopian Crisis", Historical Journal, 20 
(1977).
1 * Hardie, op.cit.
l^ D. Waley, British Public Opinion and the Abyssinian War, 1935-36 (London:1975). 
13post, op.cit.; Marder. op.cit.; ()uartararo, op.cit.
14See especially Hardie, op cit., and Braddick, op cit.; also see Neville Thompson, The 
Anti-Appeasers (Oxford: 1971).
l^ A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (London: 1965), p.393.
IbHardie, op. cit., p.3.
Chapter 2
The Foreign Office: Dec. 1934 to May 1935
The Foreign Office had been concerned about Italian designs in 
Abyssinia for some time. Those familiar with the history of the region, 
were quick to point out that the small Italian colonies in Somalia and 
Eritrea were not enough to satisfy Italy. Italy's imperial aspirations in 
Africa were growing rather than diminishing, and Italy could only expand 
her colonial frontiers at the the expense of neighboring Abyssinia. Italy had 
tried to conquer Abyssinia between 1895 and 1896. The war had ended 
with the crushing defeat of the Italian forces at Adowa in 1896. Italy's 
humiliation at the hands of the Abyssinian tribes was not forgotten, and it 
was widely assumed that one day the Italians would attempt another 
advance into Abyssinia.^
Foreign Office officials had been aware of the volatility of the region 
for some time. The Annual Report on Abyssinia for 1913 stated the matter 
clearly:
The Italians are thus using every effort to establish their 
predominance in those districts to which they w ill lay claim to 
in the future, and there is...no doubt that their whole policy in 
both the north and the south is based on the idea that the day 
of the final division of Abyssinia is not as far distant as we may 
hope it may be. Italy has no wish to prolong the present 
situation indefinitely, as, until the Abyssinian hinterland is 
absorbed, their colonies of Erythrea and Benadir have no real 
commercial value, and the money which is now so lavishly 
spent on them can bring in no return until Abyssinia breaks 
up.
Britain's interests in the region were twofold: first, the maintenance of 
her position in Egypt and the Sudan, and secondly, stability in the area as a 
whole. The tripartite treaty of 1906, signed by Britain, France, and Italy, 
honored Abyssinian independence, and was an early attempt to prevent a 
conflict of interests in the region. Nevertheless, conflict continued. The 
1913 report went on to say that:
Once {the Italians] are ready for action, it is more than likely 
that they w ill foment trouble in Abyssinia in order to force our 
hand and bring about the division of Abyssinia which it is to 
our interest to postpone, and therefore any efforts which we 
may make to strengthen the internal government of the 
country w ill meet w ith no real response from their side. From 
now onwards British and Italian policy in this respect w ill 
tend to become more divergent 2
Recognizing Italian colonial concerns in the region, the Foreign Office 
pushed for an agreement whereby Britain and France might accommodate 
Italian interests with territorial concessions. The result was the 1915 
Treaty of London. In the treaty, Italy was promised that increases in 
British and French colonial territory after the first world war would 
coincide with extensions of Italian frontiers in Eritrea, Somaliland, and 
Libya at the expense of Britain and France. In 1924 Britain honored this 
pledge w ith the cession of Jubaland to Italy; France, on the other hand, did 
nothing.^
Since 1902 the Foreign Office had been seeking a concession to build 
a dam on Lake Tsana in the northwest corner of Abyssinia. Because Lake 
Tsana was one of the sources of the Blue Nile, it had immense strategic 
importance for Egypt and the Sudan. British efforts to secure an 
agreement w ith the Ethiopian Government had met w ith repeated failure, 
and by 1924 the project appeared to be doomed. The following year, 
however, the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade decided to approach 
the Italian Government on the matter. Earlier, in 1919, the Italians had 
offered support to the Tsana Dam proposal in return for British support of 
Italian economic interests in the region. Having shunned the Italians the 
first time, the Foreign Office was now prepared to bargain. After seven 
months of private negotiations, the two governments came to an
agreement: Italy would use its leverage in the Ethiopian capital to get local 
cooperation for the dam project; in return, Britain agreed to support an 
Italian railway between Eritrea and Italian Somaliland that would run 
through Abyssinia west of Addis Ababa.
The negotiations were carried out in secret, and the text of the
agreement came as a shock to both the Abyssinians and the French. A
letter of protest was submitted by the Abyssinian Government to the
League of Nations, and it soon became apparent to the Foreign Office that
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Britain would have to distance herself from the agreement before further 
damage was done.
The uproar that followed the negotiations ended Ânglo-ïtalian 
cooperation in the region, and in the years that followed, Ethiopia became a 
source of considerable friction between the two nations. More importantly, 
the Foreign Office had made a crucial error: naïvely, they had
underestimated Italian interests and had failed to see that the agreement 
set aside western Abyssinia as a zone of exclusive Italian control. No one in 
the Foreign Office believed that the Italians would put this into effect. 
While acknowledging Italian colonial aspirations, they did not think that 
the Fascist regime would be so bold as to undertake such an endeavor. 
The French Government voiced its concerns; they thought Britain had 
paid a high price for Italian cooperation, and that the Anglo-Italian 
agreements might have set a precedent for future Italian expansion. 
Responding to this French criticism, John Murray, head of the Egyptian 
Department in the Foreign Office, issued the following statement:
The young stalwarts of Fascism, no doubt, entertained 
extravagant ideas of colonial expansion, but M. Mussolini and 
the senior officials of the Italian Foreign Office had shown 
themselves more concerned with realities than w ith dreams,"*
In the light of future events, this view proved to be dangerously 
shortsighted. Unfortunately, it was a view that was common in the 
Foreign Office at the time.5
In June 1931, the Foreign Office issued a memorandum that broadly 
outlined British policy. Speaking of Italy, the memorandum acknowledged 
the Italian need for national "prestige." Furthermore, Italy's growing 
population would need "an outlet" in the years to come. On Italian foreign 
policy the memorandum observed: "The foreign policy of Italy is, if  not 
actually aggressive, at least restless and ambitious, and constitutes a 
disturbing element in Europe...[However], the [likelihood] of this country 
being drawn into hostility w ith Italy, save in virtue of our obligations under 
the Covenant of the League of Nations, is, as heretofore, remote." Turning 
to Italian policy in Abyssinia, the memorandum stated:
The ambitions of Italy have...to be considered. Italian policy is 
to secure a predominating influence in Abyssinia. Its 
disruption might therefore lead to an endeavor to extend the
frontiers of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, and this would 
certainly meet w ith opposition with France, who is jealous of 
any increase of Italian influence
While this memorandum showed some foresight, it was also vague. If 
Italian foreign policy was expansionary, and the most likely area was in 
Abyssinia, what might Britain do in response? The memorandum stated 
the facts, but made no policy recommendations. Indeed, it appears that 
there was little discussion of the matter inside the Foreign Office. France, 
the memorandum correctly observed, was a bulwark against Italian 
expansion in the region; what would be the consequences, however, if  
France and Italy came to an agreement similar to the one Britain had 
negotiated w ith Italy in 1925? This possibility was not mentioned.
Warning signs began to appear again in 1933, when the Foreign 
Office found itself locked into a dispute with the Italians over the Sudan- 
Libya border. Maurice Peterson, a career diplomat and member of the 
Egyptian Department in the Foreign Office, was sent to Rome in 
November. After four days of failure, the negotiations were called off. In 
his memoirs, Peterson says of the negotiations: "The negotiations with the 
Italians...were to me a revelation of the growing confidence and arrogance 
of Mussolini’s Empire." Negotiations were resumed a few months later by 
the British Ambassador in Rome, Sir Eric Drummond, and the Italians 
finally backed down on their demand for an extension of the Libyan 
frontier. Peterson, back in London, described his reaction;
When the news that agreement had been reached came to us 
in London, I felt that the Italian climb-down' must hold some 
ulterior significance. I f  it did, there could be small doubt of 
what was in their minds. And I gave warning that the way 
was being cleared for Mussolini's descent upon Abyssinia.?
Peterson says that the negotiations marked a turning point in Anglo-Italian 
relations:
....at the end of 1933, my view changed. I was by then 
convinced that, whatever might be the future regarding 
Germany, war between the British Empire and the Italy of 
Mussolini was inevitable. My own experience of the Libyan 
frontier negotiations in Rome...as well as numerous other signs 
of greater portent, left me on this point in no doubt.®
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Writing in 1950, Peterson had the advantage of hindsight, and these 
statements should not be taken at face value. If he warned his superiors of 
the likelihood of Italian aggression in Abyssinia, as he says he did, there are 
no records in the Foreign Office to support his claim. Relations with Italy 
were, on the whole, quite good. Far from deteriorating, they were actually 
improving; few in the Foreign Office, despite later claims to the contrary, 
saw reason for alarm.9
In any event, policy-makers in the Foreign Office had their eyes fixed 
on Europe rather than Abyssinia. The growing belligérance of Nazi 
Germany, and particularly her departure from the League of Nations and 
the Disarmament Conference, posed the biggest concern for the Foreign 
Office. Problems in Austria and the Saar, added to Foreign Offices worries. 
Accordingly, most of the diplomatic efforts of the Foreign Office during 
1934 were attempts to ease the tension in Europe. There were two thrusts 
to British strategy: the first involved direct negotiations with Germany 
designed to address German grievances; the purpose of the second was to 
build a defensive bulwark against potential German expansion. The 
keystone to the latter strategy was the state of relations between Britain, 
France and Italy, and Foreign Office officials—particularly the Permanent 
Under Secretary of State, Sir Robert Vansittart—made great efforts to 
improve these relations.
For years the Foreign Office had tried to encourage Franco-Italian 
cooperation but without much success.n During the summer of 1934, 
however, the diplomatic situation began to improve. Having improved 
relations with the Soviet Union, and fearful of the threat to Austrian 
independence posed by Nazi Germany, the French Government was eager 
now to strengthen the Little Entente. Aware that this could only be 
achieved by an improvement of relations with Rome, the French were 
prepared to strike a bargain w ith Mussolini.12
Pierre Laval, the French Foreign Minister, knew full well that an 
agreement with Italy would only come at a price; he also knew that 
Mussolini's immediate interests were in Africa not Europe. Anxious to sign 
an agreement w ith the Italians before the end of the year, Laval was 
prepared to withdraw French economic interests in Abyssinia (guaranteed 
under the 1906 treaty) to the benefit of the Italians. As one member of 
Laval's Government put it: "The danger that appears from now is the
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question of Ethiopian independence. I f  these matters were resolved, a 
declaration of Franco-Italian friendship would be drafted and signed. ”*3 
Whether Laval fully comprehended the ramifications of buying-off 
the Italians with concessions in Africa is open to debate.H What is clear, 
however, is that he managed to secure Italian cooperation. When Laval 
and Mussolini signed the Rome Agreements on the 7th of January, it was 
hailed by both governments as a tremendous success. The Foreign Office 
was equally pleased, and any worries about the price Laval had paid for 
Italian agreement were lost amid the fanfare.
In its enthusiasm for a Franco-Italian alliance, the Foreign Office 
failed to see the danger signals on the horizon. Most of the professionals in 
the Foreign Office familiar w ith the situation, as well as Simon, Eden, and 
Vansittart, knew that Laval had made concessions to Mussolini, and that 
those concessions would most likely be in Africa where Mussolini was most 
interested. In the wake of the Wal-Wal incident, it should have been 
obvious that the Italians were up to something in Abyssinia. France, it was 
well known, was the key obstacle to Italian expansion in the Horn of Africa; 
indeed, the 1931 Policy Memorandum made this quite clear. Had France 
disinterested herself in Abyssinia for the sake of an agreement w ith Italy in 
Europe? No one in the Foreign Office seems to have asked this question.
The Foreign Office was by no means ignorant of Italian designs. As 
early as December 12th--only a week after the Wal-Wal incident—the 
Foreign Office had summoned Signor Vitetti, the Italian Charge d'Affaires 
in London, to discuss the situation in Abyssinia. During a conversation with 
Geoffrey Thompson, a member of the Egyptian Department, Vitetti shed 
some light on Italian policy in the region. In a minute attached to his 
memorandum of the conversation, Thompson recorded:
...Signor Vitetti, towards the end of the interview, expressed 
himself cynically in regard to Ethiopia, He mentioned that it 
was the only region in Africa which holds out any hope for 
Italian expansion politically and c o m m e r c ia l l y . *5
In the words of Vansittart, it was "a very nasty situation" building up 
between the Italians and the Abyssinians.*^
The Foreign Office might have made the connection between these 
remarks by Vitetti and the negotiations in Rome had they not made an 
earlier blunder further down the bureaucratic hierarchy. The mistake 
occurred shortly after the first reports of the Wal-Wal incident arrived in
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London. Members of the Egyptian Department responsible for Abyssinian 
affairs made a fundamental error of judgement: after reading the telegrams 
describing the incident, they concluded that the events at Wal-Wal were 
merely a minor border skirmish that could be rectified by a review of the 
existing frontiers between Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia. The only real 
danger that they could foresee was the possibility of Abyssinia filing a 
protest at the League and the diplomatic tension that would follow such a 
move.
One of the reasons why the Foreign Office viewed the Wal-Wal 
incident as a minor border skirmish was because similar clashes had 
occurred in the area before. In August 1934 Sir Sidney Barton, the British 
Minister in Addis Ababa, had sent a telegram to the Foreign Office 
informing his superiors that gunfire had been exchanged between Italian 
and Abyssinian forces at Wal-Wal and Wardair, 'This incident," he 
warned, might "raise the whole issue of [the! Italian Somaliland frontier."*9 
A month later Barton sent another telegram to London warning that the 
Italians were in fact occupying the two disputed sites.^o Sixteen days later, 
on the 26th of December, he informed London that the Italians were 
sending "munitions of war" to the area.2*
Thus when hostilities broke out between Italian and Abyssinian forces 
at Wal-Wal on the 5th of December, the Foreign Office saw it as an 
unfortunate frontier incident.22 Sir Sidney Barton was less certain; he 
believed that there was real cause for alarm. On the same day that the 
clash occurred at Wal-Wal, he warned London that the Italians were 
transporting artillery pieces to the frontier.23 A day later he sent another 
urgent telegram, this time describing the Ethiopian Emperor's fears: "he is 
in possession of all the recent very outspoken articles in the foreign press 
foreshadowing a deal between Italy and France at his expense and must 
realize.,.independence is at stake." Barton was referring to the possibility 
of a deal being struck between Laval and Mussolini in Africa—a deal that 
would clear the way for Italian conquest of Abyssinia. He himself believed 
that the Emperor's fears were justified and sought to warn London of this 
danger. Barton's warning caused little stir in London, however; in fact, the 
Foreign Office did not even reply to this specific telegram.2^
When the Foreign Office did respond—on December 8th—Barton only 
received instructions to inform the Abyssinian Emperor that Britain 
considered the affair to be a territorial matter that should be settled by the 
L e a g u e .2 5  A similar order was conveyed to the British Ambassador in
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Rome, Sir Eric Drummond, instructing him to teil the Italians that the 
British Government "considered that the territorial question lay solely 
between Abyssinia and Italy."2^
All was not smooth going, however. The Italians demanded reparations 
from the Abyssinians for damages incurred at Wal-Wal, and would not 
negotiate on the frontier question until reparations were paid. While 
trying to soften these Italian demands, the Foreign Office began to have 
trouble w ith its minister in Addis Ababa. To the annoyance of Vansittart, 
Barton was reluctant to carry out London's instructions and tell the 
Abyssinians to take their case to the League. Barton believed that it would 
be "premature" to put the dispute before the League; it would be better, he 
argued, if  the Italians and Abyssinians negotiated directly.25
Barton's attitude was not welcome in London. The Foreign Office 
believed that the best course of action would be to take the matter before 
the League; it would cause some friction, but it had to be done sooner or 
later. Vansittart summed up these views in a minute written on the 13th of 
December:
We cannot well do more than we have done—for I hope that 
by now Sir S. Barton's mistake as to the League w ill have been 
corrected. I think that the Ethiopians w ill Aive to go to the 
League ve/y soon now. That is where the dispute belongs 
and where it w ill cause the least trouble to us vis-à-vis the 
Italians. But we are almost bound to have same trouble, & I 
hope Sir S. Barton's advice w ill not come to light.26
Sir John Simon agreed w ith Vansittart and Barton was r e b u k e d  2? He 
defended himself in his next telegram, however:
My reasons for discouraging an immediate Ethiopian 
application to the League were first, particular, based on fear 
that premature application might provoke Italian resentment 
and thereby render a settlement more difficult...and secondly, 
general, based on fear that in the present condition of world 
politics addition of a further dispute to the League might 
prove embarrassing to its members.^s
With characteristic perceptiveness, Sir Sidney had raised an important 
question. Would the Wal-Wal dispute exacerbate the existing tension if 
brought before the League? At the time, no one in London thought much
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about the matter. From the Foreign Office documents, it appears that the 
general attitude in London was that the dispute should be handed over to 
the League where, it was hoped, the matter could be settled quickly and 
w ith the "least trouble."
The Foreign Office began to have second thoughts about Barton's 
recommendations a week later. Two things were responsible for this 
abrupt turnaround. The first was a telegram from Britain's Ambassador in 
Rome, Sir Eric Drummond, who pointed out that the dispute might have a 
negative impact on European affairs. "Can we." he asked, "be certain that 
a clear-cut line of division between European and extra-European policy 
can always be maintained?."29 Drummond’s comments were well-timed 
and, more importantly, coincided w ith new attempts by both sides in the 
dispute to reach a negotiated settlement. The Italian Government had told 
the Foreign Office that it did not want the dispute to go before the 
League , and  after considering the matter further, the Foreign Office 
reversed its instructions to Barton:
Apart altogether from the desirability of easing the situation as 
soon as possible on colonial grounds, it is very essential that it 
should not be allowed at the present critical juncture to react 
in any way upon the relations between Italy and the League 
and thereby affect the European question. You must see...the 
importance that must necessarily be attached to this aspect.^!
The Foreign Office seemed confused. Did it want the dispute to go before 
the League or not? With vague instructions such as these, Barton was left 
to speculate.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office was beginning to have trouble with its 
Ambassador in Rome. Twice he had been instructed by London to meet 
Mussolini, and both times he had failed. On the 1st of January, 1935, 
Geoffrey Thompson of the Egyptian Department wrote an angry minute to 
Vansittart describing the situation in Rome:
...Sir E. Drummond has missed the point...We shall certainly 
make no progress in this matter while Sir. E, Drummond 
remains entirely inactive, in striking contrast to the initiative 
displayed by Sir S. Barton...! submit that the Ambassador 
ought to be told not to delay action any longer.32
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The Foreign Office had been hoping that Drummond could secure an 
interview w ith Mussolini in order to obtain a better picture of Italian 
policy. Drummond's lack of initiative was causing worry in London, and 
provoked a strongly-worded telegram from Sir John Simon, telling him "not 
to delay action any longer"; otherwise, warned Simon, the Wal-Wal 
"incident" might develop "inta something bigger and uglier," Despite these 
warnings, Drummond was not able to see Mussolini until the 15th of 
January.35
On the 3rd of January Abyssinia invoked article 11 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations. Already annoyed by Drummond’s handling of 
affairs in Rome, who, in the words of one Foreign Office staff member, had 
"no heart for the task, " the Foreign Office was prepared to let the League 
take care of the troublesome dispute.36 They hoped, however, that the 
matter could be kept away from the Council where, it was feared, the 
dispute might escalate. Hoping to find an "out-of-court" settlement 
between Italy and Abyssinia, the Foreign Office sent Geoffrey Thompson 
to Geneva to explore the possibility of such a solution. According to 
Vansittart, this was "the best solution available" and the "advantage of some 
such procedure would of course lie in its face-saving potentialities for both 
sides."37 At all costs, the dispute would have to be kept under control at 
Geneva.
On the 7th of January the Franco-Italian negotiations were concluded 
w ith the signing of the Rome Agreement. It was well-known that Laval 
had offered concessions to Mussolini, and that these concessions probably 
included an agreement on economic interests in Abyssinia. Exact details of 
the Agreement were not available, but British officials knew enough about 
the negotiations to be able to speculate about its contents. Foreign Office 
opinion was divided, however. Discussing that portion of the Agreement 
that covered Abyssinia, Sir Eric Drummond believed that the Italians would 
want to take advantage of their new economic position in the region, and 
would therefore take a more conciliatory attitude towards the Abyssinians 
in the present dispute.^* Sir Sidney Barton, on the other hand, warned that 
the French concessions made in the Agreement might pose a threat to 
Abyssinian independence.^^
What exactly were the details of the Agreement? No one in the 
Foreign Office was in much of a hurry to find out. While visiting Geneva 
in early January, Sir John Simon had been told by Laval that an "accord " 
had been reached between the French and Italian Governments over
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Abyssinia. When Simon talked to Dino Grandi, the Italian Ambassador in 
London, on the 17th of January, this was confirmed. Simon wrote to 
Drummond and said that he wanted "to study this agreement w ith great 
care and make sure what it implied."^<^ For the time being, however, Simon 
was content to let the matter wait.
The manner in which the Foreign Office handled events between the 
outbreak of hostilities at Wal-Wal on December 5th, 1934, and the signing 
of the Rome Agreement a month later, was both clumsy and confused. It 
was a mistake for the Foreign Office to view the Wal-Wal incident as a 
frontier dispute, but given the shortage of reliable information about the 
dispute at their immediate disposal, it is not surprising that they came to 
such a conclusion. The more important blunder occurred a week later, 
when Signor Vitetti of the Italian Embassy in London hinted that Abyssina 
was the only region in Africa that held out "any hope for Italian 
expansion.'"** By not making the connection between this statement and 
the recent events at Wal-Wal, the Foreign Office failed to see the trouble 
that was brewing. To make matters worse, the Foreign Office began to 
experience trouble w ith its Embassies in Rome and Addis Ababa. When the 
Rome Agreement was signed, and the Foreign Office failed to obtain 
details about its contents, they cut themselves off from information that 
would have illuminated the true magnitude of the problem. Italy was 
preparing to conquer Abyssinia, and the Foreign Office was not prepared to 
deal w ith the crisis before it.
On the 15th of January Sir Eric Drummond finally saw Mussolini. The 
conversation revolved around the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, and Mussolini 
reiterated the Italian demand for reparations. When Drummond pointed 
out that this "could hardly be accepted by the [Abyssinian] Emperor" and 
that the dispute would probably have to be dealt w ith by the League, 
Mussolini "shrugged his shoulders and said that if  it did so the 
consequences might be very serious." According to Drummond, Mussolini 
"did not . . . develop his warning." Mussolini then went on to describe the 
concentration of Abyssinian forces, and said that "if this concentration did 
not cease action would have to be taken by Italy since it represented a 
menace to Italian territory."^ 2
In his telegram to London describing his conversation w ith Mussolini, 
Drummond did not offer any of his own analysis. He did, however, 
conclude his telegram w ith an ominous piece of information: according to 
his sources in Rome, he reported. General De Bono, the Italian Minister for
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the Colonies had recently gone to East Africa. This had been confirmed by 
Mussolini during their conversation, and in Drummond's view, "General De 
Bono has been sent in order to take chief command should events take a’ 
turn for the worse." In another telegram sent to London later in the day, 
Drummond said:
While I cannot believe that Signor Mussolini has not examined 
consequences of a refusal to submit to the League's 
jurisdiction I doubt whether he has fully faced all that it 
implies. He may deliberately have shut his eyes to European 
and world consequences of such an action and have only 
considered the situation as regards Ethiopia.'*^
According to Drummond, the situation was "not only serious but . . . 
becoming threatening,
Drummond's fears were directed towards the League, however, not 
Abyssinia. Like his colleagues in the Foreign Office, Drummond still saw 
the dispute as a territorial matter. This being so, the Foreign Office saw no 
reason why the dispute should go before the Council where, as Anthony 
Eden believed, it might "provoke a lamentable crisis." The Foreign Office 
preferred an out of court settlements^ British efforts were rewarded when, 
on the 19th of January, the Italian and Abyssinian representatives to the 
League agreed to enter into direct negotiations, and the Council decided to 
postpone further discussion of the matter. For the time being, the tactics of 
the Foreign Office had succeeded; relief was felt in London.
From Drummond's reports from Rome, and particularly from his 
report of the conversation he had had with Mussolini, the Foreign Office 
should have suspected that something was amiss. The news that Gneral De 
Bono had been sent to the area should certainly have arounsed suspicions 
in London. In addition to these reports, there were indications of Italian 
military preparations. On the 2nd of January a British Naval Liaison officer 
at Port Said sent a telegram reporting that an Italian ship loaded w ith war 
material and 240 white troops had passed through the Suez Canal the day 
before. News of this was conveyed to London by Drummond on January 
8th. In his opinion, however, it was not cause for alarm. In a second 
telegram a week later, he reported that he had discussed the matter w ith 
Colonel Stevens, the British Naval Attache in Rome, and that in the 
Colonel's opinion the information "is not more significant though it is more
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precise than various rumours which have, from time to time, during the 
past year reached the ears of this Embassy.'"*^
The Foreign Office seems to have taken a complacent attitude to 
these reports. Simon and Vansittart were more concerned w ith the 
immediate impact the dispute would have on the League. The danger 
signals were ignored, and it was not until the 29th of January that the 
Foreign Office began to realize the potential magnitude of the problem.
On the 29th, Simon met w ith Grandi and received an outline of the 
Rome Agreement. During the meeting Grandi asked what Britain’s 
interests were in the region, and Simon brushed the matter aside; it could 
be discussed at a later date. In any event, Simon did not react w ith much 
c o n c e r n ."*6 The next day, however, Geoffrey Thompson met w ith the 
Italian official, Count Vitetti, and obtained a more detailed picture of the 
Agreement. Vitetti also inquired about British interests in Abyssinia, and 
told Thompson that Italy would like to sign an agreement w ith Britain 
similar to the one she had just signed w ith France. Thompson was alarmed 
by this, and sent an urgent telegram to London giving the full details of the 
conversation.^'^
Thompson’s telegram received a great deal of attention in London. 
Reviewing the contents of the telegram, Ronald Campbell, Head of the 
Egyptian Department, wrote that "the new Franco-Italian greement carries 
w ith it a real threat to Ethiopian independence." Orme Sargent, the 
Assistant Under Secretary, minuted that he wished to emphasize that "the 
success of our European policy, based as it is on cooperation between 
ourselves, France and Italy, may be seriously prejudiced if  we give even 
the impression that we are trying to block Italy's expansionist schemes in 
Africa." Both men agreed w ith Thompson that British interests in 
Abyssinia needed to be determined as soon as possible. Such a question 
could be dealt w ith by a specially formed committee, chaired preferably, 
by Sir John Maffey, Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Colonial 
Office. Sir Robert Vansittart consented to this proposal, and added:
I think it would be dangerous to encourage the Italians to 
develop their ideas, until we do know our own minds. I f  we 
do know our minds, we may be able to head them off from 
asking too much by taking an initiative ourselves when we are 
ready. For we know that they wd otherwise open their 
mouths pretty wide. I f  left to themselves they wd ask from us 
a self-denying ordinance, such as they have obtained from the
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French. The only question wd be how far they wd seek to 
extend it. We may be quite sure that they would ask far more 
than we could give, unless we are able to keep the initiative.
That wd involve a negative and a rebuff from us. It w ill be 
tactically better to avoid that if  possible. Hence a clear 
conspectus of our essential interests must first be reached.'*^
Suddenly, the Foreign Office saw the implications of the Franco- 
Italian agreement. But why had they been so slow to obtain details of the 
agreement in the first place? More than three weeks had passed since the 
signing of the agreement in Rome, and there had been ample time to gather 
information about its contents. Laval had mentioned the matter to Simon in 
Geneva, but Simon did not bother to inquire further. The issue had been 
raised again during his conversation w ith  Grandi on the 17th, and that had 
convinced him of the the need to study the agreement and "make sure 
what it implied." Even so, the Foreign Office did not need to know the 
details of the agreement to see that danger was ahead. From Drummond's 
telegram from Rome it is clear they already knew the essential aspect of 
the agreement—that Laval had disinterested himself in Abyssinia for Italian 
benefit. A simple review of the Foreign Office files on Abyssinia compiled 
over the last eight years would have shown that France was the only 
obstacle standing before Italian expansion in the region. Now that that 
obstacle had apparently been removed, what would be the consequences 
for Abyssinia? No such review took place, however, and when the Foreign 
Office finally realized at the end of January that something was amiss, 
valuable time had already been lost.
After reviewing Thompson's telegram the Foreign Office was alerted, 
but not sufficiently. Instead of taking immediate action they called for the 
formation of a special committee to review British interests in the region: 
only after these were determined would they respond. Simon did not even 
see a copy of the telegram until the 15th of F e b r u a r y A t  the time the 
Foreign Secretary along w ith Vansittart and most of the senior officials of 
the Foreign Office were preoccupied w ith the visit of Laval and Flandin. 
The conference was to deal w ith the issue of German rearmament, and in 
the eyes of the Foreign Office, European policy took precedence over 
Abyssinian affairs.
Referring to this period, Rex Leeper of the Foreign Office's news 
department later noted:
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It was quite true that Signor Grandi had suggested in January 
that the Italian government would like to have the views of 
His Majesty's Government on the rights and interests of Great 
Britain in various parts of Abyssinia. The Foreign Office at 
that time were concentrating all their attention on 
preparations for the visit of the French ministers ... no one 
thought that Signor Grandi s enquiry was more than a matter 
of minor colonial importance.so
Since Leepers's statement was made to a League of Nations Union 
official and was, therefore, a public comment, it should be taken w ith a 
grain of salt. It certainly was not the whole story. Leeper's remark does, 
however, provide some insight into the general attitude of the Foreign 
Office during this period; it also raises some important questions. Was the 
Foreign Office incapable of handling more than one matter at a time, as 
Leeper suggests? I f  so, then something was drastically wrong w ith the 
machinery of British diplomacy.
It would be appropriate to pause here and take a brief look at the 
atmosphere and circumstances in which British diplomacy was formulated 
and carried out during this time. Indeed, it appears that there were 
fundamental problems inside the Foreign Office—problems that 
complicated the running of affairs.
At the top of the Foreign Office bureaucracy was the Secretary of 
State, Sir John Simon. Below him were two other political appointments, 
Anthony Eden and Lord Stanhope. Assisting Simon were the two 
permanent officials, Vansittart and Sir Victor Wellesley, the Deputy Under­
secretary. These men were responsible for the policies that emerged from 
the Foreign Office. Lower down on the administrative hierarchy were four 
assistant under-secretaries and eight geographical departments. Each 
department was led by one man, assisted by a staff of lesser ranking 
advisors. Telegrams and despatches from abroad were collected by the 
clerks in the office and then passed on to various departments. Policy 
recommendations were frequently made by either the Department heads of 
one of the assistant under-secretaries. A recommendation of this kind was 
usually transmitted to Vansittart who would review it and then, if it met 
w ith his approval, pass it on to the Foreign Secretary.5*
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After the F irst World War the workload of the Foreign Office 
increased dramatically. While the number of clerks had risen accordingly, 
the number of senior staff had not. In short, the basic structure of the 
Foreign Office remained the same despite growing demands w ith  which it 
was faced. Senior officials such as Geoffrey Thompson frequently had to 
work long hours.53 Vansittart also had a d ifficu lt workload to cope w ith; he 
had no time "for reading anything but official documents."54 The heavy 
workload had an effect on the running of day to day affairs. Sometimes it 
would take days to respond to despatches and telegrams from abroad. In 
his memoirs, Sir Walford Selby recounts how he once searched for two 
despatches in the Foreign Office and eventually found them "immersed 
under a file of papers where they had lain for 10 days though marked 
'immediate.’"55 The general inefficiency of the Foreign Office was well 
known w ithin official circles. According to Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir Warren 
Fisher, the permanent head of the Treasury and the C ivil Service, wanted 
to remedy the situation by absorbing the Foreign Office into the general 
administrative system of the C ivil Service.^^ By any measure the Foreign 
Office was in serious need of reform. It certainly was not a good 
atmosphere for the formulation of foreign policy.57
In addition to these problems there were further difficulties at the top 
of the Foreign Office. The working relationships between Simon, Eden and 
Vansittart were, for the most part, strained. Eden frequently bypassed 
Simon on policy matters by w riting  to Stanley Baldwin. Simon quite 
naturally resented this. During the Saar episode in 1934 the two men had a 
falling out when Simon refused to be swayed by Eden's advice.5& Years 
later Eden said that:
ISimon'sl weakness as a Foreign Secretary was that he found 
it d ifficu lt to devise and hold to a policy. His training and his 
active mind enabled him to see its shortcomings all too clearly, 
w ith the result that he was tempted to hedge and trim  to meet 
the objections, until little  was le ft of the original purpose. Too 
penetrating a discernment and too fra il a conviction 
encouraged confusion where there should have been fixed 
intent. Simon could master a brief quicker than any man, but 
that is only part of the business in foreign affairs. His 
colleagues used to complain that he was more apt to turn to 
them for a policy than to champion his own.59
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Eden's allegations were not w ithout foundation. Towards the close of 
Simon's tenure at the Foreign Office, Neville Chamberlain wrote:
It is a bad situation [at the Foreign Office). Simon is
completely at odds w ith Vansittart. Eden says that he and
Slimon] are on the verge of breaking point...S9
Eden wrote in his diary at the end of April 1935: "I fear that J.S. is 
uncertain which way to turn, Vansittart drives him this way, but J.S. is 
reluctant to travel. Yet he clings to the F.O. It is an unhappy situation for 
us alL'GO
Such tension only clouded the already troubled atmosphere w ith in the 
Foreign Office, The situation required strong, effective leadership, and in 
Simon it was lacking. Simon was extremely perceptive, but his 
management style was complacent, even careless. Perhaps this was due to 
bitterness: he was certainly aware of the disrespect his Cabinet colleagues 
held for him. According to Geoffrey Thompson Simon had " foresight," but 
this was tainted w ith "cynicism." In his memoirs he alleges that Simon 
knew as early as the middle of January that the Italians planned to conquer 
Abyssinia . In Geneva w ith  Simon at the time, Thompson says that Simon 
called out to him one night and said, "You realize, don't you, that the Italians 
intend to take Abyssinia?" Thompson was "surprised and disconcerted" by 
the Foreign Secretary's remark.6*
It is impossible to verify Thompson’s story since the conversation took 
place in private, and Simon makes no mention of the incident in his own 
m e m o irs .6 2  i f  Thompson is telling the tru th—and there seems to be no 
reason why he would lie—then it is quite a revelation. From Foreign Office 
records there is no indication that Simon suspected Italian policy at such an 
early date. I f  Simon did, in fact, realize the fu ll extent of Italian designs, 
then he deliberately ignored the issue until a month later; by then the rest 
of the Foreign Office had come to the same conclusion. How could Simon 
have known this so early? One possibility is that he received the 
information from Laval when the Frenchman took him aside earlier that 
day in Geneva and told him of the Rome Agreement. In any event, Simon 
did not say anything about the matter to Grandi when they met a week 
later; instead, he feigned ignorance. Nor are there any indications that he 
mentioned the issue to Vansittart or any of the other Foreign Office 
officials. I f  Simon had such information he failed to act on it. Meanwhile.
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the Foreign Office continued to treat the situation as a territoria l matter 
that called for a definition of British interests before being dealt with.
While Thompson's story cannot be confirmed it does shed some light 
on Simon's personality. Simon knew that a major crisis would ensue if  "the 
Italians took Abyssinia." Armed w ith this knowledge, unlike his colleagues, 
he could have taken the in itiative and instructed the Foreign Office to 
draw up contingency plans. Did he fail to do so because he was 
disillusioned and hurt by the back-stabbing around him? By the end of 
1934 a number of prominent politicians, including members of the Cabinet, 
has privately discussed removing him from the Foreign Office.^3 Simon 
was certainly aware of what was being said and done behind his back. He 
was not a happy man in January 1935. I f  he had foreknowledge of the 
Italian plans and did nothing about it, he was not the blundering, 
incompetent Foreign Secretary that so many historians have seen him as. 
Rather, he was disillusioned and frustrated after four d ifficu lt years in the 
Foreign Office and either lacked the energy to tackle the problem or 
simply didn't care.&4
Such an accusation, however, rests on shaky ground. Thompson's 
statement cannot be verified and, by itself, is not enough evidence on 
which to build a solid case. In the end one can only speculate. What is clear, 
however, is that Simon was in no condition to take on a new diplomatic 
crisis. He lacked the respect of his colleagues, and he no longer possessed 
the w ill and determination required for strong leadership, something the 
Foreign Office desperately needed at that time.
If these problems were not enough, there was the added problem of 
expertise. While the Foreign Office possessed many superb diplomats, their 
expertise was prim arily in the field of European diplomacy. There were 
not many regional specialists in the Foreign Office. Senior diplomats were 
often shifted from department to department, and it was assumed that their 
professional skills would enable them to adapt. For the most part, this 
system worked adequately during the 1930s. During the Abyssinian crisis, 
however, it began to break down.
In January 1935 there simply were no experts on Abyssinian affairs 
in the Foreign Office. Abyssinian affairs were the responsibility of the 
Egyptian Department, and no one in that department had extensive 
knowledge of Abyssinia; no one, in fact, had even been to Abyssinia. Later, 
at the height of the crisis, a special Abyssinian Department was formed; it 
was staffed, however, by the same men who had dealt w ith Abyssinia in
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the Egyptian Department. The two chief "experts" on Abyssinian affairs— 
the men who were turned to for advice by the senior staff—were Geoffrey 
Thompson and Maurice Peterson. In their memoirs, w ritten years later, 
both men were quick to point out that they knew little  or nothing about 
Abyssinia at the time. Peterson said:
Abyssinia had, it is true, formed part of my sphere of activity 
during the years I had been head of the Egyptian Department.
But I had never been in the country and my more intimate 
knowledge of it, apart from despatches and reports of which I 
had read plenty, was confined to some amusing experiences 
connected w ith the Abyssinian Mission I to London] of 1932.^5
And Thompson:
The country had never previously been anything but a name 
to me . . .  As, however, at the time of Wal-Wal I happened to 
be the member of the office most intimately concerned w ith 
the Abyssinian work, I found myself suddenly cast in the role 
of so-called expert" on the tangled affairs of the country. In 
this capacity I was included in the team that accompanied the 
Secretary of State to Geneva for the meeting of the League 
Council that was to consider what had now become known as 
the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.^^
Later the Foreign Office viewed the crisis w ith enough concern to recall 
Patrick Scrivener from Addis Ababa. Scrivener had more knowledge of the 
country than either Peterson or Thompson, but he did not arrive on the 
scene until the summer of 1935.67
With no expert on Abyssinian affairs immediately available to the 
Foreign Office in January 1935, it is easier to understand why they were 
caught off guard by the Italian request that they outline their interests. No 
one inside the Foreign Office knew what Britain's interests in Abyssinia 
were. Thompson was "in something of a fog" about the matter, and Owen 
O'Malley suggested that they "hand over the question of the future of 
Abyssinia, as arising out of the Franco-Italian Agreement, for consideration 
by a small committee of persons who would have not only specialized 
knowledge but a wide experience of African problems."6& The Colonial 
Office they concluded, was better suited for the matter. After going 
through all the bureaucratic channels, the committee—headed by Sir John
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Maffey—was finally approved by the Cabinet on the 27th of February. It 
did not deliver its report until the 18th of June. By then, valuable time had 
already been lost.®9
During the firs t two weeks of February the Italian-Ethiopian 
negotiations continued, but w ithout much success. The atmosphere inside 
the Foreign Office was relatively calm, and most of the senior officials 
were preoccupied w ith the London Conference. On the 11 th, however, Sir 
Eric Drummond sent a telegram to London containing some disturbing 
information. According to Drummond, the Italians had recently announced 
that they were mobilizing two divisions—a total of 30,000 men—as a 
"precautionary measure" against a possible Abyssinian attack. In 
Drummond's opinion, there was little  cause for alarm, however; he believed 
that the Italian actions were genuinely precautionary:
It seems probable that while the Italians have at present no 
aggressive intentions they are genuinely afraid of 
overwhelming Abyssinian attack. Whatever happens they w ill 
not be caught napping. Situation is therefore serious but 
hardly critical. Extravagant rumours of every kind are 
prevalent but public opinion is I think very far from favouring 
policy of adventure both on financial and general grounds.?o
The Foreign Office took Drummond at his word. He was one of 
Britain's most senior diplomats, and his judgement was respected. In his 
speech to the House of Commons two days later, Sir John Simon echoed his 
Ambassador in Rome. He assured members of Parliament that the Italian 
mobilization was a "precautionary and defensive measure." It did not imply 
that it was "the intention of the Italian Government to abandon their 
endeavours to seek an amicable settlement of their differences w ith 
Ethiopia by direct negotiations.' ?*
But events were moving faster than British diplomacy. On the 16th of 
February—only five days after his telegram that described the situation as 
“hardly critica l"—Drummond sent an urgent letter to Simon. Italo- 
Abyssinian affairs were "taking a grave turn, " and he had changed his mind 
about the Italian mobilization. He had just talked to a senior Italian official, 
Marchese Alberto Theodoli, and what Theodoli had said alarmed him: . " . .
26
it  is the firs t inside information I have had as to what is in Mussolini's mind.
. . [sol I have thought it well to w rite  to you at length." Drummond 
described his conversation w ith  Theodoli in great detail:
I [asked]... what were the real aims of Italy? He told me that 
Mussolini had decided some years ago to try  a policy of 
friendliness w ith  Abyssinia...The results had been n il—every 
Italian request had been refused and the Âbyssinians showed a 
deep suspicion of Italian intentions. Then followed the Walwal 
incident and Mussolini came to the conclusion that the policy 
he had pursued hitherto had only resulted in kicks and no 
benefits and determined to change it. Having reached this 
decision he had become the chief exponent of the doctrine of 
force. (This is bad news). He also fe lt that Italy was entitled 
to her place in the sun. We and the French had taken almost 
all the dish—only the crumbs were left. It would be 
intolerable in the Duce s view if  Italy were not allowed even to 
consume these crumbs. I remarked that this was all very well, 
but what about the League? This led to the reply that the 
League must not stop legitimate Italian aspirations.
Drummond then asked Theodoli if  Ita ly would "be content" w ith  economic 
advantages in Abyssinia. Theodoli skirted around the question, but implied 
that she would not: the Abyssinians would have to "bow to the inevitable." 
Theodoli hoped that "Great Britain would not stand in Italy's way." British 
interests. Theodoli added, would not be interfered w ith in any way.?2
What was Britain to do now? Drummond suggested that Barton apply 
pressure on the Abyssinian Emperor to make concessions to the Italians as 
soon as possible. "Otherwise" he feared "the worst and Italy acting 
contrary to her League engagements and involved up to the h ilt in 
adventure in Abyssinia is not going to be of much use to us in a critical 
moment of European affairs." He did not relish the prospect of a League 
crisis. The Italians "would resent intensely being.. .  put in the dock." In 
his opinion, it would be infin ite ly better if  "the Emperor,. .  be well advised 
to make the best terms he can as quickly as p o s s ib le ."? ^
W riting from Addis Ababa, Sir Sidney Barton expressed his alarm. He 
wrote to London:
There is only one real issue and that is the independence of 
Ethiopia. Italian propaganda and action during the last few 
years have prepared the way for intensive manifestations
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since last summer culminating in Franco-Italian agreement 
and fits in perfectly w ith  a policy of absorption proceeding 
according to plan.
Personally I can think of only one course likely to prevent 
perpetration of what might be widely regarded as an 
international crime and that would be for England and France 
to tell Ita ly that she cannot have Ethiopia.?"*
Already there was a divergence of opinion as to what British policy 
should be. While Drummond suggested appeasing Mussolini, Barton was 
calling for Britain and France to take a strong line against Italian ambitions. 
It was up to the Foreign Office to decide on which course to take. For once 
Sir John Simon was quick to respond, and opted to side w ith Drummond. 
On the 20th of February he sent a telegram to Barton, instructing him to 
use his influence w ith the Abyssinian Emperor and persuade him to be 
flexible w ith the Italians. In Simon's opinion, the Abyssinians should avoid 
any action which might be seen as "provocative"; that, he reasoned, might 
lead to "vigorous action" by the Italians. With characteristic vagueness, he 
told Barton that the Abyssinians should face facts in a spirit of realism." 
All the efforts to reach a settlement would be "rendered fruitless" if  the 
Abyssinians refused to be conciliatory. It was up to the Abyssinians to 
make concessions, not the Italians.?^
W ith the London Conference over, the Foreign Office began to shape 
its policy. It was clear to all now, that a major international crisis was 
about to begin. What was not clear, however, was how the crisis should be 
handled. They faced a dilemma: Britain could not afford to lose Italy as an 
ally, but nor could she sit by and watch the Italians violate the League 
Covenant. It was a d ifficu lt situation, and no one in the Foreign Office was 
anxious to have to face a choice between Italy or the League.
Sir Robert Vansittart outlined his views on what British policy should 
be in a memorandum w ritten on the 25th of February. Vansittart wrote it 
after reading Drummond's letter describing the conversation w ith 
Theodoli. The letter was, in Vansittart's opinion, "the confirmation of our 
fears." "We must," he continued, "face the inevitable and frame our policy 
accordingly." There were two parts to this policy:
(1) We should endeavor to dissuade Italy from going the fu ll 
length, firs tly  because it  can hardly suit her, when she ought 
to have her hands free for graver matters in Europe; secondly
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because of the further, and perhaps deadly blow that this must 
deal to the League; and therefore, th ird ly on account of the 
consequent reaction on a large section of public opinion here, 
just at a period when we want and need all of us, the most 
complete confidence and collaboration.
(2) But all this must be done in the quietest, most friendly 
way. We must not be manoeuvered into playing an isolated 
and futile role of opposition. Both those epithets are now 
certain, seeing the attitude of France. And, for the gravest and 
highest of reasons, reasons which concern the maintenance of 
peace in Europe and therefore the lives and safety of our 
people, we cannot afford to quarrel w ith Ita ly and drive her 
back into German embraces. This would be the effect either 
of a quarrel w ith this country, which would break the 
European harmony of London, Paris, Rome, or of Ita ly leaving 
the League and finding Germany waiting for her at the door.
This is, of course, and unpleasant necessity, but to ignore it in 
any way would be the most dangerous and unpardonable folly 
on our part. I t  would be a grave and foolish departure from 
the policy of realism, on which our existence depends.
Vansittart argued that the Secretary of State should state these views 
to the Cabinet as soon as possible, and "lay particular stress on (2)." He 
hoped that a warning to the Italians would have "an arresting effect." but 
Britain woulc have to "be prepared for the—more probable—contrary." In 
his conclusion, he hinted that a solution to the crisis might lie in a 
territoria l compromise:
I have sometimes thought it  was a pity we didn’t let Italy have 
a German Colony in 1919. We were really imprudently 
greedy. The impending episode is the sequel of our hogging 
policy then. On this also we must reflect, and I think that the 
Cabinet w ill have to pay some attention to it.
For the moment, however, an "inter departmental conference should . . .  be 
called to decide plainly what precise representations we should have to 
make to Italy, if  and when the real forward movement or absorption 
begins."?^
The memorandum was a reflection of Vansittart's chief concerns— 
particularly, his objective of keeping Germany in check through the 
bulwark of three-power (British, French, and Italian) unity. Read between 
the lines, Vansittart's memorandum laid more emphasis on the European
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situation than on Abyssinia. In fact, there was little  concern for Abyssinia 
at all; rather, Vansittart's fears were directed toward the possible 
repercussions that would be fe lt in Europe. For three years he had worked 
on improving Anglo-Italian relations; he did not want that harmony 
destroyed. Ita ly should be dissuaded from taking Abyssinia, but such a 
warning would have to be delivered in “the quietist. most friendly way. " 
Vansittart's policy proposal also contained a peculiar paradox. A few 
days earlier he had said that British policy "should steer a course 
compatible w ith our position as a member of the League and our necessity, 
in the name of far greater issues than Ethiopia, of not breaking w ith 
Italy.""77 If, however, Ita ly went ahead—despite British protests—on an 
adventure in Abyssinia, how would this position be maintained? Britain 
could not keep in line w ith the League and maintain good relations w ith 
Ita ly at the same time. I f  Ita ly invaded Abyssinia, then British policy would 
have to decide on one of the two of the two policies; walking the line in 
between would be d ifficu lt. In fact, as Vansittart had hinted, the only way 
that the choice could be avoided would be to find a territoria l solution that 
would satisfy both parties.
Anthony Eden provided his opinion on what British policy should be in 
a memorandum w ritten the next day. Eden wrote:
Personally, I have for some time past been anxious at the d rift 
of events in Ethiopia. It is hard to believe that Italian 
ambitions are lim ited to a few wells. It would seem now that 
Italy aims at no less than absorption of Ethiopia morsel by 
morsel.
The impression le ft on my mind by all this is that unless some 
hint, and a pretty strong hint, is given to the Italians that we 
should not view w ith  indifference the dismemberment of 
Ethiopia, then this dismemberment w ill take place...It is surely 
at least possible that a clear indication from ourselves and 
from France, as members of the {Leaguel Council, might 
effectively discourage Ita ly from the more ambitious of her 
plans. In any event, whether we succeed or no I believe that 
representations on the above lines to the Italian Government 
are called for...?*
Eden's memorandum was slightly different from that w ritten by the 
Permanent Under Secretary. While Vansittart preferred to issue mild
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warnings to the Italians, Eden was calling for more vocal opposition and 
seemed eager to bring the League into the fray.
In the months to come, the differences between Eden and Vansittart 
would become more pronounced. For the moment, however, any 
disagreement between the two men was slight. Eden was a politician, and 
had built his political reputation as a staunch supporter of the League. 
Thus he was naturally inclined to advocate a line that emphasized the 
League.79 in contrast, Vansittart, the c iv il servant, was less enthusiastic 
about the League.^o
It was Vansittart, however, not Eden who set the tone of Foreign 
Office policy. Eden was in Geneva, and then later involved in the v is it to 
Berlin (in March); Vansittart, meanwhile, held sway at the Foreign Office. 
The Foreign Office deliberated over the question of how a suitable warning 
might be given to the Italians. Ronald Campbell and Owen O’Malley 
suggested that the Foreign Secretary make a statement on the matter 
before the House of Commons: in Campbell's opinion, such a move would 
have the advantage of "letting Ita ly plainly know our position." But 
Vansittart ruled this out a few days later: ’’I do not like the idea. . .  I prefer 
friendly k  quiet pressure on the Italians." All agreed, however, that 
"representations should be made at Rome at the earliest possible moment." 
This, they believed, could be done by Sir Eric Drummond in his next 
meeting w ith Mussolini,^^
On the 26th of February, Vansittart. Eden, and Campbell drafted a 
telegram to be sent to Rome, instructing Drummond to convey Britain’s 
views to the Italian Government. After the draft was approved by Simon 
(who made no alterations of his own), a copy was sent to the Embassy that 
night. The telegram was specific: Drummond was to tell the Italians of 
Britain's "growing anxiety" about Italian m ilitary measures "coupled w ith 
the delay in the opening of negotiations." It might "lead to a s till further 
intensification of the tension. . . and risk a situation which His Majesty’s 
Government would view w ith  the most serious concern." The Italians 
should be reminded of Britain’s commitment to the League, but "in the 
friendliest way. ” The telegram concluded:
You w ill no doubt use your own discretion as to the terms and 
manner in which you convey this amicable but real concern to 
Signor Mussolini, Further points of which you might make use 
as you see f it  are these. Public opinion here w ill assuredly be
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reminded by critics of the responsibility of His Majesty's 
Government (to the League). This is a responsibility which 
His Majesty's Government bear as members of the Council and 
which perforce pre occupies them, the more so since they and 
the country as a whole attach so much significance to 
maintaining the authority of the League. Criticism on the 
point of the responsibility of His Majesty's Government w ill, 
w ith the considerable and inevitable publicity, lead to 
criticism  of Ita ly if  the obligations to [peaceful arbitration). . . 
have not been fulfilled.
“Italian attention, " the telegram continued, “should [not] be unnecessarily 
diverted overseas"; especially "at a moment when all energies should be 
concentrated on the European situation and its possible remedies "^ 2
Drummond saw Mussolini on the 28th, and sent a report of his 
conversation in a telegram to London on March 1st. According to 
Drummond, Mussolini was in a bad mood when he arrived. Replying to the 
suggestion that negotiations proceed at a faster pace, Mussolini “stated w ith 
the utmost emphasis that until a modus vivendi was reached between the 
two countries he would continue to send troops up to half a million if  
necessary. “ Later in the conversation, Mussolini "laid great stress on [the] 
defenceless character" of the Italian colonies, and that therefore 
reinforcements were necessary. Drummond believed that Mussolini was 
sincere on this point: “From His Excellency’s remarks on the m ilitary 
situation and from indications I have had from other sources I am 
convinced that Signor Mussolini and his advisors are still sincerely 
perturbed at [the] possibility of successful Abyssinian action against both 
Eritrea and Somalia." Drummond then gave his account of how the 
conversation ended:
As Signor Mussolini seemed ha rd ly ...  in the right spirit I said 
that I hoped that he would not think remarks of my 
government were animated by any desire to criticize Italian 
action. Signor Mussolini replied that he quite understood our 
position which he believed was inspired by interest in the 
League of Nations rather than Abyssinia. I f  however the 
League took action contrary to Italian interests he would know 
what conclusion to draw.«3
Drummond's handling of the meeting, and especially his apparent 
reluctance to criticize Italian action, provoked a storm in the Foreign
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Office. Reviewing the telegram, Ronald Campbell wrote in the margin: 
"But surely we do want rather to criticize it."®  ^ The effect that 
Drummond's disclaimer would have on Mussolini was particularly 
worrisome since Vansittart had made a point of criticizing Italian action to 
Ambassador Grandi the day before. Grandi had called into the Foreign 
Office to express his doubts about Simon's projected trip  to Berlin. After 
reassuring him, Vansittart proceeded to warn him about Abyssinia, and 
specifically Italy's use of delaying tactics in the negotiations w ith  the 
Abyssinians. According to Vansittart, if  the Italians "failed to live up to 
their obligations, " they would present the Germans w ith  an opportunity "to 
drive a wedge between the United Kingdom, Italy and France." I f  this 
happened, it  would be Italy's fault, and Vansittart hoped that the 
Ambassador "would report to the Head of the Italian Government the 
apprehensions he had e x p re s s e d ."® ^
The Foreign Office knew that Grandi had a habit of watering down 
his reports to Mussolini. Even if  Grandi reported Vansittart's warning 
correctly, would the warning not be weakened by Drummond's failure to 
criticize Italian action earlier? Ronald Campbell expressed his fears in a 
minute w ritten on the 2nd of March:
I f  Signor Grandi accurately reported and did not attempt 
(wrongly) to interpret what was said to him, the Duce’ would 
be under no illusion of our exact feelings. But past experience 
has unfortunately justified a feeling of doubt on this point. I 
hope too that Sir E. Drummond's disclaimer on behalf of 
H.M.G. of any wish to criticize Italian actions w ill not have 
weakened the effect of Sir R.Vansittart’s remarks, supposing 
them to have been correctly reported to Rome...*^
Campbell was not the only one unhappy w ith Drummond's handling of 
affairs in Rome. Anthony Eden thought that Drummond had behaved "too 
apologetically" w ith  Mussolini when the situation called for "firmness."^?
On the 7th of March Sir John Simon sent a telegram to Drummond 
criticizing his handling of the meeting w ith  Mussolini, and informing him of 
Vansittart's recent conversation w ith  Grandi, After telling Drummond 
about the dangerous situation that might occur if  the Italian violated the 
League Covenant, Simon emphasized the importance of clarity. The 
Italians had misunderstood British policy so far. and it  was important that 
they be correctly informed:
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I hope that the Italian Ambassador may have fu lly reported Sir 
R. Vansittart's remarks but I am repeating them to you to 
make doubly sure. It seems clear ...that Italian authorities have 
not yet fu lly grasped or may be indisposed to grasp His 
Majesty's Government’s position. This is dangerous, and it  is 
clearly of the highest importance that the Italian Government 
should realize that His Majesty's Government, besides being 
concerned for the League of Nations, are also deeply and 
sincerely concerned for Anglo-Italian relations.^®
This telegram had the desired effect, and four days later Drummond 
apologized for the misunderstanding and promised to correct it.&9
Another matter which concerned the Foreign Office was the growing 
suspicion of the Italians, who feared that Britain was exploiting "the 
tension....existing between Italy and Ethiopia to secure concessions of one 
sort or another from the latter. '^ o Since the early 1930s Britain had been 
particularly influential in the Abyssinian court, certainly more so than 
either France or Italy. Naturally, the Italians resented this. At the same time 
the Italian government was aware that the British Colonial Office had been 
negotiating w ith  Abyssinia over the economic rights to Lake Tsana and 
grazing rights in the Ogaden for the local tribes in British Somaliland. 
Italian suspicions had posed a problem for the Foreign Office as early as 
December 1934. The Colonial Office had actually been negotiating w ith the 
Abyssinians for control of Wal-Wal at the time of the December 5 incident. 
When the Foreign Office realized what the Colonial Office was up to. they 
forced them to drop the negotiations altogether. In Vansittart's words, it 
had been "a considerable tussle" because of the "pronouncedly anti-Italian 
attitude of the Colonial Office. '^i
Now, three months later and on the verge of a major crisis the Foreign 
Office was unable to shake o ff these lingering Italian suspicions. For the 
Foreign Office it  was important to soothe the Italian government's fears; if  
trust were not established, it would be impossible to work w ith  them to try 
and resolve the dispute. Thus Drummond was instructed on the 11th of 
March to see Signor Suvich, the Head of the African Department of the 
Italian government and convince him that British policy in Abyssinia did 
not contain selfish interests and that Britain was maintaining a neutral 
stance in the dispute.^2 Drummond carried out this order promptly, but 
Italian suspicions remained.
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The Hurry of diplomatic activity that had surrounded the Italo- 
Abyssinian dispute from December to February subsided in March. 
Negotiations dragged on between the two countries w ith  little  success, and 
on the 17th of March the Abyssinian government filed another complaint 
w ith  the League. But the Foreign Office had on worries on its mind. Sir 
John Simon's scheduled trip  to Berlin turned into a fiasco after the Cabinet 
published a white paper on British defense that prompted H itler to cancel 
the visit. The German Government's subsequent announcement that it  was 
introducing conscription and that it possessed an a ir force made matters 
worse. The Foreign Office soon found itself embroiled in a diplomatic 
quagmire. Vansittart and his staff labored to find a solution to the mess. 
They most certainly did not have time nor inclination to worry about 
Abyssinian affairs.93
For the remainder of the month all eyes were turned to the upcoming 
three Power Conference to be held at Stresa in April. Originally the 
conference had been called to obtain general settlement between Germany 
and the other powers. The German announcements of March, however, 
radically altered the nature of the conference. Its purpose, it was now 
hoped, would be to provide a framework for three power unity against the 
German threat.^4
Stresa was to be a conference on European problems, and this was 
clear from the outset. The prelim inary agenda that the Italians put forward 
contained no mention of Abyssinia. Instead, its emphasis was on the danger 
posed by German rearmament, three power solidarity, and the question of 
Austrian security. While France and Ita ly hoped that the conference might 
produce concrete results—specifically a guarantee of Austrian 
independence—British objectives were quite different. John Simon told the 
Italian Ambassador in London that in his opinion Stresa "would be largely 
for the purpose of collating information" between the three p o w e rs .^ s
Although all three governments saw Stresa as lim ited to European 
affairs, towards the end of March the Italians began to hint at some possible 
talks on African matters. This news was conveyed to Drummond who 
passed it on to the Foreign Office.^^ After reading this Geoffrey Thompson 
wrote in a minute:
Here is an admission—even an invitation—which seems to me 
well worth noting, especially as it comes to our notice at a 
time when there is every reason to suppose the Italian
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government wish to take advantage of the Stresa meeting to 
discuss their dispute w ith Abyssinia w ith the French and 
ourselves. I  believe they are seeking a way out o f the present 
difficuity^’^
This was not the firs t indication that the Foreign Office had that the 
Italians wanted to discuss the Abyssinian affair at Stresa. Only the day 
before Thompson had received a phone call from the Italian Embassy in 
London conveying sim ilar news. According to Thompson, the Italians were 
"inclined to think that the opportunity soon to be afforded by the Stresa 
Conference for informal talks between Italian, French and British 
statesmen on the Ethiopian problem, should not be missed." In his reply to 
the Italians, Thompson said that the "department had also been turning 
over our minds the possibility of Stresa providing a useful opportunity for 
some informal discussions on this question.' ^ )
But not everyone in the Foreign Office agreed w ith Thompson. 
Lancelot Oliphant did not like the idea because he fe lt it "would prove 
illusory"; he wrote: "I imagine that European questions w ill take up every 
available moment and in addition, I feel that as regards the Duce, his 
attitude would be entirely dependent on how the ’Europe' discussions and 
explanations at Stresa [are] developed.'^ Q Vansittart had similar 
reservations about raising the Abyssinian question w ith  the Italians at 
Stresa. 100 Thompson was instructed to avoid discussion of the w ider 
questions of the dispute; instead, his conversations were to be lim ited to 
the grazing rights in the Ogaden territory. Likewise, no provision was 
made for discussion of the Abyssinian question at the ministerial level.io* 
The Stresa Conference opened on the 11 th of April and was scheduled 
to end on the 14th, The British delegation included the Prime Minister, 
Ramsay MacDonald, the Secretary of State, Sir John Simon, and Vansittart. 
Also present were W illiam Strang, a Counsellor in the Foreign Office. 
Geoffrey Thompson, and Sir Eric Drummond. Representing the French, 
were Laval. Leon Noel, and Alexis Leger. Italy was represented by 
Mussolini w ith his "chef de cabinet," Baron Aloisi, and under secretary 
Suvich, as his chief assistants. The two Italian specialists on Abyssinia 
Guarnaschelli and V itetti, were also included in the Italian delegation.
While the ministers discussed European affairs, Thompson and his two 
Italian counterparts began their informal talks on Abyssinia. The firs t 
exchange took place during the morning of the 11th. Thompson lost no
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time telling Guarnaschelli that the Foreign Office was "rather disturbed by 
the widespread rumors of a possible forward m ilitary movement by the 
Italians against Abyssinia," and that he hoped "these rumors were baseless." 
Guarnaschelli then "replied that the possibility of an offensive could not be 
entirely dismissed." "The Ethiopian question," he continued, "would not be 
settled by Conciliation Commissions; at the same time, the necessity for a 
settlement was daily becoming more urgent." The Italian continued:
I t  was impossible to believe that the Ethiopian Empire, w ith its 
fourteenth century policy and outlook, could effectively 
continue to resist the march of progress. Contrast the state of 
affairs in independent Abyssinia (slavery, cruelty, xenophobia, 
no development of resources and all the rest) w ith the work 
which was being carried out under our guidance in British 
colonies and mandated territories, Ita ly was largely denied 
such opportunities for constructive labour—her possessions in 
Africa were mainly desert areas; and in Eritrea and Somalia 
they were confined to arid stretches of coast line. Something 
would have to be done to remedy this situation, and he could 
see only one way of doing it, either sooner or later. It would 
be a big task, but its magnitude had been appreciated and 
taken into account. It was not, he thought, impossible of 
achievement.
In his reply, Thompson told Guarnaschelli that "what he had said perturbed 
me very much." He warned the Italian that:
Ita ly could expect no co-operation from the United Kingdom in 
any attack upon Ethiopia; and a forward policy against that 
country would not only be extremely dangerous from the 
Italian point of view, since once undertaken such a policy 
might be found to be inordinately expensive in blood and 
money, but might w ell react adversely upon Anglo-Italian 
relations. We had a very vocal and humanitarian element in 
our public opinion who would not conceal their feelings...
At the end of the discussion, Guarnaschelli said he thought "the Ethiopian 
question might mentioned during the present conversations [between
the ministersl."i02
Thompson had another round of talks w ith Guarnaschelli and V itetti in 
the afternoon, but the focus of the session was on the question of the
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watering rights of nomadic British Somali tribes in Abyssinian territory 
included w ith in an Italian sphere of influence. In his report of the second 
conversation, Thompson wrote that in his opinion it was "quite likely that 
they [the Italians] w ill in the near future advance further westwards 
towards the mountains... which is Ethiopia p ro p e r ."
While Italian ambitions in Abyssinia had been discussed by the expert 
advisors in these unofficial conversations, the topic had not been raised by 
the three heads of government or their foreign ministers in the official 
conversations. Sir Eric Drummond warned Vansittart of the dangers of this 
silence. He wanted to impress on Vansittart "the necessity of a warning 
being given to Mussolini by the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary 
about what would happen if  he persisted in his scheme, then in embryo, of 
an invasion of Abyssinia." Vansittart, however, did not agree w ith his 
Ambassador. According to Drummond, he "replied that he did not consider 
that any such step was advisable... because a certain psychological tension 
had arisen between our delegates and Mussolini, and in his view the 
introduction of so thorny a question as Abyssinia might lead to the failure 
of the Conference its e lf ."
Drummond's suggestion to Vansittart was ruled-out, but Vansittart did 
say that he would speak to Mussolini himself on the matter. The 
Permanent Under Secretary also gave instructions to Thompson to raise 
the subject again w ith Guarnaschelli and Vitetti. When Thompson did so, 
he got the same reply—that Ita ly had been denied colonial possessions, and 
that she intended to obtain territory before it was too la te .  *05
Vansittart, however, never got a chance to warn Mussolini about 
Abyssinia. "My attempts at warning were side-stepped at Stresa...! did not 
get an opportunity w ith  Mussolini alone," he wrote in a minute a week 
later.loo MacDonald and Simon also failed to mention Abyssinia to 
Mussolini. When the final draft of the Stresa communique was issued it 
read:
The three powers, the object of whose policy is the collective 
maintenance of peace w ith in the framework of the League of 
Nations, find themselves in complete agreement in opposing, 
by all practical means, any unilateral repudiation of treaties 
which may endanger the peace of Europe, and w ill act in close 
and cordial collaboration for this purpose. 10?
38
MacDonald and Simon had no objections to the phrase peace in Europe." 
Indeed, the phrase was included in the original draft put forward by the 
British delegation. When it came to Mussolini's turn to sign the resolution, 
he twice read out the words "of Europe"—pausing each time to look around 
the table to see if  there were any objections. No one uttered a word, and 
Mussolini later claimed that "the silence of my feliow-statesmen... [was! an 
expression of tacit acquiescence in what was my manifest intention to
invade that country." *08
Why was the British delegation silent on Abyssinia at Stresa? In 
retrospect it appears to have been a perfect opportunity to warn the 
Italians about their policy. Later, the failure to warn Mussolini at Stresa 
came under severe criticism. Hugh Dalton called it  "one of the most 
crim inal blunders in the whole course of British diplomacy in these 
disastrous years."*00 Dalton was a politician and a member of the 
opposition at the time, so his words must be taken w ith a pinch of salt. But 
not all the criticism  came from politicians; even members of the Foreign 
Office were critical. Geoffrey Thompson later wrote:
I think it was a catastrophic error for the British delegation to 
have ignored the remorseless fact that the Abyssinian question 
existed . The silence of MacDonald and Simon was taken by 
Mussolini as a personal affront. This result at least might have 
been avoided by a frank explanation of our attitude.* *0
Anthony Eden also criticized the British delegations handling of the 
matter at Stresa.*** But the strongest criticism  came from Eric Drummond, 
who singled out Vansittart as the culprit. Vansittart did not warn 
MacDonald and Simon as Drummond had suggested, and though he 
promised to talk to Mussolini himself on the matter, he never did. 
Responding to Drummond s criticism, Vansittart turned the tables on the 
former Ambassador:
Lord Perth [Drummond] certainly suggested to me —I 
emphasize the word—at Stresa that a warning against 
Abyssinia should be administered to Mussolini by Mr. 
MacDonald or Sir John Simon . if  Lord Perth had a contrary 
view (to my own judgement) it  was open to him to press it  not 
on me but on our own Ministers. He was our Ambassador in 
Rome...If Lord Perth did not do so, it  was to be presumed
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either that he did not hold his views strongly or that he 
thought my reasoning sound.* *2
Drummond countered Vansittart's remarks by replying:
Lord Vansittart now asks me a question which I expected, 
namely, why I did not talk to our Ministers myself. The 
answer is that Lord Vansittart, who was Permanent Secretary 
to the Foreign Office, and, therefore, the chief official adviser 
to H.M. Government on foreign policy generally and who was 
at the centre of the Conference, had told me that he would 
make himself try  to talk to Mussolini. Unhappily, he felt 
unable to make the attempt till the last day of the Conference, 
and when he informed me that he had failed to broach the 
subject w ith Mussolini it  was too late for any further effort.* *2
The debate between Drummond and Vansittart eventually died down, 
but questions remained about Vansittart's conduct—especially the 
reasoning behind his decision not to talk to MacDonald and Simon. When 
Vansittart's private secretary, Clifford Norton, asked him precisely this 
question, he replied: "MacDonald is gaga: Simon is bad tempered at not 
being head of the delegation; and I am only an official.""**^ It is true that 
MacDonald was by no means mentally sound or capable of effective 
leadership,* *5 but Vansittart's answer is hardly sufficient. He was the 
senior advisor, and special permission had been obtained from the King 
allowing him to go; it was his job to make sure that nothing went 
wrong.* *^
Later. Vansittart elaborated the argument for his defense. He claimed 
that he did not want to risk a rupture w ith Mussolini at Stresa; he wanted 
to secure an agreement w ith  the Italians on Austria before saying anything 
to them about Abyssinia. In his memoirs he wrote:
Eric Drummond had come up from Rome and urged sensibly 
that we should begin by warning the Duce of our wrath, 
should he attack Abyssinia. Knowing the fellow's antipathy to 
Ramsey and John, I fe lt that by such a course we might never 
sit down at all. We should not save Abyssinia by immediate 
quarrel, and should certainly lose Austria if  we broke up 
abortively. I told Eric that I thought a better tactic might be 
to land Mussolini firs t and lecture him later. Get an 
agreement, I suggested, make it look valuable if  we can—and
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there is the rub—then tell him that all w ill go for nothing if  he 
embroils himself for nothing.*
Vansittart's statement would be fine if  the British delegation had gone to 
Stresa to secure an agreement on Austria; in fact, quite the opposite 
happened. At the fourth meeting of the Conference, Simon told the French 
and Italian delegates that Britain could not enter into any new agreements 
on Austria. This had been the intention of the British delegation to begin 
with.**®
Vansittart, despite his attempts to defend his actions, cannot escape 
criticism. But he should not be singled out as the chief cu lprit as some 
historians have done.* *9 MacDonald—despite his lack of mental powers— 
was certainly aware of the Abyssinian problem long before Stresa, as his 
diary entry for the 21st of February 1935 reveals:
Italian attack on Abyssinia becomes more and more a w olf and 
lamb tale. It is an irredeemable tale of calculated aggression 
w ith a plentiful adornment of assumed innocence and lied. *20
Sir John Simon should also share the blame. As Secretary of State, he was 
regularly briefed on the growing problems in Abyssinia; he certainly was 
aware of the potential magnitude of the situation. Interestingly enough, he 
devotes only one paragraph to Stresa in his memoirs.*2*
Clearly, the British delegation mishandled the Stresa Conference. A 
series of unofficial talks between the "expert advisers" took place, but no 
warning was given where it counted—to Mussolini directly. Whether such 
a warning would have actually stopped Mussolini is hypothetical and can 
never really be answered. Existing evidence, however, does suggest that 
Mussolini had not yet made up his mind to invade and, therefore, might 
have been deterred by a strong warning at Stresa. *22
The Stresa Conference was immediately followed by a special council 
of the League of Nations. The session was dominated, however, by the 
question of German rearmament. The Italian delegates at Geneva agreed 
to put into effect the arbitration procedures of the its 1928 treaty of 
friendship w ith Abyssinia, and this move was greeted w ith  optimism by the 
League Council, who in return agreed to postpone further discussion of the 
dispute. *23 The Foreign Office, meanwhile, continued its policy of mild 
warnings to Italy. On the 30th of April. Dino Grandi went to the Foreign
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Office to meet w ith Vansittart and inform him that he would be delivering 
a message from Mussolini to Simon in a few days. Vansittart understood 
the message to be "an appeal from Signor Mussolini to His Majesty's 
Government to adopt a more sympathetic and helpful attitude towards the 
Italian Government in their difficulties w ith Ethiopia." Next, Vansittart— 
w ith  his "accustomed frankness*'—warned Grandi that:
I f  resort were had to violent methods, and there was in fact an 
Italian invasion of Abyssinia, there would naturally be 
unrestrained expressions of opinion in the British Parliament 
and the British press. No doubt these would provoke answers 
from the Italian side, and we should then be in for an era of 
polemics. Nothing filled me w ith greater alarm than this 
prospect. Ita ly would put herself in the wrong in public 
opinion here as being the stronger power, and it would look 
like an obvious case of a larger power bullying or even eating 
a little  one. . . would not the prospects of peace indeed be 
further impaired if  Ita ly were to embark on an African 
adventure. . . during a period when it  was obviously in her 
highest interests to preserve her resources intact.*24
Vansittart—perhaps anticipating Grand's habit of diluting his reports to 
Rome—asked him to repeat his warnings to Mussolini.
Vansittart's warnings were reiterated by Geoffrey Thompson in a 
conversation w ith Signor Fracassi the next day.*25 Finally, Grandi met 
w ith  Simon on the 3rd of May. The Italian Ambassador told the Secretary 
of State that the situation in Abyssinia was "a cancer which had to be cut 
out," and that "Signor Mussolini was contemplating a forward policy of the 
most serious dimensions." Grandi also asserted "that Italy could take no 
other course. " In his report of the conversation, Simon described the 
warning that he gave Grandi after hearing this news:
I told the Ambassador that it  was always the object of British 
policy to be helpful and friendly to Italy in every way we 
could and we had many proofs of this in the past and in the 
present. But I expressed to him my gravest anxiety as to what 
would be the effect of Ita ly 's contemplated action upon British 
public opinion... I had already been questioned many times of 
late in the House of Commons about Italian policy in regard to 
Abyssinia and had found d ifficu lty in answering w ithout 
appearing to reflect on the long-drawn out failure to carry out 
the conciliation procedure which Italy as well as Abyssinia
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said she was ready to apply. The Ambassador must see that 
the gravest criticism  would arise and would be expressed if  a 
situation was reached in which a great Power like Italy was 
regarded as engaged in aggressive action against a state like 
Abyssinia.
Simon added that 'Ita ly should deeply consider what the effect of such a 
policy might be on the European situation."^26
Simon's warning to Grandi was anything but forceful. It certainly did 
not possess the sort of firmness that would deter Mussolini. Anthony Eden, 
sick at the time and away from the Foreign Office, read Simon's account of 
the conversation at home. He thought Simon had been weak, and he 
registered his displeasure in his diary that night:
Even from his own account [of the interview] nothing like s tiff 
enough. Ita ly ’s request was a diplomatically phrased demand 
for a free hand in Abyssinia. This should have been 
strenuously resisted, emphasis laid on our support of the 
League, etc. It is useless to ask Musso how he thinks that 
Simon can answer questions on the subject in the House.i27
There could be no doubts now as to what Italy's real intentions in 
Abyssinia were. Grandi had admitted that Mussolini "was contemplating a 
forward policy of the most serious dimensions," and this could only be 
taken as meaning that Italy was planning an invasion of Abyssinia. 
Confronted w ith Grandis admission, Simon had replied w ith  a mild 
warning that spelled out British objections to such a policy on the grounds 
that it  would have an adverse effect on public opinion in Britain (and thus 
Anglo-Italian relations), at a time when three-power solidarity was needed 
most. Vansittart had been the firs t to propose this strategy of "quiet, but 
friendly" warnings; *26 it may have been an appropriate policy in February 
and March, but by May the situation had drastically changed for the worse. 
Now it appeared that the Italians were almost certain to embark on an 
invasion of Abyssinia, and from what Grandi had told Simon, it seemed that 
Ita ly would not back down.
The situation had changed by early May. and this should have 
prompted the Foreign Office to at least make a reappraisal of its policy. On 
a number of occasions, the Foreign Office had warned the Italians that 
Britain had commitments to the League; no effort was made, however to 
spell out to the Italians what exactly that commitment entailed, or how far
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Britain would be w illing  to go to support the League. The policy of "quiet, 
but friendly" warnings did not contain any mention of sanctions. Instead, 
the Foreign Office warned the Italians of the effect their policy would have 
on public opinion in Britain. The wisdom of this British strategy was 
dubious—especially by May, when it  had become clear that the Italians 
were as intransigent as ever.
The Cabinet discussed the crisis during its meeting on the 15 th of 
May, and after hearing a report on the matter from Simon, decided to press 
for a fu ll discussion of the dispute at Geneva when the next Council 
meeting took place. The Cabinet also decided to recall Ambassador 
Drummond from Rome to indicate to Mussolini British displeasure w ith 
Italian foreign policy. *29
Meanwhile the Foreign Office was trying to coordinate their policy 
w ith  the French Government. Joint-action, they believed, would stand a 
better chance of deterring Mussolini. Sir George Clerk, the British 
Ambassador in Paris, was given instructions to try and convince the French 
Government to work w ith Britain at Geneva and, at the same time, send a 
protest to Mussolini through their ambassador in Rome. 120 These efforts 
were successful, and the French Government seemed eager to 
cooperate.* 31
Drummond returned to Rome and met w ith  Mussolini on the 21st. 
The two men spoke at length and, more importantly, in blunt terms. 
Drummond told Mussolini that he feared that Britain might "have to choose 
between ...friendship w ith Italy and...support of the League.” British public 
opinion was so in favour of the League, he continued, that "England might 
well feel bound to support the League against Italy." Mussolini stated that, 
if, in order "to clarify the situation and to obtain security, it  was necessary 
for him to resort to arms, in short to go to war, he would do so and he 
would send sufficient men to obtain his objective." Mussolini did "not want 
to damage the League but if  the League became hostile...against Italy then 
he would have no course but to leave it." In Drummond's opinion, Mussolini 
"would not change his policy." *22
It was common for the Foreign Office in this type of situation, to 
repeat telegrams to other embassies and posts. Such a system had been in 
use for some time, and it allowed British representatives abroad to keep up 
to date w ith information. Decisions could be made faster and, on the whole, 
it meant greater efficiency.
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The system had its drawbacks, however; sometimes it actually 
created confusion and uncertainty. When a copy of Drummond's telegram 
reporting his conversation w ith  Mussolini was sent to Anthony Eden in 
Geneva, just such a situation arose. After reading Drummond's report, 
Eden sent a telegram of his own to London;
Mussolini's statement that if  it was necessary for him ‘to resort 
to arms, in short to go to war' in Abyssinia he would do so, is a 
declaration to us that if  he cannot obtain his objectives by 
other means he w ill take action which would be inconsistent 
w ith Covenant of the League, Kellogg Pact and tripartite 
treaty of 1906 to all of which both the United Kingdom and 
Italy are parties...  It  seems to me impossible for us to allow 
this statement to go unchallenged and I suggest as a firs t step 
Mussolini should be reminded of these treaties and obligations 
which we share under them. It would be made clear to him 
that if  he should decide to engage upon a policy which from 
his own showing would run counter to obligations he has 
assumed under these treaties then he cannot expect us to 
condone much less to support him in doing so either at Geneva 
or elsewhere.
Eden added that, in his view, Britain should "make this clear at once" to the 
Italian Government. 1^ 3
In keeping w ith Foreign Office practice, a copy of this telegram was 
sent to Drummond. Drummond wrote an immediate reply:
I fu lly understand and appreciate Mr. Eden's point of view, I 
feel bound however as representative at Rome to point out 
that proposed action w ill not in my opinion divert Signor 
Mussolini from his deliberate policy... Moreover such action by 
us w ill w ithout doubt lead to a serious explosion on Signor 
Mussolini's part and anger directed against His Majesty's 
Government and at this moment against His Majesty's 
Government alone .We must anticipate violent and anti-British 
campaign in the press which is completely under government 
control. Is there not also real danger...that Signor Mussolini 
w ill turn towards Germany, who w ill only be too pleased to 
support his Abyssinian policy if  she thinks she may thereby 
weaken or destroy the common front?
In Drummond's opinion, it  would be wiser "to await results of Council 
meeting before deciding on the policy we should adopt,
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Faced w ith this row, the Secretary of State decided to back Eden, On 
May 24th he had an interview w ith Ambassador Grandi, and told the Italian 
that "Mr.Eden's handling of the Italo-Abyssinian problem at Geneva had the 
fu ll support of His Majesty's Government." *35 Accordingly, Eden—w ith 
French cooperation—pressed the League to monitor Italo-Abyssinian 
arbitration. In itia lly reluctant, the Italians were forced to accept these
terms.* 36
Simon had confidence in Eden's policy at Geneva, but others were not 
so sure. The conflict between Eden and Drummond revealed a r ift inside 
the Foreign Office. Eden's firm  stance against the Italians was not 
compatible w ith Drummond's more cautious approach. For the moment, 
Eden's policy won approval. Simon backed Eden, but Vansittart was 
expressing reservations. Like Drummond, Vansittart feared that a strong 
line against the Italians might actually drive them "into Germany's arms." 
Only a few days before, the Foreign Office had received a telegram from 
Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador in Berlin, warning that such a 
scenario was a real possibility. Phipps wrote:
I fear...that if  we oppose Ita ly too strongly we may find Herr 
H itler posing as Signor Mussolini's best friend w ith the 
possible risk of an Italo-German under- standing concluded 
behind our backs.*3?
Vansittart minuted that this was "a very real danger." and he hoped that 
the government would keep it in mind. *35
These were the firs t signs of dissent over policy since the crisis had 
begun. The angry exchange of telegrams between Eden and Drummond 
was a relatively minor incident, but it did reveal a conflict of opinions 
w ith in the Foreign Office staff. Looking further back, this divergence of 
opinion can be traced to the two policy memorandums w ritten by 
Vansittart and Eden in February. At that time, little  attention was paid to 
the different views expressed by the two men. Instead, the Foreign Office 
continued w ith its policy of mild warnings coupled w ith  attempts to ease 
the dispute through arbitration.
Simon should have handled the dissent w ithin the Foreign Office; he 
should have made the decision to opt w ith  one of the two policies, or 
instead to formulate a third, alternative policy. As it was, Simon did 
nothing. Ultimately, the job of unifying the Foreign Office fell on his
successor. *39
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W ith no firm  lead from the Secretary of State, British policy drifted 
along, unguided and incoherent. Eden's postures at Geneva coupled w ith 
Drummond's tim id warnings to Mussolini, effectively undercut each other. 
To the Italians, these contradictory signals from the Foreign Office 
indicated uncertainty and confusion. Britain's failure to respond to their 
diplomatic note of January 29th, reinforced this belief.
Simon's weak leadership and the failure to mention Abyssinia at the 
Stresa Conference, have already been commented on. These failures, 
however, were merely symptoms of a general malaise rooted-deep w ithin 
the Foreign Office. Poor organization and under-staffing meant that the 
Office could not handle the vast workload it was burdened w ith. The slow 
response to telegrams is only one example of this. More importantly, it 
meant that there was little  time for contingency-planning. The signs that 
Ita ly was interested in taking Abyssinia had been there for some time, and 
in some cases, the members of the Foreign Office staff actually took note. 
But when the clash at Wal-Wal took place, the Foreign Office was caught 
off-guard. In itia lly, they saw the incident as a territorial problem and it 
was treated as such. Had they recognized the significance of the Laval- 
Mussolini agreements signed in early January, they might have noticed that 
something was amiss. As it  was, however, they were taken by surprise 
when the Italian Government approached w ith the diplomatic note 
enquiring about British interests in the region. Even then, a special 
committee had to be established to ascertain what British interests there 
were—if  any—in Abyssinia. Had the Foreign Office had an expert on 
Abyssinia, the task might have been easier; instead, the matter was handed 
over to the Egyptian Department whose members knew little  or nothing 
about the region.
The manner in which the Foreign Office handled the situation during 
the firs t six months of the crisis makes for sad reading; it should be 
remembered, however, that the Foreign Office was prim arily concerned 
w ith  the European situation at the time. It is easier then to understand 
why the Italo-Abyssinian conflict was in itia lly treated as a peripheral 
problem. It was when the problem began to intrude on the general 
European political scene—via the League of Nations—that the Foreign 
Office began to worry. By the end of May. however, the Italo-Abyssinian
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crisis was anything but peripheral: it was now a full-blown diplomatic 
crisis.
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Chapter 3
The Foreign Office: June to November 1935
At the beginning of June 1935, the Cabinet was reshuffled and Stanley 
Baldwin replaced Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister. Sir John Simon 
was moved from the Foreign Office to the Home Office, and Sir Samuel 
Hoare, the previous Secretary of State for India, became the new Foreign 
Secretary. Anthony Eden was named Minister for League of Nations Affairs 
and given a seat in the Cabinet.*
Neither Hoare nor Eden were particularly happy w ith the new 
arrangement. Having two Cabinet Ministers w ith responsibilities for 
foreign affairs was certainly unusual. Hoare was in charge—that was 
unquestioned—but what was Eden's position? No one really knew, and 
Baldwin was reluctant to step in and make a clear definition of their 
respective duties.^ It was a dyarchy, and the situation was criticized by a 
number of prominent politicians, including Sir Austen Chamberlain. 
Churchill, and Leopold Amery. Amery, in fact, warned Hoare that his 
success at the Foreign Office depended on "pulling Anthony back by his 
coat tails."^
Sir Samuel Hoare came to the Foreign Office w ith little  experience in 
the realm of foreign affairs. At the India Office he had pushed the 
Government of India B ill through Parliament, and this political victory won 
him the respect of Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain. But his work on the 
India B ill le ft him exhausted and in poor health; as Hoare later said in his 
memoirs, he was "physically weak and mentally tired. '"* In addition to these 
problems, Hoare received an in itia l shock upon arrival at the Foreign Office. 
He had grown accustomed to the quiet and efficient work environment in 
the India Office, and he soon realized that the Foreign Office was something 
quite different. In his memoirs Hoare wrote:
Being very sensitive to my surroundings, I was at once 
depressed by the change. I was still more disturbed by what 
seemed to me to be the rarefied atmosphere of my new 
environment. Everyone seemed to be overexcited. There 
appeared to be no generally accepted body of opinion on the 
main issues. Diametrically opposite views were pressed upon
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me, and sometimes w ith the intolerance of an odium 
tfieoIogIcum>
Bewildered at first, Hoare soon came under the influence of his 
Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Robert Vansittart. Hoare believed that 
Vansittart's "fertile mind and unequalled knowledge of European politics" 
were "invaluable" to him.^ Vansittart's over-powering personality le ft its 
mark on the new Foreign Secretary, and Hoare relied on Vansittart's advice 
to a much greater extent than his predecessor had.?
Hoare's firs t task in the Foreign Office was the signing of the Anglo- 
German Naval Treaty. Already negotiated, Hoare simply had to sign it. The 
Cabinet and most of the Foreign Office staff supported the treaty, and it 
was seen by many as a first-step towards an air pact w ith Germany. Arms 
negotiations were an important priority for the National Government, and 
Hoare, along w ith his fellow Cabinet ministers, was anxious to sign the 
agreement.*
While the British Government may have believed in the merits of such 
a treaty, they underestimated the negative impact such a treaty would have 
on their Stresa allies, France and Italy. Both countries—and France in 
particular—were angered by the treaty. Had the British Government 
carefully consulted their allies before signing the treaty, they might have 
avoided the trouble.^ As it was, Britain's two Stresa partners saw the 
bilateral treaty as formal approval by Great Britain of Germany's arms 
violations. The Stresa front had been designed as the foundation for 
tripartite protection against German aggression; now, barely two months 
later, Britain had undermined Stresa. In the eyes of Ita ly and France, the 
British had been driven by their own national interests—to the detriment of 
European security.^o Of the Naval Treaty Vansittart said in his memoirs: 
"Tactless...we asked for trouble." *1
The treaty w ith Germany now signed, the Foreign Office began to turn 
its attention back to the Abyssinian situation. Hoare was briefed on the 
matter by Vansittart, and the two men held a number of discussions, 
sometimes w ith  Eden present, i 2 Vansittart, worried about the German 
menace, wanted to settle Italo-Abyssinian differences as soon as possible, 
and in his opinion, a territorial settlement offered the best possibility. He 
had hinted at this in his February memorandum, but it  was a telegram from 
Sir Eric Drummond that revived Vansittart's interest in this sort of solution. 
Drummond had reported that Mussolini might consider a protectorate over
53
Abyssinia similar to the one Britain had over Egypt; the advantage of such 
a solution was that it would avoid a war. *3 Vansittart thought this offered a 
"ray of hope" that needed to be explored further.H Drummond was himself 
in favor of a solution along these lines, but subsequent discussions inside the 
Foreign Office ruled this out as too extreme.
Vansittart, however, was anxious to find a solution as soon as possible. 
For some inside the Foreign Office It looked as if  Britain would have to 
choose between Italy and the League. On the 3rd of June Owen O'Malley 
wrote a minute on the problem of choosing between "good relations w ith 
Ita ly and loyalty to the League principles": in his opinion, it would be better 
to "stick to League principles and stand the racket." Anthony Eden, 
commenting on the minute, wrote that he was in fu ll agreement.*6 
Vansittart did not want to have to face such a d ifficu lt choice at all; if  a 
solution could be found before September, he reasoned, then the crisis could 
be averted. On the 8th of June he outlined his views in a minute to Hoare 
and Eden:
The position is as plain as a pikestaff. Ita ly w ill have to be 
bought o ff- le t us use and face ugly words—in some form or 
other, or Abyssinia w ill eventually perish. That might in itself 
matter less, if  it did not mean that the League would also perish.
According to Vansittart, Abyssinia could not simply be abandoned to 
"satisfy" Italy. That meant, however, that there would be "a disastrous 
explosion" that would "wreck the League and very possibly His Majesty's 
Government too ' The only way to prevent such an explosion, he continued, 
was if  Britain ceded territory to Italy; he thought British Somaliland could 
be sacrificed. Better, Vansittart concluded, to "get something for less than 
nothing...Failing these, we may prepare for a horrid autumn—and 
beyond."*?
Not everyone in the Foreign Office agreed w ith Vansittart, however. 
Ronald Campbell offered his opinion in a minute w ritten four days later:
It goes against the grain and it seems dangerous, from the point 
of view of the sanctity of treaties, for us to yield to blackmail of 
the kind which Italy is now practising. It seems also dangerous 
from the point of view of British reputation and the integrity of 
the Em pire...
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Campbell thought that an international conference would be better 
suited to deal w ith  any questions involving territoria l readjustment. 
Vansittart did not like Campbell's suggestion; he believed it to be "too 
indefinite to produce any effect on Signor Mussolini."
Vansittart's anxious search for a solution was partly motivated by the 
warning signals he was receiving from Europe. Sir George Clerk, the 
British Ambassador in Paris, had informed the Foreign Office that the 
French Government and French public opinion sympathized w ith Italy 
rather than Abyssinia. I f  the dispute became a League crisis, Britain might 
not be able to rely on French assistance.*9 Vansittart, knowing how 
d ifficu lt it would be to resolve the crisis without French cooperation, was 
understandably eager to find a solution.20
Thus the Zeila proposal was born. Vansittart was the brainchild 
behind the scheme, and it was formulated on the weekend of June 16th 
while Vansittart, Eden, and Hoare were staying at the house of Philip 
Sassoon in Trent. Years later, Hoare wrote that they were searching for a 
"card of re-entry in a hand that was almost lost."^* There was certainly a 
sense of desperation surrounding the scheme, and the note that Vansittart 
wrote outlining the proposed plan reflected this:
A forward move on Italy's part may begin at the end of next 
month...If it  takes place—and all the omens are that it w ill—the 
result w ill be such an outbreak of criticism  that Ita ly w ill leave 
the League and thereby throw herself into the arms of 
Germany ...The League and the Stresa front...w ill thereby both 
be simultaneously broken, all our past policy w ill be shattered, 
and our national future w ill be in clear danger.
Vansittart then described the plan, which was, he admitted, "concrete 
inducement":
We had long contemplated the possibility of ceding Zeila to 
Abyssinia—she is comprehensibly eager for a new port of her 
own—and only dropped the idea a short while ago. ...It is now 
proposed to revive the project. Instead of asking in return a 
number of counter-concessions on our own behalf, we should 
ask in return that Abyssinia should cede territory to Italy in the 
Ogaden country. The extent would remain to be defined. But in 
the essentials Abyssinia would gain more than she lost, and Italy 
would register a net gain.
In this way, Mussolini could "obtain something substantial for the shop 
windows without fighting or fever." Vansittart urged Hoare to press the 
Cabinet to agree on the scheme. Time was essential, and if  approved, 
Vansittart continued, the plan could be presented to Mussolini at the 
beginning of the next w e e k .22
The Cabinet agreed to the proposal on the 19th, and decided that 
Anthony Eden should present it to Mussolini. Eden was already scheduled 
to go to Paris to discuss the recent naval treaty w ith Laval at the end of the 
week, and the Cabinet thought it  would be convenient for him to go to 
Rome before returning to London.23
The decision to send Eden to Rome-seemingly for the sake of 
convenience—was not wise. Sir Eric Drummond had recently been 
reporting of a campaign in the Italian press that was highly critical of Eden 
who, the Italians believed, was championing the League at the expense of 
I t a ly .2 4  The Foreign Office was aware of the Italians' dislike of Eden, but 
presumed that this "would not m ilitate against this proposal...receiving the 
best possible w e lc o m e .  25 Surely, the importance of the proposal ruled out 
any risks in the firs t place. But the Foreign Office decided to take that risk.
After the decision had been made, Vansittart quickly despatched a 
telegram to Drummond informing him of the plan. Vansittart did not 
provide any specific details, but he did ask Drummond for his opinion of the 
scheme, and whether "such a proposal would prove attractive to Mussolini." 
The proposal, he continued, was "all important" and seemed to be "in the 
nature of a last hope." Lastly, he warned Drummond about secrecy. The 
press was to be told that Eden's trip  was merely a continuation of the talks 
over the naval agreement; nothing would be mentioned of A b y s s in ia .2 5
Drummond replied to Vansittart on the 18th of June, and said that he 
believed the plan to be a good idea. The day before, Drummond had 
w ritten to Hoare saying that: "For some reason or other [the Italians! seem 
to believe that we are unw illing to talk business w ith  them."27 This 
proposal, on the other hand, would change all that. Even if  it did not 
succeed, Drummond continued, it  "would show our willingness to make 
concrete and serious sacrifices to help in a most d ifficu lt situation." In his 
view, the chances that the plan would be accepted by Mussolini were 
"about fifty -fifty  ."28
On the 20th of June Hoare wrote a personal letter to Mussolini. Hoare 
had served in Italy during the F irst World War and had met Mussolini then. 
Hoare's letter reminded the Duce of their wartime association, and
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expressed the hope that Britain and Italy could work together in the days to 
come.
...As your Excellency may perhaps recall, I had the honour of 
serving for two years in Italy during the War. In the course of 
that time I had many opportunities of admiring the manner in 
which Ita ly and her people discharged the heavy tasks which 
they were called upon to assume. The happy recollections of 
that period are still v iv id ly  in my mind, and the experience 
which I was then enabled to gain w ill be of the greatest value to 
me in my endeavour to maintain and strengthen the traditional 
friendship between our two countries.. P
Couched in such terms, the letter was a clear attempt to smooth the 
path for Eden. Unfortunately, it  did little  to sway Mussolini.
Accompanied by W illiam Strang of the Foreign Office, Eden flew  to 
Paris and then on to Rome where he arrived on the evening of the 23rd. 
While in Paris, Eden spent most of his time discussing the Anglo-German 
Naval Treaty w ith the French Government; he told Laval that he would be 
discussing Abyssinia w ith the Italians, but provided no details.^o Eden's 
arrival in Rome was complicated by the fact that news of the Zeila scheme 
had been leaked to the British press by a Parliamentary Private Secretary 
of one of the Cabinet Ministers’, and had appeared in the Sunday papers. 
Eden and Drummond discussed the matter, and "agreed that the odds 
against acceptance (of the Zeila scheme] had now lengthened."3i
Eden’s firs t meeting w ith Mussolini took place the following morning, 
on the 24th of June. Eden, accompanied by Drummond and Strang, opened 
the conversation by outlining the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. He and 
Mussolini then discussed the prospects for an air pact and other European 
matters. The conversation then turned to the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, and 
Eden began "by telling Signor Mussolini that His Majesty's Government 
were gravely concerned at Ithel turn of events." Britain's reasons were 
neither egoist nor African but European"; Britain. Eden continued, was 
"irrevocably committed to [the] League" for this was the foundation of her 
foreign policy. British public opinion, Eden told Mussolini, was united 
behind the League.
Eden then outlined the Zeila proposal. From the outset, Mussolini made 
it clear that he was opposed to the scheme. He objected to the fact that 
Abyssinia would receive an outlet to the sea [Zeila], and thought that the
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scheme would enhance Abyssinian prestige. According to Eden, Mussolini 
regarded the British proposal "not only as unsatisfactory but as positively 
dangerous." In short, he "could not accept it." Mussolini did, however, 
indicate what his objectives were and how they could be achieved without 
war. He told Eden that he would be content w ith  the territory surrounding 
the central Abyssinia plateau, and an Italian protectorate over the rest. I f  
the Abyssinians could not accept these terms, he continued, then Italy 
would go to war and "her demands would be proportionately greater."
Eden, realizing that he could go no further w ith the Zeila scheme, then 
warned Mussolini of the seriousness of the situation. In his account of the 
conversation Eden records:
I would not conceal from him IMussoliniJ how gravely I viewed 
the future of relations between our two countries if  this offer 
were rejected and no final settlement were reached. I f  Italy 
were to take the law into her own hands in Abyssinia and if  the 
consequences were to be fatal to the League the British people 
would inevitably and deeply resent it. The gravest in jury 
would be done to good relations between our two countries.
Mussolini said that he "had no desire to leave the League," but if  the 
League "made Italy's position impossible, then...he might have no choice but 
to leave it."
Before the conversation closed, Mussolini told Eden that he had been 
given "a free hand in Abyssinia" by Laval during the course of their 
discussions leading up to the Rome Accord. Eden replied that this had been 
an economic "free hand." Mussolini then said that this "might be so as far as 
w ritten document was concerned but since he had yielded to France the 
future of 100,000 Italians in Tunis and received in return half a dozen palm 
trees in one place and a strip of desert which did not even contain a sheep 
in another, it  must be clear that he had understood that France had 
disinterested herself in Abyssinia." Eden countered by saying that Laval 
had told him at Geneva that this only applied in "economic matters. " 
Mussolini then "flung himself back in his chair w ith a gesture of incredulous
astonishment.''^ ^
Eden held another discussion w ith Mussolini the next day, but no 
further progress was made. Eden was, however, able to ascertain "a more 
detailed account of his objectives in Abyssinia," Eden described them in a 
telegram to London that night:
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Territories which Italy requires are those which almost 
surround this central block of territory namely the region 
bordering on south eastern Erythrea, the Aussa country, the 
province of Harrar, Ogaden, two sultanates in South Abyssinia 
bordering on Kenya and the territory bordering on the 
Sudan..,As regards Abyssinia proper Signor Mussolini repeated 
that Ita ly required a measure of control. These proposals were 
only such as could be accepted if  the Emperor were to agree 
without fighting. In the event of war the name of Abyssinia 
would be wiped o ff the map.
Eden added that he would give the French Government an outline of 
the Zeila proposal when he went back to Paris, "this seems necessary," he 
continued, "since it is time the French appreciated the formidable nature of 
the problem that confronts us both."^3
Before leaving Rome, however, Eden discussed Abyssinia again—not 
w ith  Mussolini, but w ith Mussolini's Chief of Cabinet, Baron Aloisi. During 
the conversation, Aloisi proposed an alternative solution to the problem. 
The Italians, Aloisi suggested, would condemn Abyssinia as unworthy of 
League membership at the next League meeting. The League Council could 
then "refer the question to the interested Powers, that is, to France and 
England." In this way, Aloisi continued, "public opinion, .would see the 
League of Nations' prestige safeguarded" and the Abyssinian question could 
be dealt w ith  between Italy, France, and Britain. Eden listened to Aloisi's 
proposal, and agreed to send his assistant, William Strang, back for further 
discussion of the Italian plan.^4
It is hardly surprising that Eden listened to Aloisi's proposal: since it 
was a new suggestion, it warranted attention. It was a mistake, however, 
for Eden to send Strang back for further talks on the matter. Neither 
Strang nor Eden agreed to the Italian plan, and there is no evidence to 
indicate that Aloisi's proposal was seriously considered at all.^5 | f  Eden did 
not like Aloisi's plan then he should not have sent Strang back the next day. 
As it was, Aloisi and the Italian Government received the impression that 
the British were unsure as to what course to take. When no official reply to 
Aloisi's proposal was given, Italian suspicions were aroused even further. In 
any event, Eden’s willingness to listen to the Italian plan and decision to 
send Strang back for deeper exploration of the matter, was interpreted by 
the Italians as a sign of British uncertainty.^^
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On the 17th of June, Eden flew  back to Paris for further discussions 
w ith  Laval. The two men discussed European affairs, but the conversation 
soon turned to Abyssinia. Laval immediately told Eden of his displeasure 
over the Zeila proposal: "Great Britain," he said, "had very nearly played a 
trick on France by offering to cede Zeila to Abyssinia." I f  the Abyssinians 
had a port on the Red Sea, Laval continued, then the French port of Djibouti 
would be threatened. Laval told Eden that he would support a solution that 
would grant Italy a protectorate over Abyssinia. He was, furthermore, 
annoyed that Eden had not told him of the Zeila plan before going to Rome. 
Eden countered by telling Laval about what Mussolini had said to him about 
the "free hand" in Abyssinia. Eden told Laval that this was disturbing if  it 
was true. In his response, Laval was evasive:
. . .  M.Laval had said to Signor Mussolini that he le ft him a free 
hand, but begged him not to make bad use of his freedom...  I f  
Signor Mussolini thought that France had left Ita ly a free hand 
this was true, but it all depended on the use which Ita ly made of 
it. He only gave up what France had a right to give up. He had 
agreed not to obstruct.
French policy, Laval added, "was to refrain from doing anything which 
would disturb or make less intimate existing Franco-Italian relations." 
France desired a peaceful solution to the problem, said Laval, but if  
arbitration failed then "Mussolini would go on w ith his projects w ith  all the 
risks that those projects implied." Laval concluded by reiterating his 
support for a solution that would allow "the maintenance of Abyssinian 
integrity under Italian suzerainty."^?
Eden's trip  was more than a mere failure; in many ways it actually 
exaccerbated the tension between Britain, Italy, and France. The tim ing of 
Eden's mission was especially bad. Britain had just signed a naval pact 
w ith Germany, and in the eyes of France and Ita ly this was a flagrant 
violation of the Stresa agreement. Having just ignored European treaties 
and agreements, Britain was in no position to condemn Italian treaty- 
breaking in Africa. To the Italians and the French, Britain's moralistic 
championing of League commitments reeked of hypocrisy. Furthermore, 
they suspected that Britain was blocking Italian aspirations in Africa for 
selfish—perhaps colonial—reasons. Drummond reported from Rome that:
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There is here an increasing tendency to quote the Anglo- 
German naval agreement as proving England does not hesitate 
to disregard International obligations when she considers that 
her vita l interests are concerned. It is agreed that she is 
consequently in a bad position to invoke Geneva...In 
conversation the suggestion still comes out...that England must 
have some private reasons for opposing an Italian control of 
Abyssinia...She must be inspired by hostility to the idea of Italian 
expansion and especially to the prospect of having Italy as a 
neighbor to the Sudan.^s
Sir George Clerk sent a telegram describing a similar anti-British sentiment
in Paris 39
To make matters worse, Eden had failed to mention the Zeila proposal 
to the French Government before going to Rome. Before leaving London, 
Eden had been asked by Vansittart to discuss the matter w ith Laval, but 
Eden ignored this advice because he thought it "better to handle that firs t 
w ith  Mussolini direct."^^ This aroused French suspicions, and Laval became 
increasingly distrustful of British diplomatic initiatives. At a time when 
Britain was looking for French cooperation, the Foreign Office could ill-  
afford such a blunder.
Adding to these problems, was a security leak in the British Embassy in 
Rome. The Italian Intelligence Service had obtained a fu ll set of the 
Embassy keys, and thus had unlimited access to the Embassy archives— 
including day-to-day despatches and secret reports. The Maffey Committee 
which had been formed in February to study British interests in 
Abyssinia"!!, had issued its report on the 18th of June. A copy of the report 
was forwarded to the Rome Embassy, and w ithin days was in the hands of 
the Italian Government. Since the report concluded that British interests in 
Abyssinia were minimal and would hardly be affected by an Italian 
conquest"!^, the Italians became even more suspicious of British motives. As 
Sir Samuel Hoare later said, this "strengthened Mussolini’s belief that we 
were playing a double game w ith him.""*3
The failure of the Zeila scheme did not dampen Foreign Office 
enthusiasm for a territorial settlement. Vansittart thought that the Zeila 
proposal should be explored further. After Mussolini rejected the scheme, 
Vansittart minuted:
. . .  we must have a further shot at this; and the means for doing 
so w ill have to be carefully considered & discussed. The issues
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are in fin ite ly too great to take a firs t no, however 
uncompromising, for a final one.*<^
Earlier. Vansittart had proposed that the Zeila scheme "be regarded as 
a m in im u m " ; '*^  now that the British offer had been rejected, it was only 
natural for Vansittart to urge a second attempt along these lines. He 
thought a solution to the problem could be achieved through "quiet 
negotiations." After the Zeila scheme had been condemned by Parliament, 
Vansittart told Eden: "There is no reason why we should further impair our 
foreign relations [w ith France and Italy) to satisfy idle curiosity in the 
House of C o m m o n s .'" i6  Vansittart was also worried that pro-Abyssinian 
sentiments among members of Parliament and certain sectors of the public 
were on the increase and might have an adverse affect on British Policy. 
On the 10th of July he wrote to Hoare:
Taking the long view, I am sure that it would be well to have on 
record something to counteract the present impression, which is 
so markedly anti-Italian that it w ill end by misrepresenting 
Abyssinia as a kind of oppressed paradise.'*'^
Vansittart’s hopes for a peaceful settlement to the crisis were fading 
rapidly, however. On the 3rd of July, the Cabinet was given a "fu ll verbal 
appreciation of the grave situation" which had resulted from "Italy's 
menacing attitude towards Abyssinia." Later in the meeting, the Cabinet 
agreed that the A.T.B. Committee (the Advisory Committee on Trade 
Questions in Time of War) should consider and report on the likely effect of 
sanctions upon I t a l y T h e  signs were beginning to indicate that there 
would a full-scale League crisis come September.
Vansittart became increasingly frustrated. In his view, the League 
approach was bound to fail: Italy would leave the League, and France 
would be alienated. Since Britain could not rely on French help, any 
League-oriented strategy initiated by Britain would only result in British 
isolation. In an angry minute w ritten on the 5th of July Vansittart wrote:
IWe have taken)...for granted that we shall always have allies. I 
have often pointed out that this is probably but not necessarily 
so. It depends on ourselves, and I am bound to say that H.M.G. 
have done nothing of late years to warrant the certainty of the 
assumption. At the present moment they are in fact alienating 
both France and Italy, while France and Ita ly have drawn
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visibly and increasingly together since December 1934. If  
H.M.G. are not very careful, this policy is going to end by 
landing us in complete isolation at the moment of our greatest 
weakness."*^
The alarm ist-like tone of Vansittart's minute was not w ithout 
justification. On the 28th of June, the French and Italian Governments had 
begun m ilitary negotiations that would permit greater strategic flexib ility 
against the German threat; a formal treaty was signed between the two 
governments shortly afterwards that permitted France to transfer its forces 
stationed on the Italian border to the frontier on the Rhine.50 Given the 
close collaboration of France and Italy, and the French Government's 
reluctance to jeopardize those relations over Abyssinia, it seemed foolish, 
Vansittart reasoned, for Britain to rely on French help at Geneva.
Nevertheless, the Foreign Office sought to obtain French assistance, 
and Sir George Clerk was instructed to "enquire whether...M.Laval has any 
intention of taking definite action of some nature at the present time, and 
has any concrete proposals of his own which he intends to put forward at 
Rome or elsewhere'51 At the same time, the Foreign Office decided to try  
again w ith a territoria l settlement. This, it believed, could best be achieved 
at a conference between the three signatories of the 1906 Agreement on 
Abyssinia (France, Italy, and Great Britain). The idea for such a meeting 
was firs t suggested by Sir Sidney Barton, the British Minister in Addis 
Ababa; and a few days later, the Italian Ambassador to London made a 
similar suggestion to Hoare.52 Before such a conference could be called, 
however, the approval of France would have to be obtained. Sir George 
Clerk reported that French cooperation would be in short-supply; he had 
just met w ith Laval, and had been told that the French Government valued 
its friendship w ith Italy:
Monsieur Laval told me quite frankly that he was not prepared 
to do anything that would mean Italy leaving the League of 
Nations or that would impair the present harmony between 
Italy and France. It is therefore unlikely that he w ill support 
anything like pressure on Signor Mussolini.
Instead of actively searching for a way out of the crisis, Clerk reported, the 
French Government seemed to be placing its hopes "on something turning 
up."55
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While attempting to secure French cooperation, the Foreign Office 
found itself locked in a bitter dispute between its senior staff members. 
Anthony Eden was determined to send a strongly-worded message to 
Mussolini protesting the Italian Government's inflexible attitude. Eden had 
issued a verbal protest along these lines while in Rome but this, he argued, 
was not enough. He wanted an official protest sent to the Italians that 
would "register H.M.G.'s, as opposed to my, reaction to Signor Mussolini's 
demands." Vansittart, however, thought that it would be better to delay 
such a message, because there would be "every tactical advantage in not 
putting in our note until Signor Mussolini has our proposal for a 3 power 
meeting." Much to Eden's dismay, the Secretary of State elected to back 
Vansittart and no message was sent.^ "*
On the 15th of July, Drummond sent a telegram to London that 
sparked-off another dispute inside the Foreign Office. Drummond thought 
it "essential" that he "should know soon approximately how far...lH.M.G.l can 
go in support of, or acquiescence in, Signor Mussolini's designs" in 
Abyssinia. He himself believed that Ita ly should be given a protectorate of 
some sort over Abyssinia:
May not our interests and those of Italy be better served by 
Italian tutelage over Abyssinia as a whole, certain guarantees 
for foreign rights being accorded and the position of the 
Emperor remaining otherwise unaffected than by wholesale 
annexation by Italian Government of all outlying territory w ith 
the centre under control? Even if  the latter remain for the
present independent its absorption can only be a matter of time
and raise further troubles.ss
Drummond's recommendation closely resembled the demands put forward 
by Mussolini during his meeting w ith Eden.
Fifteen pages of minutes were w ritten by various members of the 
Foreign Office staff in response to Drummond's telegram. Most dismissed 
Drummond's recommendation as too extreme. Owen O'Malley wrote that 
while searching for "a middle course which avoided on the one hand a
breach w ith Italy, and on the other the sacrifice of our principles as a
member of the League...we seem to have been drifting more and more in 
the direction of sacrificing Abyssinia to Italian friendship, so that to-day it 
seems as if  we should positively welcome a colourable excuse for helping to 
bind the victim  to the altar." O'Malley concluded that Britain should side
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w ith the League: "we should stick to our principles and stand the racket." 
W illiam Strang agreed w ith O’Malley and wrote that "it is at Geneva and 
not elsewhere that the issue w ill have to be faced even though it may well 
be that the result w ill be fatal to the League." Strang did not think the 
proposed three-power meeting would "produce results’’ unless Britain 
acquiesced to Italian demands; but such acquiescence, he concluded, "would 
destroy the moral position of H.M.G..’’ Anthony Eden was "in fu ll 
agreement" w ith Strang and O'Malley, and added:
We should not in my view give Ita ly any promise of any kind in 
advance of support of her case at Geneva. We cannot in 
decency do this, and any such attempt, however hedged about, 
w ill only encourage the Italians to think that they can blackmail 
us as they have blackmailed the French, Our moral position w ill 
then be destroyed.^6
Eden, Strang, and O’Malley had touched upon the problem that had 
haunted the Foreign Office ever since the crisis had begun. This was the 
uncomfortable choice of having to choose between Italy and the League. 
While Eden, Strang, and O'Malley seemed resigned to pushing the dispute in 
the direction of Geneva, others were less sure. Both Hoare and Vansittart 
preferred to avoid the choice if  possible; if  a territoria l solution was still 
obtainable, they reasoned, then it should be attempted. Vansittart 
sympathized w ith his colleagues but he believed that a meeting of the three 
powers might "assist in bringing to Geneva an Italy prepared for something 
reasonable and attainable in peace instead of by war." Sir Samuel Hoare 
acknowledged that while "every temptation points to eliminating Ithree- 
powerl talks," he believed "that they must, if  possible, take place if  for no 
other reasons than (1) to exhaust every expedient for peace (2) to bring the 
Italians to Geneva." Hoare and Vansittart having prevailed, the Secretary of 
State ordered a telegram to be drafted and sent to Drummond "so that he 
has our views" before his next interview w ith Mussolini. Hoare was afraid 
that Mussolini had misjudged British resolve and genuine opposition to 
Italian policy in Abyssinia: "Drummond must put him right," he concluded.*?
Drummond was able to see Mussolini on the 17th of July, and he 
immediately sent an account of his conversation w ith the Duce back to 
London, According to Drummond. Mussolini was w illing to take part in a 
three-power conference but he did not see much "hope of a solution." 
Mussolini also told Drummond that he did not want the League to discuss
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the dispute in its entirety; the upcoming Council meeting, he stressed, 
should confine its discussions to the Wal-Wal incident. After making this 
point, Mussolini ended the conversation. Before leaving, however, 
Drummond, had a brief interview w ith  a senior Italian official, Fulvio 
Suvich. Suvich reiterated Mussolini’s concerns about the next Council 
meeting, and warned that if  the Council became embroiled in the wider 
aspects of the dispute then the "ultimate result would almost certainly be 
Italy's leaving the League."58
The staff in the Foreign Office were disturbed by these reports from 
Rome, No one thought it possible for the League Council to lim it its 
discussions to the Wal-Wal incident. As Hoare told Drummond in a letter on 
the 19th of July: "There is practically sure to be a demand for w ider 
d is c u s s io n ."5 9  Hoare, Vansittart, and most of their staff still pinned their 
hopes on some sort of settlement—either at Geneva, or w ith in the 
framework of a three-power conference. Unfortunately for the Foreign 
Office, the cooperation of the French was required, and that cooperation 
was proving d ifficu lt to obtain. Anxious to maintain good relations w ith  
Italy, the French were all too w illing  to lim it the League's role in the 
dispute. This exasperated the Foreign Office staff, and both Vansittart and 
Hoare made repeated protests to the French Government. It was becoming 
quite clear that the French were reluctant to follow the British lead. From 
the French point of view, British policy was heading for a direct 
confrontation w ith the Italians; Laval and his colleagues had no desire to do 
the same.^o
With the next League Council meeting scheduled for the end of July, 
the Foreign Office began to increase the pace of its diplomacy, Eden's long- 
overdue protest to Mussolini that had been delayed since early July, was 
finally delivered to the Italian Government on the 24th. In cautious 
language, the note stated that Britain’s "anxiety lover Italian policy 1 did not 
arise out of selfish reasons, or concern for their interests in Africa, but out of 
considerations connected w ith the position of the League of Nations...and 
w ith  the situation in Europe." Britain, the note continued, could "not remain 
indifferent to events which might profoundly affect the future of the 
League, ” for she was "irrevocably committed" to the League and it  was the 
foundation of her foreign policy. After reminding Ita ly of her treaty 
obligations In great detail, the note concluded:
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His Majesty's Government therefore view w ith the gravest 
anxiety the effect upon their relations w ith  the Italian 
Government which would follow if  these intentions (to attack 
Abyssinia] were carried out. Deliberate disregard of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Pact of Paris 
would strike at the root of public law and international security, 
and would be so viewed by public opinion in the United 
Kingdom.^*
There was nothing new in this note. Since the beginning of the crisis. 
British appeals to Mussolini had sought to remind him of his treaty 
obligations, the security of Europe, and the state of British public opinion. 
The protests of the past had not produced any results; in fact, there was 
every indication that the Italian attitude was h a r d e n in g .62 The Italians had 
been angered by the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, and in 
their eyes, Britain had violated the agreements reached at Stresa in April, 
and in London in February. Britain, the Italians reasoned, was in no position 
to criticize Italian treaty violations. Given these sentiments, the British 
protest note of July 24 was destructive rather than constructive. It neither 
deterred Mussolini nor forced him to re-think his policy; instead, it made 
him more intransigent.
But the Foreign Office was in a d ifficu lt situation. It still hoped that a 
territoria l solution to the dispute could be found. This desire for a territoria l 
solution, gave the Foreign Office no choice but to act w ith  caution. It could 
not afford to anger Mussolini, and thereby run the risk of ruining the 
chances for a solution; nor, however, could afford to sit by and do nothing. 
For the moment, the strategists in the Foreign Office seemed trapped by 
their own policy.
Meanwhile, feeling inside the Foreign Office was becoming more 
hostile to Italy. On the 27th of July Hoare wrote a letter to Drummond 
saying that he feared 'that it would be impossible for us to take part in an 
arrangement that destroyed the sovereignty of Abyssinia." Hoare added : "I 
own that I have been rather worried by a feeling, perhaps unfounded, that 
in Rome discussions we have sometimes let the Italians get away w ith  their 
case more easily than they deserved." The Secretary of State concluded 
w ith  a statement on British public opinion: "Feeling here is becoming more 
and more anti-Italian and there is every sign of the country being swept 
w ith the kind of movement that Gladstone started over the Bulgarian 
atrocities."63
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Despite this hardening of attitudes, the Foreign Office still had to try  
and find a peaceful settlement to the dispute. The British and French 
Governments had not yet agreed on a common strategy, and w ith the 
League Council meeting only two days away, the Foreign Office was 
desperate to bridge the gap. After some discussion it was decided that Sir 
George Clerk should submit a memorandum to the French Government 
indicating the position Britain would take in the dispute over the next few 
weeks. The memorandum was drafted and sent to Clerk on the 29th of 
July. The memorandum was intended to bring the French into line w ith 
British policy, and most of it was devoted to reminding the French 
Government of its League commitments, and the disastrous effect a war 
between Italy and Abyssinia would have on the League. It concluded w ith 
a statement on "the need for common action to prevent disaster." Common 
action, the memorandum continued, must "be as speedy and as fu ll as 
possible...for in this alone resides any prospect of maintaining p e a c e ."6 4
This memorandum to the French Government did not succeed in 
bringing Laval over to the British position. When Eden stopped off in Paris 
on his way to Geneva, he discovered that the French were being as 
stubborn as ever. During his meeting w ith Laval on the 30th of July, Eden 
learned that the French Government was still "inclined to uphold [the] 
Italian thesis that the sole object of the meeting of the Council was to deal 
w ith the Walwal dispute." Laval "thought it important that disapproval of 
Ita ly should not be publicly expressed at Geneva," because this "would at 
once drive Italy out of the League." Eden soon realized that Laval would 
not move from his position. Faced w ith this resistance, Eden repeated the 
suggestion for a meeting of the three-powers, authorized by the League 
Council, "to work for a settlement of the main dispute on a basis agreed 
upon between them [Britain, France and Italy!." Laval was "attracted by 
this proposal." and the meeting was adjourned.^^
While Eden was in Geneva, he met w ith the Italian representative, 
Baron Aloisi; Laval did the same, and after two days of deliberations, the 
three men worked out an agreement whereby the League Council would 
postpone wider discussion of the dispute until the next meeting scheduled 
for September 4th. Neither Eden nor anyone else in the Foreign Office was 
happy w ith the arrangement, but given the lack of French cooperation, and 
the Italian threat to leave the League, it was the best that the British could 
do. Sir Robert Vansittart commented on the Geneva deal on August 1st:
68
. . .  The part that I don't like is the postponement till Sept. 4. 
That is getting dangerously near what may be the Italian hour 
for striking. I do not of course feel any enthusiasm for this 
programme, nor of course does Mr. Eden or anyone. But no one 
else was prepared to take any line now that might have resulted 
in Italy's leaving the League at one.^^
Vansittart's remarks exposed the weakness underlying British policy: 
Britain desperately wanted to use the Council meeting to bring the Italo- 
Abyssinian dispute—in its entirety—before the League; at the same time, 
however, they were unwilling to go so far as to drive Italy out of the 
League. Had the British been able to rely on French support, they might 
have been able to use the League machinery to their advantage and run the 
risk of Italian departure. W ithout French cooperation, however, the British 
delegation had not been able to take such a risk. Trapped by the lim its of 
their policy, the British were forced to accept a compromise solution.
The Council meeting over, the Foreign Office began preparing for the 
three-power—or tripartite—conference. I t  was scheduled to take place in 
Paris in the middle of August, and most of the Foreign Office staff saw it as 
the last opportunity to avert war. One of the key questions facing the 
Foreign Office was whether or not Britain should define the lim its w ithin 
which they were prepared to work in advance. The Secretary General of 
the League, Joseph Avenol, had suggested this course of action to Eden on 
the 2nd of August. According to Avenol, this was the only way that the 
conference could "have any real chance of success" otherwise, Avenol 
warned, "Signor Mussolini would continue to negotiate on the assumption 
that we could continually be pushed another step backward."^? xhe 
advantage to this course was that it would make Mussolini aware of how far 
Britain was prepared to go to accommodate his demands; in short, what 
Britain would accept and would not accept.
Avenol s proposal received a cool reception in London, however. Most 
of the Foreign Office staff questioned the wisdom behind such a move. 
Ronald Campbell wrote his response in a minute on August 3rd:
Personally I sd have thought it  wd be just as good—and perhaps 
better—to make an early statement when the 3 Power meeting 
begins of the lim its w ith in which H.M.G. can negotiate. If we 
did so earlier, M. Mussolini might make our statement an excuse 
for getting out of the discussions.
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Sir George Mounsey, an Assistant Under Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, shared Campbell's views. On the 4th of August he wrote:
I am not at all impressed w ith  M. Avenol's advice; which seems 
to aim at thrusting us into the forefront of discussion w ith Italy, 
ahead of the Paris negotiations in order to enable the French 
Govt, to keep in the back-ground and play as anodyne a part as 
possible...
Vansittart agreed w ith  Campbell and Mounsey, and thought Avenol’s 
advice "fundamentally unsound." Eden and Hoare also agreed, and on the 
8th of August Avenol's suggestion was ruled-out.^®
This position was reaffirmed a few days later in a telegram to Sir Eric 
Drummond. The Secretary of State did not "think it would be useful or 
wise to enter on discussion [w ith the Italian Government] before the 
meeting. " The tripartite  conference would "afford opportunity for dealing 
particularly w ith Italian arguments," so there was no need for any 
preliminary discussions. The telegram did, however, instruct Drummond to 
inform the Italian Government that the Foreign Office had considered 
Italian demands, but was reserving its views until the tripartite conference 
convened.^9
In order to clarify British policy before the conference, Hoare, Eden, 
and Vansittart met w ith  the Prime Minister and his cabinet Secretary, Sir 
Maurice Hankey, at No. 10 Downing Street on August 6th. The meeting 
began w ith a summary by Eden of the recent League Council meeting in 
Geneva. Eden reported "that at Geneva the French representatives had 
acted markedly in line w ith the British." Later in the conversation, it was 
agreed that the British delegation to the tripartite conference should consist 
of Eden and Vansittart, and that there should be preliminary conversations 
w ith the French Government "to establish a programme for later discussion 
w ith  the Italian representative." Eden was instructed to "do his utmost to 
maintain the close relations already established w ith the French 
Government. ' The Ministers then agreed that the Italians would have to be 
presented w ith the choice: either to accept a solution similar to the Zeila 
scheme, or alternatively, to accept the consequences of League action “laid 
down in the Covenant.' But Eden and Vansittart were not to discuss 
sanctions: "Any detailed discussion of sanctions should be avoided, as this 
does not arise at present and, if  it arises at all, belongs rather to discussions 
at a later stage " The meeting concluded w ith a decision to request the
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Chiefs of Staff to examine the position that would be created by a war w ith 
Italy .70
It is surprising that Eden said the French had acted "markedly in line" 
at Geneva, This simply had not been the case, and Eden's statement gave 
the impression that Britain could rely on French cooperation in the days to 
come. Contrary to Eden's assertions, the French Government's position had 
not changed at all, and there was little  chance that Laval would be 
cooperative in Paris. It was also a mistake for the Ministers and their senior 
advisors to rule-out any discussion of sanctions. They had agreed to take a 
relatively "firm" line w ith  the Italians in Paris by presenting the Italian 
delegation w ith  a choice between a negotiated settlement (on British terms), 
or League action. But by preventing any discussion of sanctions (the most 
likely form League action would take), the Ministers and their advisors 
essentially hand-cuffed themselves. How could the British delegation 
threaten the Italians at Paris and force them to the negotiating table 
w ithout anything to back them up? Once again, the British Government 
had imposed strict lim its on its diplomacy in order to minimize the risk of a 
rupture in its relations w ith  its allies.
To add to the Foreign Office's problems, the First Sea Lord, Admiral 
Chatfield, informed Vansittart in a letter on the 8th of August, that the 
Chiefs of Staff had reviewed the situation and concluded that "everything 
possible should be done to avoid precipitated hostilities w ith  Italy until we 
are more ready. "7* Vansittart, alarmed by this admission of m ilitary 
weakness, recommended to the Foreign Secretary that the risk of war 
should prevent the British delegation from taking a strong line in Paris: "we 
shall have to be exceedingly cautious in Paris, and for long after, if  there is 
any prospect whatever of a s tiff or drastic line being taken. " Vansittart 
added that he was "therefore leaving for Paris w ith little  hope ' of success. 
He concluded:
I consider that we should be very cautious as to how far and in 
what manner we force the pace in Paris, w ith an unreliable 
France and an unready England. We must in fact feel our way 
and hope to be able to exert pressure while we are feeling it.72
Hoare agreed "entirely " w ith  Vansittart, and approved of the cautious 
line being taken in Paris.73
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Thus when the tripartite  negotiations opened in Paris the British were 
severely handicapped. Before the negotiations began. Eden and Vansittart 
met w ith Laval to try  and reaffirm  Anglo-French solidarity. Contrary to 
Eden's expectations, Laval was anything but cooperative. Eden reported to 
London: "M. Laval is s till pinning all his hopes to a deal, and has not yet 
cared to face the fu ll consequences, if  the deal fails. "?"*
When the actual negotiations began, the Italian representative, Baron 
Aloisi, told Eden and Vansittart that "his instructions were to be 
uncompromising and that Signor Mussolini’s demands remain as outlined...in 
Rome." To this, the British representatives replied "that on this basis no 
agreement was possible. Later, Aloisi proposed that Britain and France 
make a declaration endorsing Italian political as well as economic 
preponderance in Abyssinia." Eden responded by saying that this was 
"impossible. . . to accept," and Laval concurred. The British and French 
delegations tried to get the Italians to agree to a solution whereby Italy 
would be guaranteed economic predominance in Abyssinia, lim ited 
territoria l concessions, all under the auspices of the League. Aloisi rejected 
this offer, and the conference ended the next day. Eden sent a telegram to 
Hoare calling for a Cabinet meeting, and stated: "We are therefore in the 
presence of a breakdown which we have always foreseen."?^
The failure of the tripartite talks in Paris forced the Foreign Office to 
strengthen the Geneva front and try  to rebuild Anglo-French cooperation. 
The bellicose postures of the Italians at the Paris talks virtua lly ruled-out 
any hopes for a peaceful settlement to the dispute; analysts in the Foreign 
Office foresaw an Italian attack on Abyssinia in September or early October, 
and war would require a League response. Laval and the French 
Government had been publicly supportive of the British position taken in 
Paris, but in private, they had expressed reservations. Before Eden left 
Paris, Laval complained to him that Britain must "appreciate the extreme 
d ifficu lty of his position," He (Laval) had "made a treaty w ith Italy" and the 
"collapse of that treaty would leave him without allies in Europe, for he 
could not rely on Russia. " The implication was clear; France, Laval felt, 
could not rely on Britain. To complicate matters further, Laval had 
accepted "that some form of condemnation by the League of Italy's act 
would be inevitable," but he was "less definite as to what further steps 
might be taken." Laval did not relish the thought of imposing sanctions on 
Italy; sanctions, he reasoned, might push Mussolini to extremes—maybe 
even an attack on British-controlled Malta.??
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By any measure, the tripartite  talks in Paris were a dismal failure. The 
Foreign Office had never had any great hope of the talks succeeding but 
some, like Vansittart, thought they were justified in helping to establish the 
government’s ’’rather lonely record” for "fe rtility  and perseverance in 
endeavouring to avoid a catastrophe.’’?  ^ The tripartite talks never had a 
chance to succeed; given the British Government’s refusal to raise the 
question of sanctions, there was no way that Eden and Vansittart could 
coerce the Italians into line. Foreign Office officials had hoped that the 
talks might provide an opportunity to improve Anglo-French cooperation, 
but that too was a failure. When the talks ended, Laval was no nearer to 
the British position; w ith no reliable allies in Europe, he was unwilling to 
jeopardize his relationship w ith  Italy. When he made this complaint to the 
British delegation in Paris, Eden could only reply that France had Locarno. 
Laval brushed this aside, however. What he wanted was a firm  British 
m ilitary commitment; w ithout such a commitment, he was unwilling to 
take any forceful action against Italy. Unwilling to give Laval such 
guarantees, the British should not have expected French co-operation.?^
The tripartite talks over, the Foreign Office began to prepare for the 
next session of the League, scheduled in early September. The prospects 
for a peaceful settlement to the dispute apparently gone. Sir Samuel Hoare 
and his staff saw no other alternative but League action. In a letter to 
Neville Chamberlain, Hoare wrote; "it looks to me as if  the Italians w ill be 
entirely unreasonable and as a result there w ill be a first-class crisis in the 
League at the beginning of September." Hoare thought that the only option 
le ft was ’’to keep in step w ith  the French and, whether now or at Geneva, to 
act w ith th e m . ’&o
Now that the dispute was beginning to take on crisis proportions, 
Hoare thought it necessary to summon an emergency meeting of the 
Cabinet. Sir Eric Drummond had been reporting from Rome of the 
possibility of a "mad dog" attack against Malta by the Italians, and Hoare 
thought the Cabinet should consider this scenario along w ith the more 
immediate problem of French cooperation. Before the Cabinet convened, 
however, Hoare and Eden arranged to consult some of the leading political 
figures outside the government's ranks. On the 20th and 21st of August the 
leaders of the various political parties represented in Parliament, met w ith 
Hoare and Eden in the Foreign Office, where they were briefed on British 
policy. The politicians were also given the opportunity to voice their 
concerns to the Foreign Secretary. To Hoare’s surprise, the politicians
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expressed nearly unanimous views; ail stressed the need for League action 
based on Anglo-French cooperation.®*
On the afternoon of August 21st, Hoare and Eden met w ith the "inner" 
Cabinet (Baldwin, MacDonald, Chamberlain, and Simon) to discuss the 
breakdown of the Paris talks, and to plan future strategy. The Foreign 
Office had been examining the various forms of sanctions against Italy in 
the event of war, and most of the Ministers' time was spent discussing the 
implications of such action. Sanctions, they agreed, would be economic and 
would be applied in two stages; the firs t stage would involve the 
prohibition of Italian imports, and the second might take the form of an 
economic blockade. Sanctions, they concluded, would be inevitable if  Italy 
went ahead and invaded Abyssinia. Since sanctions against Italy might lead 
to Italian reprisals, perhaps even war, the Cabinet agreed to place British 
armed forces in a state of re a d in e s s .® 2
A fu ll Cabinet meeting, held the next day, dwelt on the Italo-Abyssinian 
dispute, and went over most of the ground covered in the previous meeting. 
After examining the weak state of the British m ilitary, and particularly the 
navy, the Cabinet agreed that the British delegation at Geneva should go no 
further than to "reaffirm  that Great Britain would fu lfil its 
obligations...following closely the procedure laid down in the Covenant. " 
Britain, the Cabinet agreed, would have to follow in step w ith France, and 
avoid any unnecessary provocation of Ita ly which might lead to war.®®
Neither the Cabinet nor the Foreign Office were happy about using the 
League to coerce Ita ly into line. Such a course of action could only succeed 
w ith  fu ll cooperation w ith  France, and that cooperation would be d ifficu lt to 
obtain. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office was w illing to try. In an attempt 
to assess the national mood in France, the Foreign Office asked Sir George 
Clerk to report on the general feeling in France towards strong League 
action against Italy, and especially sanctions. Clerk replied in a telegram on 
the 22nd of August, w ith  bad news: according to Clerk, the French press 
"deploreidj talk of sanctions against Italy," and there was widespread fear 
that "British policy should precipitate events and make conciliation 
impossible." The French press. Clerk continued, was criticizing what it saw 
as British hypocrisy: Britain was eager to invoke the League Covenant 
against Italy, but was reluctant to do so against Germany.®^ The 
implication was clear: if  Britain wanted French cooperation, then she
would have to show equal severity towards Germany.
74
Later that day Clerk sent the Foreign Office a detailed analysis of 
French policy. In Clerk's opinion, the French attitude in the dispute would 
"be prompted not by reverence for general principles of international 
morality but by shrewd appreciation of French interests in Europe." France 
cared "little or nothing for the fate of Abyssinia," but only regarded it "in so 
far as it affects French security in Europe." This being so, Laval was "most 
reluctant" to jeopardize his relations w ith Italy. Laval did not want to have 
to choose between Britain and Italy. The French Government and French 
public opinion. Clerk continued, believed that "the interests of France are to 
be found in a compromise," and Laval would press for such a compromise. 
According to Clerk, Laval would agree to follow British policy only at a 
price:
In the last resort it may be possible to make him do so but only 
if  he receives satisfactory assurances that he w ill have the 
support of His Majesty's Government in resisting German 
encroachments on the territorial system established in Europe 
by the treaties such as w ill compensate him for the loss of 
Italian friendship.^s
The Foreign Office had no intention of paying any such "price"; a 
security agreement of the sort Laval desired was out of the question. In 
fact, when Hoare replied to Clerk's telegram in a letter on the 24th, he 
avoided addressing the issue entirely. Instead, he reaffirmed Britain's 
commitment to 'play out the League hand in September. " Sanctions, he 
admitted, might not work, but it must be the League—not Britain—that 
decided the matter. After describing the likely course of events at Geneva, 
Hoare stated: "it is most important that we should prevent the French 
Government from drifting into the Italian orbit. " Hoare did not say how this 
could best be done, however. His next point concerned sanctions and the 
British position:
The British Government w ill certainly have to make its position 
clear in public at a suitable time in Geneva. We shall have to 
say that we are prepared to do our part if  others w ill do theirs 
and that if  sanctions are not applied, it w ill not be because of 
our failure to carry out our obligations. It w ill either be because 
other members of the League w ill not play their full part or 
because the non-members of the League would make the 
application of sanctions futile.
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Finally, Hoare reiterated the need for Anglo-French cooperation. 
There needed to be concerted action, and it was "essential that we should 
not drift into Geneva, neither side fully understanding the position of the 
other." Hoare wanted Clerk to reply w ith "advice as to how best to deal 
w ith the French Government between now and Geneva." Before sending 
the letter to Clerk, Hoare had a copy made for Sir Eric Drummond in Rome 
asking for his "equally personal and confidential comments by telegram or 
urgent despatch."&&
Clerk was the first to reply to Hoare s letter, and he stressed again the 
difficulty of getting Laval to agree to sanctions against Italy. Laval might 
be persuaded to do so were he given a definite British commitment against 
Germany:
. . . French public opinion is without doubt opposed to any 
imposition of sanctions against Italy. It is just possible that 
Monsieur Laval who so far has shown himself a strong Prime 
Minister might have the courage to override this feeling, but 
only if  he had the definite assusrance that if  France joins w ith 
us in advocating sanctions against Italy at Geneva next month, 
we are prepared to support France with our full strength 
against Germany.
Clerk added, however, that he could not "conceive any British 
Government at the present time being able to give such a blank cheque to 
France."^?
Sir Eric Drummond replied to Hoare in letter on August 27th. He 
painted an even bleaker picture that Clerk. He began w ith a description of 
popular feeling in Italy:
. . .  the truth is that Mussolini cannot climb down now. He has 
worked up feeling here to such a degree that he has led his 
people to believe that they are capable of taking on the whole 
world! To recede would, I think, not only mean personal 
disaster for him . but to-day would also lead to the fall of the 
Regime...[Furthermore] the Italian press have stated that 
sanctions mean war against those who take them.
Drummond then warned that Mussolini might very well act like a "mad 
dog" and attack British installations in the Mediterranean. Drummond did 
not like the idea of sanctions, and instead recommended caution;
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. . .  I see little hope of securing collective sanctions or of 
effective French aid. Action by us alone is likely to lead to war 
between Italy and ourselves because Mussolini believes that we 
are weak and because (as I have already stated) he cannot climb 
down. It behoves us. therefore to be very careful as to our 
declarations and doings at Geneva.
Drummond concluded w ith a pessimistic appraisal of the League: "the 
time may now have arrived for scrapping (or at least completely 
overhauling) the existing machinery of the League."*®
More bad news arrived at the Foreign Office on the 27th. Clerk had 
just seen Laval, and in his report of the meeting he provided a gloomy 
description of the Frenchman’s mood. Laval did not give Clerk any 
commitment on sanctions; instead, he skirted around the question, and 
asked Clerk to remember that "his position was even more delicate than 
that of His Majesty's Government." "If France voted for the application of 
sanctions," Laval continued, then "the Rome agreements would be torn up."
Laval pointed out to Clerk that Hitler was "waiting to take the fullest 
advantage of the break-up of the Stresa front." To this Clerk could only 
reply that it was "vitally necessary" that France and Britain "find a common 
understanding’’ before Geneva. Clerk added that if  the Council 
"unanimously decided that sanctions were called for and should be applied," 
then the British would be "ready to take their part in their collective 
obligation of responsibility. ” Laval told Clerk that he had not decided what 
to do yet, but he would think it over and let him know.*^
This information that the Foreign Office was receiving from its 
ambassadors in Paris and Rome should have caused some alarm for Hoare 
and his staff. Laval's indecision and his reluctance to damage Franco- 
Italian relations, coupled w ith Mussolini's intransigence, should have led the 
Foreign Office to re-think their strategy or at least have second-thoughts.
Since no one in the British Government was willing to buy French 
cooperation w ith a security agreement, how reasonable was it to expect '
assistance from Laval? Hoare and his staff should have asked themselves j
this question. Instead of trying to modify their policy to find some middle |
ground w ith the French, the Foreign Office continued to hope that Laval |
would eventually come around to their side.
There were also fundamental flaws in the Foreign Office's approach to 
the Geneva meeting. Hoare, his fellow Cabinet ministers, and the Foreign
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Office staff had explored the question of sanctions against Italy, but had not 
made a definite commitment. Instead, they stated their willingness to apply 
sanctions if  the League Council decided that sanctions must be applied or, 
alternatively, to opt out of sanctions if  Council's verdict went the other way. 
Rather than taking an active role in trying to shape the Geneva meeting, 
they were content to sit and wait for the League to decide their policy for 
them. As Hoare told Sir George Clerk:
We must, however, on no account assume the impracticability of 
sanctions until the League has made this investigation. It must 
be the League and not the British Government that declares that 
sanctions are impracticable and the British Government must on 
no account lay itself open to the charge that we have not done 
our utmost to make them practicable.^^
Were sanctions wise or not? All Hoare and his colleagues wanted to 
do was to let the League decide. Sanctions or no sanctions, they were ready 
to accept the Council's verdict. Hoare and the Foreign Office were walking 
into the Geneva meeting w ith a blindfold on.
British foreign policy had little room for manouever, however. The 
Government could not "buy " French assistance; the public would not stand 
for it. But neither could they sit by and watch the League destroyed. 
Forced to work within these strict confines, the Foreign Office could only 
carry out a cautious, ad hoc policy designed to minimize risks.
Replying to Clerk's recent telegram describing Laval’s mood, all Sir 
Samuel Hoare could do was to say that it was "essential" for Laval and Eden 
to "have some conversation before they meet at the Council table." Eden 
was stopping off in Paris on his way to Geneva, and it was hoped that the 
two men could discuss strategy.9* Clerk was still warning, however, that 
Laval retained a "personal predilection in favour of compromise even at 
expense of p r in c ip le ." ^ ^  Hoare did not respond to this; he was still hoping 
that Laval might come around to the British position.
Meanwhile the Foreign Office was exploring the positions that some of 
the non-League members might take in the event of sanctions against Italy. 
Of particular importance, was the likely stance of the United States. Since 
July, the Foreign Office had been in contact w ith the American 
Government, trying to ascertain what sort of action the United States might 
take against Italy. While it was hoped that the United States might go 
beyond a mere arms embargo to both belligerents (under United States
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Neutrality legislation), the possibility of this was remote. From its embassy 
in Washington, the Foreign Office learned that American public opinion was 
"almost unanimous against Italy"; they also learned, however, that 
American action was unlikely to go beyond moral condemnation.^^
The Foreign Office was also trying to determine what kind of attitude 
other members of the League might take towards sanctions. From the 
British Embassy in Madrid, the Foreign Office learned that the attitude of 
the Spanish Government could be "summed up in the phrase strict 
neutrality and Spain first "; it was thought, however, that this would "not 
necessarily preclude Spain from following a lead given by the United 
Kingdom."94 News from Moscow was less clear, however. The British 
Ambassador. Viscount Chilston, reported that it was "difficult to gather" 
from Soviet officials what kind of line the Soviet Government would take. 
He added that he did not think the Soviets were "anxious about the fate of 
the League."95 For the time being, the only place that seemed to promise 
whole-hearted support, were the Scandinavian countries who, it was 
learned, agreed on "the necessity of upholding the Covenant."^^
The League meeting in Geneva was scheduled to begin on the 4th of 
September, and Anthony Eden along w ith Sir Robert Vansittart were sent 
as the British delegates. On the 2nd, the two men spent the day in Paris 
where they had an interview w ith Laval. The purpose of the discussion 
was to try and agree on a cooperative strategy for the upcoming Geneva 
meeting. According to Eden, Laval:
. . . presumed that in any event the Council could not discuss 
sanctions before war had broken out. He thought it desirable to 
set up a committee which might make some recommendations 
to the Council for the settlement of the dispute. It was 
important to gain time.
Eden did not like this, and replied "that it seemed. . . more important 
that the Council should not give to the world the appearance of meeting at 
Geneva and achieving nothing." Laval asked Eden if  he could "give him the 
assurance that Britain would be as firm in upholding the Covenant to the 
extent of sanctions in the future in Europe as she appeared to be today in 
Africa." Eden could only say that:
If  the Covenant was upheld in this instance...the authority of the 
League would be immensely strengthened and our own moral
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obligation to assist in supporting and enforcing the Covenant in 
the future would be correspondingly increased. If, however, the 
Covenant were violated now with impunity its authority would
be so impaired that the future influence of the League must be
negligible in Europe or anywhere else.
Laval responded by saying that this "did not really meet his question." 
He was thinking of Germany, and although he did not raise the subject 
again, it was clear to Eden that the Foreign Office would have to "be
prepared to answer it" in the future.
Later in the conversation, Laval asked Eden what Britain's position on 
sanctions was. He himself was "very fearful lest in this instance sanctions 
might lead to war." After hearing the British position, Laval stated that he 
"himself did not think that economic sanctions could work in this instance." 
He was prepared to give a "moral condemnation" and perhaps even minor 
sanctions; he ruled-out. however, a naval blockade. Laval said that he was 
"anxious to maintain his friendship w ith Italy without breaking the Anglo- 
French front"; what he "wished to avoid was the choice between Italy and 
Britain." To this. Eden replied that the real choice "lay between the survival 
of the League and acquiescence in Italy's breach of the Covenant." Laval, 
however, would "not have this definition," and he listened to Eden's remarks 
with "irritation."^’^
When the Council meeting opened on the 4th of September, the 
arbitrators who had earlier been appointed to examine the Wal-Wal 
incident, delivered their findings—that neither Italy nor Abyssinia had been 
responsible for the events of December 1934. The next day, the Italian 
delegation submitted a memorandum that declared that Abyssinia was unfit 
to be a member of the League owing to her backward and barbaric ways. 
The Council put this aside, however, and on the 6th, supported a proposal to 
refer the whole dispute to a special Committee of Five. Eden and Laval 
supported this move, and it was decided that the committee would include 
representatives from Britain, France, Spain, Poland and Turkey.98
At this point, however, there was a change of plans. Sir Samuel Hoare 
thought that it would be better if  he himself made the address on behalf of 
the British Government to the League's General Assembly, scheduled to 
open on the 9th. Hoare's motives were twofold: on the one hand he thought 
it would provide a good opportunity to coordinate policy w ith the French 
and clear up some of the confusion between the two governments; at the
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same time, he though that a strong speech would put "new life" into the 
League's "crippled body. " In his memoirs Hoare later wrote:
I accordingly determined to make a revivalist appeal to the 
Assembly. At best, if  might start a new chapter of League 
recovery, at worst, it might deter Mussolini by a display of 
League fervour.99
Hoare had drafted the speech in London w ith the help of Vansittart 
and his Cabinet colleague, Neville Chamberlain. Vansittart had pressed 
Hoare to make a tough speech; a strong speech, he reasoned, would boost 
the authority of the League and impress the French. The original draft 
contained a phrase that stated that Britain would back "resistance to all 
unprovoked aggression in whatever quarter such a danger to the peace of 
the world should arise." The draft was revised, however, and Vansittart’s 
phrase was watered-down; Britain would stand for "the collective 
maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety." Vansittart protested against 
this change, but the phrase r e m a in e d .*00
Before delivering the speech, Hoare held a series of meetings w ith 
Laval. Hoare reassured Laval that Britain would not apply sanctions unless 
such action was undertaken on a collective basis by League members. 
Hoare also emphasized the need for Anglo-French cooperation. Both men 
agreed that League action against Italy would have to "be done in as 
unprovocative a way as possible" to avoid a "mad-dog" response from Italy. 
Laval and Hoare also spoke at length on German rearmament, and the 
danger of driving Italy into an alliance w ith Nazi Germany. When the talk 
turned to sanctions, however, Laval expressed reluctance to the Idea of 
prohibiting Italian exports. Such sanctions, he said would "be a very grave 
step" and would "jeopardise the Rome agreements. ' Hoare agreed that 
sanctions of this sort "would be a very serious thing," but he thought that 
this type of pressure would be more effective. The two men agreed that if 
applied, sanctions would take place in two stages, w ith mild sanctions first. 
Laval noted that if  war broke out "prudence would still be essential"; 
nothing should ’’be done to make... conciliation more difficult ” He thought 
that in the event of war the Council should "employ a double method in 
order to stop the war, namely by exercising economic pressure and by 
conciliation. ” Hoare had no objections to this, and stated that he ’’was glad 
that on broad issues there was general agreement."*oi
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Hoare made his speech to the General Assembly on the morning of 
September 11th, Hoare's speech has received a great deal of attention from 
scholars, and there is no need for extensive discussion of its contents 
here. 102 There was nothing particularly new in Hoare's speech; most of it 
had already been said before. Hoare told the Assembly that collective 
security was what League members made of it. The "burden" of collective 
security, Hoare stated, had to "be borne collectively." The United Kingdom, 
Hoare continued, would "be second to none in their intention to fu lf i l l . . .  the 
obligations which the Covenant lays upon them." British public opinion, 
Hoare told the delegates, was behind the League, and the British 
Government stood "for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its 
entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of 
unprovoked aggression." *03
Most of what Hoare said had been stated before, but given the tense 
atmosphere in Geneva, Hoare's speech seemed tougher than he had 
intended. League delegates thought that Britain was championing collective 
security, and was determined to stop Italy, M.P. Hymans, the Belgian 
representative, summed up the mood in Geneva: "The British have decided 
to stop Mussolini, even if  that means using fo rc e , "*04 Hoare himself was 
amazed at the speech’s reception: "I felt it would make an impression, I had 
no idea, however, that it would make so big an im p r e s s io n ." *05
The one immediate effect of Sir Samuel's speech was to create the 
impression that Britain was prepared to stop Mussolini. In fact, nothing 
could have been further from the truth. Earlier, in their two meetings 
before the speech, Hoare and Laval had explicitly ruled out any military 
action against Italy such as a naval blockage; even sanctions were to be 
moderate.*00 Hoare later admitted that there had been an "element of bluff" 
in the speech; he thought that a strong speech "might deter Mussolini by a 
display of League fervour.'"**)? Unfortunately for Hoare, the speech failed in 
its first purpose—to halt Mussolini—and, at the same time, produced an 
embarrassing after-effect: League members now looked to Britain to take 
the lead in stopping Mussolini. Hoare had no intention of taking any such 
lead. The one scenario that he and everyone else in the Foreign Office 
dreaded, was that of the dispute becoming an Anglo-Italian rather than 
League-Italian dispute. Now, to his own surprise, the Foreign Secretary 
had increased the likelihood of such a scenario occurring.
Before leaving Geneva Hoare had a third meeting w ith Laval. The 
discussion opened w ith Laval congratulating Hoare on his recent speech.
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and then moved on to the subject of the Committee of Five (both Laval and 
Eden were members of the Committee). Hoare and Laval were both 
anxious for the Committee to draw up new proposals for a territorial 
settlement as soon as possible. Such a settlement—if accepted by both 
sides—would eliminate the question of sanctions altogether. Laval "thought 
that the best thing to do would be to recast the Paris offer, and. if  possible 
to add something new to it." The two men also discussed what additional 
concessions could induce the Italians to accept such a territorial settlement. 
The conversation then turned to sanctions, with Hoare expressing his hope 
that sanctions "should not merely be effective but should convince the 
world that it was intended to have a definite and concrete effect upon the 
duration of the war." Laval replied w ith less enthusiasm. "What might be 
possible for Great Britain," said Laval, "might be less possible for France"; he 
added that "International morals were one thing: the interests of a country 
were another." I f  war broke out, Laval continued, it might be better "to rely 
on conciliation alone." Hoare did not really reply to this; he merely stated 
that the question posed by Laval "did not, in fact, arise for the moment." 
The conversation closed w ith Hoare telling Laval that "Great Britain 
regarded the present case as a test case." 10»
This last meeting between Hoare and Laval is illuminating. While 
Laval had appeared to move closer to the British position during the 
previous meetings, the third meeting indicated that he was as far away as 
ever. His remarks on sanctions were revealing: Laval did not only appear 
to be reluctant about sanctions, he actually seemed to be ruling them out 
entirely. His emphasis on national "interests," and his statement about 
relying "on conciliation alone" certainly suggested such sentiments. Laval’s 
remarks should have alarmed Hoare (or, for that matter, Eden, who was also 
present). As it was. Laval's statements went unanswered.
Hoare should have seen that Laval was playing for time, and had no 
real desire to sacrifice his friendship with Italy. Hoare seems to have 
missed the point entirely. Shortly after he returned to London, he wrote a 
letter to Wig ram concluding that "there is now no danger of finding 
ourselves in an isolated position without French s u p p o r t .  "^ 09 jn  fact, French 
support for the British position was virtually non-existant. When on the 
14th of September the French Government approached Eden in Geneva, 
asking him what the "future attitude" of the British Government would be 
regarding a security pact w ith France, Eden replied that the British 
"position had been made abundantly clear" in Hoare's speech. For Laval,
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this was not enough; he wanted a clear answer from the British— 
preferably in “diplomatic form." Eden fully realized what Laval was after, 
but he had no desire to "buy" French cooperation: He said in a telegram to 
Hoare:
I f  I may express personal opinion...your speech seems to us to 
meet in full French Government's question and it would perhaps 
be wiser neither to extend nor explain it further at 
present.-.French Government have exactly the same obligation 
as ourselves to fu lfil their obligations under the Covenant in this 
instance and they can hardly press for a future price for present 
fulfillment of their word.
Once again Laval was pressing Britain for a security guarantee, and 
once again he was refused. Given these circumstances, it was not wise for 
Hoare and the Foreign Office to expect French c o o p e r a t io n .ho
British policy seemed to be at a crossroads. Despite Eden's readiness to 
ignore the French request, the Foreign Office was beginning to realize that 
it could not delay its response for much longer. Reports from Rome 
indicated that the Italian Government was drawing closer to Berlin. On 
September 19th Drummond reported that the Italians were negotiating 
w ith Germany in the hope of "mitigating [the] effect of sanctions"; 
Drummond thought that the negotiations had a "favourable" chance of 
success.HI The Foreign Office was already worried about the growing 
tension between British and Italian forces in the Mediterranean, and this 
news from Rome was received w ith g lo o m .H2 The deteriorating situation 
also forced the Foreign Office to face the French request since any outbreak 
of hostilities between Britain and Italy would necessitate French military 
cooperation. Thus, after some deliberation, the Foreign Office finally 
replied to the French request in a formal letter to Ambassador Corbin on 
September 26th. Vansittart delivered the letter himself, and bitterly 
remarked “that the French were in fact asking for more in a hypothetical 
case than there were prepared to perform in the present concrete case of 
the Italo-Abyssinian conflict." The letter was hardly what Laval desired, 
however. It merely reiterated what Hoare had said in his speech about 
Britain's adherence to the League Covenant and, to Laval's dismay, drew a 
distinction between "unprovoked aggression and the non-fulfillment of 
treaties." I f  the Foreign Office thought that this was enough to satisfy the 
French, they were wrong. Laval was worried about a potentially hostile
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Germany and desired a concrete commitment by Britain, not words 
pledging fidelity to the League.*
Meanwhile, events were moving rapidly. In Geneva the Committee of 
Five issued its report and its proposals for a settlement. It was essentially 
an expanded version of the proposals made by Britain and France during 
the Paris talks, and it was flatly rejected by the Italians on the 22nd of 
September. Suddenly, the situation seemed on the verge of collapse. In 
Geneva, Eden and Laval began to d rift apart, w ith Eden stressing the need 
for strong League action to force Mussolini back to the negotiating table, 
and Laval openly declaring his willingness to give Italy a mandate over 
non-Amharic Ethiopia. Eden was infuriated w ith Laval and on the 23rd, 
telegraphed to London:
In the circumstances of the present dispute and in the light of 
our knowledge of M.Laval s character, it is clear that effective 
action by the League is dependent upon a lead from us...If we 
are absolutely to surrender the leadership to a France 
represented by M. Laval and to allow the pace to be dictated by 
him no effective action w ill be taken and Signor Mussolini w ill 
be free to prosecute his campaign u n h in d e r e d .*  *4
Eden did not receive an immediate response from London. The 
Foreign Office was preoccupied w ith trying to diffuse the tension in the 
Mediterranean, and Eden had to wait for a reply. The rumours of an 
imminent "mad dog" attack against the Royal Navy by the Italians had been 
a source of great worry in London. Thus on the afternoon of the 23rd, 
Drummond was ordered to deliver a communiqué to the Italian Government 
designed to soothe Mussolini. Hoare gave the message a personal touch: he 
was speaking, he told Mussolini, as "an old friend of Italy." No one in the 
British Government, the message continued, wanted to "humiliate Italy"; 
there was no question of m ilitary sanctions, and Britain would not close the 
Suez Canal. Hoare reminded Mussolini that he had "been most careful to 
avoid the word sanctions"; Britain would only act if  the League agreed 
"upon collective action."* *^
Not everyone in the Foreign Office agreed about the wisdom behind 
sending such a communique. Eden did not like "relieving Ithe) Italian 
Government from anxieties"; he thought that sanctions, or at least the 
threat of sanctions, should be used to coerce Mussolini.**^ Maurice 
Peterson, head of the newly-formed Abyssinian Department, thought that
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such reassurances to the Italians would be counter-productive: there was a 
danger of giving Mussolini the impression that "he is really free so far as we 
are concerned to do whatever he likes ."N everthe less , the message was 
sent, and Mussolini told Drummond that he "greatly appreciated" the tone of
it; Mussolini added that he "had not the slightest intention of
injuring....British interests,"^
Back in Geneva the tension between Eden and Laval began to increase. 
On the 24th, Eden sent a telegram deploring France's lack of cooperation: 
"The only nation which has shown a marked lack of enthusiasm for 
effective action under the Covenant is France." Eden continued:
Their support of the League does not rest on a conception of a 
code of international law. They regard it mainly as an 
instrument of French policy to be used when it is convenient for 
France. In present crisis they are uncertain whether it is 
convenient. They are driven therefore to a series of 
manoeuvres object of which is not to antagonise Italy while 
keeping League alive for another crisis when it may be of value 
to them. This is explanation for Monsieur Laval's perpetual 
tacking to and f r o .*  *9
Eden's analysis was close to the mark, but Eden should not have been 
surprised by French behavior. He knew full well that Laval wanted a 
security guarantee from Britain, and would not cooperate without one. 
Unwilling to bow to this demand, Eden and the Foreign Office should not 
have been so shocked by Laval's "perpetual tacking to and fro."
The Foreign Office was also experiencing trouble within its ranks. 
Eden and Drummond, who had been in disagreement before, became locked 
in a dispute over the internal stability of Mussolini's regime. Eden 
telegraphed to the Foreign Office that the Italian Government was 
"tottering for economic reasonis] to its fall" since Mussolini's war against 
Abyssinia was placing such a strain on the Italian e c o n o m y .*20 Drummond 
quickly replied from Rome, saying that he feared that "Mr. Eden over 
estimates [the] chance that Signor Mussolini is weakening or that he has lost 
confidence " Drummond had seen Mussolini the previous day, and had not 
been left "with any such i m p r e s s i o n . " ^ 2 i
Why had Eden told the Foreign Office that Mussolini's regime was on 
the verge of collapse? The evidence for this was flimsy, so it is likely that 
Eden had ulterior motives for arguing such a point. Eden was convinced
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that strong League action could successfully stop Mussolini, and it is 
possible that this belief rested upon an assumption that Mussolini’s regime 
was fundamentally weak and vulnerable to economic pressure. Since there 
was little evidence to support this contention, it is possible that Eden was 
merely trying to rally support for sanctions in the Foreign O f f ic e .  *22
While Eden was pushing for strong League action the Foreign Office 
was having second thoughts. Hoare, Vansittart, and some of the senior staff, 
believed that Eden was moving too fast. The Foreign Office still hoped that 
some kind of territorial settlement could be reached, and Eden's actions, 
they feared, might make such a settlement impossible. On the 20th, 
Vansittart had expressed his fear that at Geneva, the British delegation was 
showing "lack of elasticity" towards the Italians, and as a result, there was 
the danger of wrecking "the possibility of a settlement." Unlike Eden, the 
Foreign Office believed that a settlement could still be obtained if  the 
Abyssinians could be persuaded to make further territorial concessions. 
Maurice Peterson, the Head of the Abyssinian Department, thought that: 
'There ought if  necessary be very strong pressure bought to bear on the 
Abyssinians to concede more than they may be disposed to give."*23 
Accordingly, the Abyssinian Department was instructed to draw-up a 
memorandum on possible further territorial concessions by Abyssinia to 
I t a l y .*24 To keep Eden in check, Vansittart—with Hoare's approval- 
despatched a telegram telling him "not [toi allow any haste on the Council in 
regard to the discussion of sanctions." *25 Vansittart had no desire for 
sanctions; he preferred a quick solution. Eden, however, was "disturbed" 
by these instructions. *26
When war broke out between Italy and Abyssinia on the 3rd of 
October, the long-awaited crisis came to a head. War did not, however, 
change British policy. Since Italy had invaded Abyssinia, sanctions seemed 
inevitable and Anthony Eden was in favour of "sanctions. . . [that would] be 
substantial." Eden and Laval were no nearer to an agreement, however, and 
during a conversation in Paris the two men found themselves unable to 
agree on a formula to end the crisis. Laval told Eden that he was w illing to 
give Italy a mandate over non-Amharic Abyssinia, and asked if Britain was 
willing to co-sponsor such a scheme. Eden told Laval that he would "refer 
his suggestion to London," but would not endorse it himself; he told Laval 
that he did not like putting forward a proposal that would involve 
"rewarding the aggressor." Eden also emphasized to Laval that the Cabinet 
and the British people were united behind the League, and that effective
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sanctions were necessary from "the outset." Aware that Laval was 
uncomfortable w ith this advice, Eden repeated Hoare's warning of 11 
September that "the future attitude of the British people would undoubtedly 
depend upon the attitude of France in the present dispute." 127
Eden failed to tell Laval that the Foreign Office had been considering a 
territorial solution similar to the one Laval was now proposing (though not 
quite as extreme). Eden also misled Laval when he told him that the British 
Government was firm ly behind the League. In fact, the Cabinet was deeply 
divided over the question of sanctions, and when it had last met, on the 2nd 
of October, it had agreed to pursue the double policy of mild sanctions and 
continued efforts to find a negotiated solution. 128
Laval was not a fool, and he was able to see through Eden's 
pronouncements. Laval knew that the British Government was divided, and 
Eden’s firmness combined w ith the Foreign Office's double line only 
confirmed his view that British policy was hesitant and vacillating. In stark 
contrast, Laval knew exactly what he wanted. Aware that British policy 
needed his support, he was prepared to exploit the situation to his 
advantage.
Ironically, the British Government played into Laval's hands. Fear that 
Mussolini might attempt a "mad dog" attack on British forces in the 
Mediterranean, prompted the Foreign Office to submit a diplomatic note to 
the French Government asking whether Britain could rely on French 
military assistance in the event of such an attack.129 Laval responded on 
the 5th of October in vague terms; he certainly did not promise whole­
hearted support. Vansittart was furious, and minuted his impression that it 
was "not an honest document"; in Vansittart's words, it provided "a loophole 
for French inaction" if Britain got into trouble.!39 Once again, Laval had 
taken advantage of the situation. Aware that the British would not press 
forward without French support, Laval was prepared to withhold support 
to keep British policy in check.i^i
Events were moving rapidly, and the Foreign Office found itself caught 
up in a swirl of activity. In Geneva the atmosphere was even more chaotic. 
On the 7th of October a Committee of Six, appointed by the League Council 
to investigate Italy's breach of the Covenant, reported that Italy had 
resorted to war and had, therefore, violated Article 12 of the League 
Covenant. After the League's General Assembly approved this report, 
another committee (the Committee of Eighteen) was established to examine 
the question of the imposition of sanctions against Italy. On the 12th, Eden,
88
as the chief British delegate, pledged immediate British support for a 
general ban on the import of Italian goods. Finally, on the 19th of October, 
the committee officially proposed s a n c t io n s .* 32
In London meanwhile, the Foreign Office and the Cabinet were 
expressing reservations. Eden's enthusiasm for strong League action was 
beginning to make the Foreign Office uncomfortable. Indeed, the Foreign 
Office had never had any intention of taking the lead at Geneva. Now, 
without guarantees of support from the French, the Foreign Office was 
reluctant to press ahead w ith sanctions. Laval, it was reported from Paris, 
would only support "sanctions of a completely anodyne n a t u r e ." *33 Eden 
was are of French anxieties over sanctions, but he thought that "constant 
pressure...upon the French Government" might bring Laval into line.*34 
The Foreign Office was already worried about Eden's reckless behavior in 
Geneva, and this latest suggestion prompted an outburst from London. 
Ralph Wigram, Head of the Central Department, responded to this in a 
minute written on the 14th:
I do not believe that further pressure by us w ill get us what we 
want: but I am afraid that it w ill further poison our relations 
w ith France and leave us without one real friend in Europe.
Orme Sargent agreed w ith Wigram. as did Vansittart. Vansittart 
thought that it was time to bring "an end. . . {toi this dangerous farce." 
Britain, Vansittart believed, would end up isolated if  it pressed too hard 
against Italy without French support, Eden was running out of control, and 
it was time to put a stop to it. Vansittart wrote:
Mr. Eden's instructions were to discuss no sanctions until we 
were sure of material support. Now we are in the thick of 
sanctions, w ith no such assurance from anyone and constantly 
represented—by no one more than the French—as playing the 
lead. It must surely be clear that this cannot continue. *35
There was also pressure from outside the Foreign Office to put some 
sort of check on Eden. On the 13 th of October Hoare received a letter from 
Lord Wigram, the King’s Private Secretary, expressing concern over Eden’s 
handling of affairs in Geneva:
Eden appears to be taking the lead to too great an extent and 
the League, from reading the papers, would appear to be a one
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man show', and Eden to be justifying Mussolini's contention that 
the quarrel is really one between Great Britain and Italy and not 
between the latter country and the League.. .*^6
Hoare tried to calm Wigram's fears, but steps were already being taken 
to put Eden under control. A Cabinet meeting on the 16th decided that 
there could be no discussion of further sanctions until the French promised 
military s u p p o r t . T h e  same day Hoare wrote a letter to Eden warning 
him that there was "a considerable feeling that you had recently taken the 
initiative too much at Geneva." Hoare concluded:
I feel myself that it is essential that we should go slow until we 
have the withdrawal [of French reservations) and if  Laval is 
recalcitrant, the reason for our going slow w ill have to come out 
both in Geneva and in London. I cannot overestimate the urgent 
importance that the Cabinet attach to this recommendation. 3^^
Sanctions were effectively put on hold (they did not take effect until 
the 15th of November), and Eden brought under control. Meanwhile, the 
Foreign Office continued to hope for a negotiated settlement. Laval’s 
proposal to give Italy a mandate over non-Amharic Abyssinia was ruled-out 
as going "too far, " but Hoare and his staff believed that there was still hope 
for a solution along these lines. In the middle of October Hoare telegraphed 
Eden declaring that: "the door is still open for reasonable and generous 
negotiation."*^^ The Foreign Office continued to explore the possibility of 
this type of solution during the rest of October, and in November Maurice 
Peterson, Head of the Abyssinian Department, was sent to Paris for 
consultations w ith the French Government in the hope that an agreement 
could be found for such a solution.
Between June and November the Foreign Office followed a double 
policy of trying to uphold Britain's League obligations while attempting to 
find a negotiated solution. When the Zeila proposals were rejected by 
Mussolini, the Foreign Office did not alter the tack of its policy but instead 
kept on the same course. The tripartite talks in Paris were a desperate 
second attempt to work out a solution through territorial concessions, and 
although the failure of the talks forced the Foreign Office to rely on the
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League, the idea of a negotiated settlement never lost its appeal. Hoare's 
speech to the League was delivered in seemingly strong language, but was 
mere bluff; Hoare never intended to lead the League against Italy, and he 
agreed w ith Laval that the door had to be left open for a negotiated solution. 
When war broke out and Eden began pushing for strong League action, 
Hoare and the Foreign Office put the Minister for League of Nations Affairs 
in check. This move was prompted by lack of French cooperation, but also 
by a feeling that strong League action would hinder the chances of a 
peaceful settlement.
How much had Foreign Office policy changed since Wal-Wal? After 
examining the evidence it appears that, at least in substance, British policy 
changed very little. As a strategy, the double policy had been in the 
Foreign Office long before Sir Samuel took office. Acutely conscious of the 
limitations of British policy, and specifically of the need to maintain the 
Stresa front while upholding the League, Vansittart had set the tone of 
British policy in his memorandum of February 25th. Determined not to 
have to make the choice between Italy or the League, Vansittart suggested 
that a solution the problem might lie in a territorial settlement. *"*1 
Preoccupation w ith other problems, and Simon's weak leadership, however, 
prevented the Foreign Office from fully implementing Vansittart's strategy; 
the warnings to Italy were delivered, but the second half of that strategy— 
the territorial settlement—was not attempted. It was not until Sir Samuel 
Hoare arrived on the scene, that the Foreign Office put Vansittart's policy 
into effect.
Initial attempts to reach a territorial settlement—first w ith Zeila, then 
at the tripartite conference, and later w ith the Committee of Five's 
proposals—all met w ith failure. The Foreign Office did not lose hope. On 
the contrary, they grew more anxious. The imposition of League sanctions, 
and the danger of an Italian "mad dog" attack combined w ith French 
unreliability, made the Foreign Office more eager than ever to find a 
solution. Given the circumstances, there were few alternatives for the 
Foreign Office.
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Chapter 4
The Cabinet and the Crisis
I f  the Foreign Office seemed confused and divided then the situation 
inside the Cabinet and the various Cabinet committees was even worse. 
The Cabinet s handling of the crisis can only be described as incompetent. 
Not once during the crisis did the Prime Minister and his Cabinet seize the 
initiative and attempt to shape events. Incapable of providing firm 
leadership and unwilling to shoulder the responsibility of policy-making, 
the Cabinet allowed the Foreign Office to handle affairs as it saw fit. These 
are serious charges, but after examining the evidence one can reach no 
other conclusion.
The chief foreign policy objective of the National Government during 
the latter half of 1934 and the first six months of 1935, was to secure a 
European settlement. Peace, the Government believed, could best be 
achieved by engaging in arms-reduction talks w ith Germany and bringing 
Germany back into the League of Nations. The Government realized that 
this policy would meet resistance from its European allies, and particularly 
France, but hoped that this could be overcome. Sir John Simon outlined the 
National Government's policy in a letter to the King on the 21st of 
December, 1934; according to Simon, "the great Task of 1935" was:
to bring about agreement leading to Germany's return to 
Geneva while there is time...This means that we must first 
persuade the French—and pay the necessary price for such 
persuasion—then bring in the Italians...The legalisation of 
German rearmament and the cancelling of the armament 
clauses of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles are a bitter pill 
for the French to swallow; especially as they don't believe in 
any German promise. But the alternative is not the stopping 
of German rearmament but its continuation at an ever- 
increasing rate behind the screen. Germany is more 
dangerous out of the League than in it.*
Anxious for peace, Simon and his Cabinet colleagues responded with 
enthusiasm when they received the news that Laval and Mussolini had 
completed the Rome Accord. In Simon's words, the Franco-Italian 
agreement was "a good preparation for wider European understanding.''^
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As we have already seen, Simon was in no hurry to obtain a copy of the 
agreement and study its contents.^
Between January and May (1935) the Cabinet's involvement in foreign 
affairs was confined to European problems. The London Conference, the 
publication of the Government White Paper on rearmament, Simon's trip to 
Berlin, and the Stresa Conference kept the Cabinet busy."* During the 
course of these months, the Cabinet treated the Italo-Abyssinian dispute as a 
peripheral question best handled by the Foreign Office. The matter was 
raised during Cabinet meetings on only two occasions: once, on the 13th of 
February when the Cabinet "took note" of a report by the Foreign Secretary 
that the Italians had not sent the Abyssinians an ultimatum as had been 
reported in the Press, and again on the 27th of February when the Cabinet 
took note" of another report on the deterioration of relations between the 
disputants. At the second meeting. Simon told the Cabinet that he would 
send a telegram to the Italian Government designed "to put on record, in the 
friendliest manner, our misgivings at the present turn of events." The 
Cabinet voiced its approval but did not enter into discussions on the 
matter.5
Nor did the Cabinet discuss the dispute during the special Cabinet 
meeting before Stresa on the 8th of April. Like the majority of the staff in 
the Foreign Office,^ the Ministers thought that the conference would deal 
primarily w ith European affairs. No mention was made of Abyssinia during 
the course of the Cabinet meeting. Instead, the Ministers discussed at 
length the various problems that might arise at the conference. The 
Cabinet was afraid that France and Italy, incensed by Germany's moves 
towards rearmament, might try to use the conference to consolidate a 
three-power bulwark against German expansion. Britain, the Ministers 
agreed, could not take part in any such scheme; there could be no further 
commitments in Europe:
It was pointed out that if  France and Italy asked us to join 
them in a statement that we would not stand a breach of the 
peace anywhere, that meant in effect an undertaking that |
we should be prepared to take forcible action anywhere...We j
ought not to agree to such a proposition unless we were I
prepared to take action anywhere..,There was general 
agreement that we ought not to accept further I
commitments... Î
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The anti-German front that Mussolini envisioned was to be avoided at all 
costs: "To adopt Signor Mussolini's point of view would be to throw German 
public opinion more behind Hitler than ever, and to drag us into escapades 
which we had no intention to follow." The Ministers preferred to follow a 
middle course that would leave the door open for negotiations with 
Germany. "The idea," the Cabinet agreed, "was to get...[thej confidence [of 
France and Italy] without isolating Germany at Stresa."?
The National Government's objectives outlined at this Cabinet meeting 
were doomed from the start. How could Britain gain the confidence of Italy 
and France without entering into any new commitments and without 
isolating Germany? The Cabinet Ministers could not have both at once; 
French and Italian confidence would only come at a price, and it was 
wishful thinking to believe that it could be obtained otherwise. 
Nevertheless MacDonald and Simon returned to London after the 
conference convinced that it had been a success; MacDonald reported to the 
Cabinet:
The main problem at Stresa had been to renew the 
confidence of the French and Italians in this country, which 
had been somewhat impaired. This had been successfully 
accomplished.^
In fact, nothing of the kind had been achieved.^ Far from reassuring 
their French and Italian allies, the National Government conveyed a sense of 
weakness and irresolution.*0 This was to have dire consequences since 
Stresa gave Mussolini the opportunity to size-up the British Prime Minister 
and Foreign Secretary while preparing for his war in Abyssinia. I f  Britain 
would not stand up to German treaty violations, Mussolini reasoned, surely 
they would not take a strong stand against his Abyssinian policy. The fact 
that the British delegation said nothing about the matter to him during the 
conference only reinforced this belief.* *
As April drew to a close, relations between Italy and Abyssinia 
continued to deteriorate. Simon's meeting with Grandi on May 3rd ,*2 
prompted the Foreign Secretary to warn his fellow ministers of the 
situation during a Cabinet meeting on May 8th. It was the first time that 
the Cabinet examined the dispute, and after hearing Simon's report of "the 
serious situation which had arisen between Italy and Abyssinia," the
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Foreign Secretary was asked to circulate a "full appreciation" of the 
problem for the next meeting.*3
Simon drafted a memorandum on May 11th, and it was brought before 
the Cabinet during its meeting on May 15th. It began w ith a resume of the 
course of events since Wal-Wal, and then went on to describe how the crisis 
would probably evolve:
We have the clearest indications from the Italian 
Government that they contemplate military operations on an 
extended scale against Abyssinia as soon as climactic 
conditions permit and Italian preparations are complete. As 
the rainy season is understood to end in September, it is 
probable that the advance w ill take place in that month or in 
October...
Even if  League arbitration were set in motion, the memorandum continued, 
it would probably not stop Italy:
...for it  is quite certain that Italy no more intends to accept an 
adverse decision from the [League] Council in this matter 
than Japan did in the case of Manchuria.
Simon's memorandum was vague, however, when it came to making a 
policy recommendation. The only thing that was clear was that "His 
Majesty’s Government are in this matter likely to be faced w ith an 
exceedingly difficult decision." Simon then outlined the two choices:
I f  they support against Italy a practical application of League 
principles, their action is bound greatly to compromise 
Anglo-Italian relations and perhaps even to break the close 
association at present existing between France, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom. Indeed, Ita ly’s reaction, in Signor 
Mussolini's present mood is incalculable; the possibility of 
Italy retorting by leaving the League must not be 
overlooked. In any event, the European situation would be 
most seriously affected, and it would, in fact, be hard to 
imagine a state of affairs which would be more welcome to 
Germany.
On the other hand, if  the United Kingdom acquiesce in what 
would be a misuse of the League machinery by acting in a 
manner acceptable to Italy, but certainly unjust to Ethiopia,
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His Majesty's Government w ill undoubtedly lay themselves 
open to grave public criticism.
Simon did not suggest which of the two policy alternatives would be better 
to follow,*'*
Simon's diagnosis of the problem and his description of the pros and 
cons of the two policy options was clear and concise. By not voicing a 
preference for one of the two options, however, Simon was leaving it to the 
Cabinet to decide. As it was, the Cabinet made no decision on the matter at 
all. Simon was the Secretary of State and he should have at least made a 
recommendation; but he did not even do that. The situation called for 
strong, decisive leadership, and neither Simon nor any of his Cabinet 
colleagues were prepared to provide it.
In the Cabinet's "somewhat long discussion" that followed, there was 
little agreement among the Ministers as to what should be done. Three 
suggestions for delaying the dispute at Geneva were made, but these were 
eventually dropped. The Cabinet decided against delay at Geneva "which 
must result, not only in nothing being done before September to prevent 
hostilities, but which gives no opportunity for anything to be done." The 
Ministers decided to give Anthony Eden "a wide discretion as to the best 
course to be taken" at Geneva. What course this might be—other than not 
to delay—was not discussed. Eden's only instructions, in fact, were to use 
his own judgement. The Cabinet also decided to recall Ambassador 
Drummond from Rome to serve "as an indication to Signor Mussolini of how 
seriously His Majesty's Government was concerned w ith the course of
events." *5
Simon's memorandum and the ministers' discussion that followed 
indicates a certain intellectual poverty inside the Cabinet. This is not to 
suggest that Simon and his colleagues did not possess sharp minds; rather, it 
seems that there was a shortage of ideas—as if no one had given serious 
thought to the crisis that was unfolding. In the extracts of Simon’s 
memorandum quoted above, the emphasis is on the probable reaction of 
British public opinion to an Italian invasion of Abyssinia. In neither the 
memorandum nor in the discussion that followed is there any mention of 
Britain's national interests, or of the strategic implications of an Italian 
attack on Abyssinia. The Cabinet's decision to give Eden "wide discretion " 
at Geneva was hardly a decision at all. The Cabinet was merely placing the 
burden of responsibility on someone else's shoulders—in this case, someone
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who was not even a member of the Cabinet (Eden was not made a Cabinet 
Minister until June 1935.).
Confusion and indecision inside the Cabinet did not go away. It 
surfaced again during the meeting on May 17th, when Ambassador 
Drummond was present. The ministers agreed that it was important for 
Britain to maintain Italian friendship, and also to keep her commitments to 
the League:
It is therefore of the utmost importance that the course of 
procedure at lGenevaJ...should be such as shall satisfy the 
due discharge of the duty of the United Kingdom as a 
member of the [League] Council without impairing in the 
least degree the friendly co-operation between the United 
Kingdom and Italy in all matters.*^
The memorandum that Simon had distributed to the Cabinet two days 
before had suggested that these two aims might not be compatible. The 
Cabinet did not discuss this possibility, however.
The Cabinet's lamentable handling of the dispute between December 
and May was partly due to problems within its ranks. Foremost among 
these problems was the weakness of the Prime Minister, Ramsay 
MacDonald, whose mental powers had been in a state of decline for some 
time. According to one contemporary observer, Stanley Baldwin had 
frequently complained of "the uselessness of Ramsay MacDonald, of his 
inability to make up his mind on any subject, of the tragic spectacle offered 
by a man whose faculties it was evident to everyone except himself had 
failed."*?
In addition to the problem of MacDonald’s senility, there was the 
weakness of the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon. Some of his 
weaknesses have been discussed already.*® His relationship w ith some of 
his Cabinet colleagues needs further scrutiny, however. By early 1935, 
most of the Cabinet felt that it was time to remove Simon from the job. 
Stanley Baldwin thought that four years as Foreign Secretary "had knocked 
up Simon completely and that he was now unable to take a decision." 
Neville Chamberlain passed a similar judgement on Simon when he 
recorded in his diary: ."..he seems temperamentally unable to make up his 
mind when a difficult situation arises."*9 Simon was also at odds with 
MacDonald who, according to the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, 
treated the Foreign Secretary w ith open contempt.^*) When it came time to
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reshuffle the Cabinet at the end of May, it was clear to all that Simon had to 
be moved.
When the Cabinet reshuffle took place in early June, MacDonald 
stepped down as Prime Minister to become Lord President of the Council. 
Baldwin, the previous Lord President and leader of the Conservative Party, 
became the new Prime Minister. Simon was moved to the Home Office, and 
Sir Samuel Hoare, who had been Secretary of State for India for the last 
four years, became the new Foreign Secretary. Eden, who had wanted to 
succeed Simon at the Foreign Office, was named Minister for League of 
Nations Affairs and given a seat in the Cabinet.21 Both Eden and Hoare 
were uncomfortable w ith this dyarchical arrangement, and when Hoare 
asked Baldwin to define their exact responsibilities Baldwin refused to 
"involve himself in the details"; instead, he asked the two men to settle their 
differences privately.22 This was one of the first tastes of Baldwin's "hands- 
off" style of management. The consequences, however, would only make 
themselves felt in later months.
The first foreign policy decision that the new Cabinet faced was the 
Anglo-German Naval Treaty. On paper, the Agreement looked attractive to 
the National Government: Germany would lim it her total naval tonnage to a 
ratio of 100:35 in favor of Great Britain. Having tried for so long to achieve 
an arms-limit agreement w ith the Germans, the Cabinet jumped at the 
opportunity to sign a naval agreement of this kind. Baldwin, in fact, applied 
tremendous pressure in driving the negotiations to a success.23 In his 
opinion, it was "the first real and practical move in disarmament 
...accomplished since the W a r . '24 As we have already seen in the previous 
chapter, the agreement had a profound effect on the Italo-Abyssinian 
Crisis.25
The next decision the Cabinet confronted were the Zeila proposals. On 
the 19th of June, Sir Samuel Hoare brought the blueprints for the plan 
before the Cabinet for approval. After briefing his colleagues on the 
deteriorating situation, Hoare painted a grim picture of what might lie in 
store:
There was every prospect therefore of being placed in a 
most inconvenient dilemma. Either we should have to make 
a futile protest, which would irritate M. Mussolini and 
perhaps drive him out of the League and into the arms of 
Germany, or we should make no protest and give the 
appearance of pusillanimity.
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The Foreign Secretary then put forward the Zeila proposals which, he 
argued, would possibly offer a means of escape from the "inconvenient 
dilemma." The Cabinet approved and, after some discussion, agreed to send 
Eden to Rome to present the proposals to M u s s o lin i.2 6
The contents of the plan and the failure of Eden's mission have already 
been examined in the previous chapter. The reception Eden received when 
he returned to London warrants further scrutiny, however. When Eden 
returned to London, he and Hoare faced trouble in the House of Commons. 
The appearance of the Zeila proposal in the newspapers had aroused the 
anger of many M.P.'s: Conservatives were angry that the Foreign Office 
had considered ceding British territory; some members of the Labour 
Party, on the other hand, were upset that the proposal would have 
rewarded the aggressor, Italy, at Abyssinia's expense. Critics of the Zeila 
proposal saw it as a dangerous example of reaipolitik. Eden diffused some 
of this criticism when he went before Parliament on the 1st of July and 
insisted that the Zeila proposal had only been a diplomatic feeler. It had not, 
he declared, been a "deal " of any kind.27 For the Cabinet, this criticism of 
the Zeila proposals should have been a signal that a territorial settlement 
along these lines was not popular at home.
One of the reasons why the Zeila proposals met w ith such opposition in 
Britain was due to the recent publication of the results of the Peace Ballot. 
Organized by Sir Robert Cecil's League of Nations Union, the Peace Ballot 
was an attempt to measure the British public's feelings on arms reductions, 
arms manufacturing, British membership in the League of Nations, and the 
imposition of sanctions against an aggressor in case of war. 11,000,000 
citizens answered the ballots, and the results, published on June 27th, 1935. 
showed overwhelming support for the League and economic (not military) 
sanctions against nations that resorted to war. To politicians on both sides 
of the political spectrum, these results reinforced the conviction that British 
support for the League was political necessity. It was in this political 
atmosphere that Baldwin and his Cabinet had to conduct affairs.2»
When the Cabinet discussed the Italo-Abyssinian dispute on the 3rd of 
July, Anthony Eden briefed his fellow Ministers on the failure of his mission 
to Rome, then "spelled out" what—in his opinion—was at stake:
An invasion of Abysinnia would, therefore, raise the issues
envisaged by Article 16 of the Covenant, which involved
104
collective, but not individual, commitments for signatories.
If  these obligations were ignored or evaded, a heavy blow 
would be struck at the whole of the Pacts and Agreements 
on which the post-war system had been built up. It would 
amount to an admission that the attempt to give the League 
coercive powers was a mistake—an admission that would 
have serious effects in increasing confusion abroad, as well 
as on public opinion at home.
The Ministers then discussed the "various courses open to the Cabinet." 
including sanctions. The Ministers could not agree on whether sanctions 
were wise, and during the course of the discussion it was pointed out "that 
previous investigations of economic sanctions had shown that (since they 
involved blockade) they were almost bound to lead to hostilities." Finally 
the Cabinet agreed that "the appropriate sub committee of the Committee of 
Imperial Defense should consider and report on the application of Article 16 
of the Covenant to Italy, including the possible closure of the Suez Canal."29 
At first glance, the Cabinet's decision to allow a subcommittee of the 
C.I.D. (in this case the A.T.B. Committee) to examine the question of 
sanctions appeared to represent a significant move foward; the Cabinet 
looked as if  it would make a determined effort to check Italian policy. In 
reality, however, the Cabinet was postponing the decision on sanctions. The 
Cabinet was deeply divided on the troublesome issue. While Eden and 
Neville Chamberlain were w illing to use the League's machinery and even 
sanctions to stop Italy, the Service Ministers—Londonderry, Cunliffe-Lister, 
and Monsell—were afraid that such a policy might lead to war. Walter 
Runciman, the Minister for Trade, voiced similar concerns. Ramsay 
MacDonald and Lord Hailsham warned that a confrontation w ith Italy 
would wreck the Stresa front and alienate France. As Prime Minister. 
Stanley Baldwin might have been able to break the deadlock by throwing 
his authority behind one of these groups, but he preferred to mediate. In 
the end, no real decision was made.^9
At the next Cabinet meeting a week later (July 10) the fear of sanctions 
surfaced again. Discussing the best course to follow at the next League 
Council meeting, the Cabinet agreed that the British delegates "should not 
make any proposals...Iand that! it should be made clear that no approach had 
been made to France for the application of sanctions and that none should 
be made."2i
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A special Cabinet meeting was called to examine the Italo-Abyssinian 
dispute on July 22nd. Once again, the atmosphere was one of confusion and 
uncertainty. The Foreign Secretary began by telling his fellow Cabinet 
Ministers that he "felt that the only card in our hands was the deterrent, by 
which he meant publicity and conversations with the French in order to get 
them to put pressure on Italy before the Geneva discussions." Some of the 
Ministers objected to the idea of entering into conversations w ith the 
French, however. The Ministers considered telling the French privately, 
through Eden, "that the British Government were prepared in the last resort 
to fu lfil their engagements under the Covenant," but after some discussion 
this move was ruled out because "it would probably leak out at once and 
cause great irritation to Italy, and that in any event M. Laval would be 
under strong pressure to inform Italy and obtain the credit for having 
blocked our proposal for sanctions." Finally the Cabinet agreed to drop the 
scheme altogether, opting instead for a less risky alternative: enquiries into 
the French Government's attitude would take place in Paris through the
B ritis h  E m bassy
Another Cabinet meeting was held on July 24th. Hoare told the 
Ministers that he was ready to send the telegram to the Embassy in Paris 
that had been approved at the previous Cabinet meeting, Hoare's telegram 
to Clerk would contain a message to the French Government alerting them 
"to the dangers to European peace and security involved" in an Italo- 
Abyssinian war. Hoare told his colleagues that his message would "end on 
the note that the two Governments (Britain and France] ought to agree a 
policy for averting war. " He reassured them that he would avoid the 
troublesome issue of sanctions:
His aim was to avoid crude questions being put by either 
side to the other as to whether they were prepared to carry 
out their obligations under the Covenant. The underlying 
assumption would be that both Powers realized their 
obligations and were therefore jointly interested to find a 
way out of the difficulty.
After voicing their approval for Hoare's note to the French Government, the 
Ministers discussed the various courses of action that they could follow 
during the coming weeks. Once again, they agreed to inaction:
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There was general acceptance of the view that there were 
advantages, for the present, in playing for time in the hope of 
a weakening on Italy's part...though the prospects were not 
bright at the moment.^^
The Ministers were w illing to let events develop on their own, 
postponing a decision on sanctions until a later date. When the Ministers 
went on holiday at the end of July, the question was left unanswered. 
Likewise, the Cabinet did not know whether French cooperation would be 
forthcoming or not. For all practical purposes, these essential questions 
were left hanging in the air.
The Cabinet's wavering on sanctions was reflected in the meeting 
Baldwin and his Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, had w ith Hoare, 
Eden, and Vansittart on August 6th. The meeting was called in order to 
define a strategy for the Tripartite talks due to be held in Paris later that 
month and. as we have already seen, Eden and Vansittart were given 
specific instructions to avoid any "detailed discussion of sanctions." This 
severely handicapped the two men in their talks w ith the French and 
Italian Governments.^^ Also on the agenda for the meeting, however, were 
military considerations. The possibility of an Italian "mad dog" attack had 
been raised before, and Baldwin asked the Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee 
(C.O.S.) of the C.I.D. to "examine the question of what the position would be 
if  Italy took the bit between her teeth," and what "steps...ought to be 
taken...to provide against it." Hoare stated "that the Foreign Office would 
have no objection to any relatively quiet steps being taken, such as, for 
example, the raising of the anti-aircraft defences of Malta to the approved
scale."35
The C.I.D. and its various subcommittees had already begun 
preliminary discussions on the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. The Defence 
Policy and Requirements Committee (D.P.R.C.) had been notified on the 5th 
of July that they were to examine and report on the implications of 
sanctions being applied against Italy. By the 22nd of July, the Chiefs of 
Staff had put together an interim report with the conclusion that the 
imposition of sanctions would lead to war w ith Italy, as would the closure of 
the Suez Canal. Britain, the C.O.S. emphasized, would not be ready for war 
until 1939.36 Admiral Chatfield, the First Sea Lord and a member of C.O.S., 
told the Foreign Office in August that "everything possible should be done 
to avoid precipitated hostilities w ith Italy until we are more ready."37
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The Chiefs of Staff had good cause for alarm. In the contingency 
planning that the C.I.D. and C.O.S. had worked on during the previous two 
years, little thought had been given to the possibility of a war w ith Italy in 
the Mediterranean. Germany and Japan were presumed to be the most 
likely enemies in another war; Italy, it was assumed, would remain on 
friendly terms w ith Great Britain. Now, w ith little advance warning, the 
Cabinet's military advisors were being asked to prepare for a war that no 
one had foreseen. British forces in the Mediterranean were extremely 
vulnerable, and a shortage of anti-aircraft ammunition in the Royal Navy 
meant that an Italian air attack might have devastating results. The C.O.S. 
were confident that Britain could defeat the Italians, but not without 
considerable losses. With the further threat of Germany and Japan on the 
horizon, the Chiefs of Staff had no desire to provoke a costly war w ith 
Italy.3®
The C.I.D. s anxiety about a conflict w ith Italy, added to the confusion 
w ithin the Cabinet over sanctions. In addition to the reports from the C.O.S,, 
there was a report from the A.T.B. Committee that League sanctions against 
Italy would probably have little effect unless they were supported by 
military measures like a naval blockade.^9
The British Government was caught in a dilemma: political pressure 
demanded League action, but the expert advisors were calling for caution. 
Since most of the Cabinet was on holiday. Sir Samuel Hoare was left to fend 
for himself in London. With the situation deteriorating rapidly, Hoare 
complained to Neville Chamberlain that he was receiving "little or no help" 
from his Cabinet colleagues, and that Baldwin "would think about nothing 
but his holiday and the necessity of keeping out of the whole [Abyssinian] 
business at any cost." Fearing "a first class crisis in the League at the 
beginning of September," Hoare decided to appeal to the Prime Minister for 
an emergency meeting of the Cabinet'll
In an attempt to measure the political mood at home, Hoare and Eden 
were instructed to consult some of the more influential members of 
Parliament before the next Cabinet meeting. On the 20th and 21st of 
August, the two ministers discussed the dispute w ith Austen Chamberlain, 
Sir Herbert Samuel, George Lansbury, Lloyd George. Winston Churchill, 
and Viscount Cecil. Almost unanimously, the interviewees supported the 
idea of collective action by the League and cautioned against unilateral 
action by Britain. Both Austen Chamberlain and Churchill voiced concern 
that Britain and France move together in step.'H
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Baldwin arrived back in London on the 21st of August, and that night 
an emergency meeting of the inner’ Cabinet was held. Present at the 
meeting were Baldwin, MacDonald. Simon, Chamberlain, Hoare, and Eden. 
The Ministers' primary concern was the possibility of an Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia (now almost certain), and the imposition of sanctions by the 
League. Hoare told his colleagues that ’’the only safe line was to try out the 
regular League of Nations procedure." His talks w ith "leaders of non- 
Government parties" had convinced him that there would be 'a wave of 
public opinion against the Government if  it repudiated its obligations ’ under 
the Covenant. This, Hoare continued, was "on the assumption that the 
French would go as far as we were prepared to do...if France found it 
impossible to proceed to extreme measures, there could be no question of 
putting her in the dock ."
After some discussion on this point, Eden said that he ’hoped that in 
practice economic sanctions would not be begun until a Committee of the 
League Council had carefully worked out the methods of their application— 
that is, until it had ascertained definitely what the attitude of the non- 
Member States were going to adopt.” Hoare pointed out that "such an 
investigation by experts might very probably lead to a decision not to 
impose sanctions.’’ The Ministers were not uncomfortable w ith this 
possibility, but they agreed that it would have to be the League—not 
Britain—that decided against the imposition of sanctions. If, however, the 
League decided to apply sanctions against Italy, then Britain would have to 
comply. On this note, the meeting at 10 Downing Street came to a close.'i^
A full Cabinet meeting was held the next day, and the Ministers went 
over the same problems covered the night before. After hearing two 
reports from the Chiefs of Staff describing the weak state of Britain’s 
defenses in the Mediterranean, several members of the Cabinet drew 
attention "to the grave effects on our diplomacy of our present military 
weakness. ” After agreeing that they ’’were most anxious if possible to avoid 
a war w ith Italy," the Ministers came to the conclusion that Britain "should 
keep in step w ith the policy of the French Government, and, more 
particularly in the matter of Sanctions, should avoid any commitment which 
France was not equally prepared to assume. ” As far as the League was 
concerned, the Ministers agreed to follow "the procedure laid down in the 
Covenant," and to "avoid trying to force nations to go further than they 
were willing. ” Britain, the Cabinet agreed, would let the League decide on 
sanctions then follow that decision accordingly."*3
109
These two Cabinet meetings resolved little. Caught between its expert 
advisors and military staff who cautioned against sanctions, and public 
opinion which seemed to demand some sort of League action to stop Italy, 
the Cabinet found itself unable to make up its mind. Despite having had 
two months to consider the question of sanctions, the Cabinet still could not 
reach a definite decision on the matter. Now, faced w ith a showdown in 
Geneva, the Cabinet decided to let the League resolve the issue of sanctions; 
whatever the League’s verdict, the Cabinet would comply. The Ministers 
had no desire to take a stand and try to shape the outcome of the Geneva 
proceedings. Instead of firmness, the Cabinet seemed to be guided by a 
sense of pessimistic fatalism.
On the eve of a major international crisis, the Cabinet was playing a 
dangerous game. As one of the most powerful members of the League 
Council, Britain would be expected by other League members to take the 
lead in Geneva when the proceedings began. The Cabinet was aware of 
this fact, but no one called attention to it. I f  Britain deflated these 
expectations and did not assume her role as leader, then what would be the 
outcome at Geneva? No one in the Cabinet asked.
As we have already seen, Hoare's speech to the League Assembly on 
the 11th of September aroused the expectations of other League members 
and put Britain in the leadership role that the Cabinet had sought to avoid.^"  ^
It was a strange turn of events, and the story behind the drafting of the 
speech deserves closer examination.
With the help of Vansittart, Hoare began drafting the speech during 
the first week in September. In addition to the help he received from 
Vansittart, Hoare received advice from his two Cabinet colleagues, 
Chamberlain and Runciman, on several passages dealing w ith raw 
materials. Hoare mentioned the speech to Baldwin and Chamberlain at a 
dinner on the 5th of September, but little was said in the way of details. As 
Hoare’s biographer has stated, the final version of the speech "was very 
much his o w n  ”45
Before leaving London for Geneva, Hoare went to see the Prime 
Minister to show him the draft of the speech and to obtain his approval. 
Hoare's account of this meeting w ith Baldwin is illuminating:
When I arrived, we talked of the delights of Aix and the 
English countryside. We walked round the garden and we 
had tea. Then, remembering something about Geneva, he
no 4
said to me: ‘You have got a speech to make, and you have 
brought me a draft. Let me have a look at it.' When I gave it 
to him, he gave it a quick glance, and said, on handing it 
back to me: That is all right. It must have taken you a long 
time to make it up,' and that was all....[T]he answer seemed 
to me scarcely adequate to the importance of a 
comprehensive statement of policy....At least his perfunctory 
acquiescence showed confidence in his Foreign Secretary 
and enabled me to go ahead on the lines that I had set out.'*^
That a Prime Minister should show such disinterest in a Foreign Secretary's 
speech was remarkable. From Hoare’s account of the meeting, it appears 
that even he was surprised.
The story behind the drafting of Hoare's speech and his subsequent 
meeting w ith Baldwin, provide insight into the workings of the Baldwin 
Cabinet. The freedom Hoare was given to conduct diplomacy, seems to 
indicate a “hands-off" style of management. Hoare was respected by his 
Cabinet colleagues, and it may well be that they trusted him to carry out a 
sound policy on his own, and w ith minimal supervision. Later, some of 
these colleagues alluded to this."*? Within a few months, however, this 
'hands-off" management would have tragic consequences.
In Chapter three we have seen how Hoare's speech put a reluctant 
Britain in the role of leader at Geneva.'l^ For the moment, however, the 
Cabinet did not see any cause for alarm. When the Cabinet next met, on the 
24th of September, Hoare was singled out for special praise and his speech 
to the League was hailed as a great success. After the hero’s welcome, the 
Cabinet discussed the latest developments in the crisis. No one in the 
Cabinet could predict how exactly the League would respond to an Italian 
attack on Abyssinia, but Hoare told the Ministers that he thought League 
members would be prepared to impose sanctions "on a moderate basis." 
There was no indication that League members would push for tougher 
sanctions "in spite of bold speeches." Hoare warned that the "danger would 
be that if  economic sanctions did not produce the needed results there 
would be a clamour for more drastic measures." The Cabinet agreed that 
Britain should abide by the League, but this, the Ministers concluded, would 
depend on the French doing likewise. During the meeting it was 
"repeatedly emphasised that we must be clear as to the French attitude." 
Before closing the meeting, the Cabinet turned down a request by Eden
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(who was still in Geneva) to take a stronger line in the Council 
discussions.^^
The Cabinet's next meeting took place on the 2nd of October, the day 
before the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. Eden was present, and he reported 
that some nations were reluctant to take a stand against Italy. He told his 
colleagues that in his opinion, 'the whole future of the League depended on 
how the question was handled. " The Cabinet agreed to back "the maximum 
of economic sanctions on which agreement could be secured, " but Eden’s 
request for a stronger policy at Geneva was turned down. The Ministers 
were still divided on the issue of sanctions, and Eden’s recommendations 
were ruled out "in view of the attitude of the French Government," which 
had resisted sanctions so far. Some members of the Cabinet asked whether 
it might still be possible to find a negotiated solution to the dispute. Hoare 
informed them that a settlement of this sort (involving the exchange of 
territory) had not been ruled-out; he himself hoped for a settlement which, 
"without destroying independence, would give Italy some satisfaction.'^o
Thus when the long-expected war broke out on the 3rd of October, the 
Cabinet had still not made up its mind on the thorny issue of sanctions. It 
had agreed to follow whatever decision was taken by the League but, at the 
same time, hoped that an easier, territorial settlement might be found. Far 
from trying to control events, the Cabinet was actually sitting back and 
letting events develop on their own. This would not have been a problem 
had the British Government been spectators; as it was, however, they were 
in the thick of the dispute.
The League was quick to respond to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. 
On the 7th of October, Italy was designated the aggressor and Article 16 
(the sanctions article) was invoked. Beginning on the 11th of October, the 
League Committee of Eighteen discussed various proposals for sanctions, 
and specifically the prohibition of loans and credits and certain raw 
material exports to Italy as well as bans on the import of Italian goods. The 
League Committee agreed that more serious sanctions involving oil, coal, 
iron and steel, would be applied at a later stage.S*
When the Cabinet met the next time, on the 9th of October, the 
League's recommendations on sanctions were reviewed. The Ministers saw 
no other alternative but to follow the League, and it was agreed that Britain 
would participate in the sanctions proposed by the Committee of Eighteen. 
The possibility of the oil sanction was discussed, and the Cabinet agreed 
that "if oil-producing or supplying Member States, such as Romania, were
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prepared to impose an embargo on oil, His Majesty's Government would be 
prepared to join in this and to consider further an embargo on exports of 
coal."52
The Cabinet did some back-pedalling during a meeting on the 16th of 
October, however. Runciman and some of the Service Ministers argued that 
the oil sanction would be seen by Italy as an act of war. Given the weak 
state of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean and the lack of cooperation 
from France, it was unwise, they insisted, for such a provocative embargo 
to be imposed. After some debate, the cautious policy advocated by these 
Ministers prevailed and the Cabinet agreed 'to postpone the application of 
any new sanctions until the position w ith the French Government had been 
cleared up." The Cabinet also examined Eden’s recent behavior at Geneva 
which, in the eyes of the Cabinet, was too confrontational. After more 
discussion Hoare was instructed to bring Eden under control.^3
The Cabinet had good reason for alarm at the French attitude. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, the Foreign Office was locked in a bitter 
dispute w ith the French Government at this time and was unable to obtain 
cooperation from France.54 To add to the frustration of the British 
Government, a virulent anti-British campaign had been launched in the 
French press. Sir Samuel Hoare complained to his colleagues in the Cabinet 
that Laval "seemed to be constantly intriguing behind the back of the 
League of Nations and ourselves w ith a view to some accommodation w ith
Signor Mussolini."55
The Cabinet met again on the 23rd of October, and once again the 
possibility of a territorial settlement was raised. The Foreign Secretary told 
his colleagues that "any settlement must be within the framework of the 
League of Nations. " He also informed them that he had recently sent a 
member of the Foreign Office staff "who was an expert in Abyssinian 
affairs, to assist in Paris ’ in discussions w ith the French Government to see 
if such a settlement might be reached. The Cabinet fully approved of 
Hoare's diplomatic initiatives. Given the difficulties involved w ith 
sanctions, a negotiated solution to the dispute seemed like an attractive 
alternative.56
As October drew to a close, however, the Cabinet s attention to the 
crisis was suddenly diverted. On the 19th of October Stanley Baldwin 
surprised political observers by announcing that a general election would 
take place shortly. Four days later, during a three-day debate on foreign 
affairs in Parliament, he set the date for November 14th. From the
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standpoint of domestic party politics, Baldwin's move was a shrewd one. 
Italy's invasion of Abyssinia and the subsequent imposition of League 
sanctions, had received a great deal of attention in Britain. To the British 
public, Hoare’s recent speech in Geneva and the government's apparent 
willingness to apply sanctions seemed to indicate that Baldwin's 
government stood for a strong League policy. Exploiting these popular pro- 
League sentiments among the electorate, the Conservative Party’s Election 
manifesto boldly stated that the League of Nations was the foundation of the 
Government’s foreign policy:
We shall continue to do all in our power to uphold the 
Covenant and to maintain and increase the efficiency of the 
League. In the present unhappy dispute between Italy and 
Abyssinia there w ill be no wavering in the policy we have 
hitherto pursued.57
The Prime Minister, for his part, made numerous election speeches extolling 
the virtues of the League, and pledging to uphold the Covenant.58 When 
the final results came in, the National Government were the victors.59
Baldwin's political coup had an unfortunate side-effect, however. By 
calling a General Election at a critical juncture in the Italo-Abyssinian crisis, 
Baldwin had disrupted the diplomatic machinery of the British Government. 
In the Foreign Office it was business as u s u a l , b u t  in the Cabinet and the 
various Cabinet subcommittees work came to a virtual halt. The next 
Cabinet meeting after the one held on October 23rd took place on the 27th 
of November, so more than a month passed before the Cabinet considered 
the dispute again. And w ith the exception of a meeting of the D.P.R.C. on 
November 5th, there was little activity in the Cabinet subcommittees during 
the three weeks of election campaigning.^*
In retrospect, the decision to call an election at such an important time 
seems grossly irresponsible. It was, however, a typical example of the 
manner in which the Baldwin Cabinet conducted its affairs. Since the 
dispute had begun, the Cabinet had never really approached the problem 
seriously. The Cabinet was aware of the magnitude of the crisis (indeed, 
Simon had been clear on this matter as far back as May 15th), but it was 
never able to formulate a clear, coherent policy and stick to it. Time after 
time, it had either postponed major decisions or had pushed the burden of 
responsibility onto others' shoulders. (Usually this burden fell on the 
Foreign Office, but in the case of sanctions, it fell on the League.) By calling
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a General Election in the middle of a major international crisis, the Cabinet 
seems to have acted on the hope that events would come to a temporary 
halt while it campaigned. Unfortunately for the National Government, 
events were developing rapidly—on the battlefront in Abyssinia, and in the 
chambers of the League headquarters in Geneva.
On the 1st of November Eden and Hoare, accompanied by the Cabinet 
Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, travelled to Geneva to take part in the 
League's discussions on sanctions. Military tension in the Mediterranean 
had been the source of considerable worry in London, and Hoare was given 
instructions by the Cabinet to discuss the matter w ith the Italians while in 
Geneva. After conferring w ith the Italian representative, Aloisi, Hoare was 
able to obtain a verbal agreement to defuse British-Italian tension in the 
Mediterranean by the withdrawal of two Royal Navy battlecruisers in 
exchange for the recall of an Italian division form Libya. When it came time 
to discuss sanctions, Hoare talked w ith Laval and the two men were able to 
fix a date for the imposition of economic sanctions. After more discussion, it 
was agreed that these would go into effect on the 18th of November.®^
While these discussions were taking place, the Canadian representative 
on the Committee of Eighteen put foward the proposal that a further 
embargo on the export of oil, coal, iron and steel, be imposed as part of a 
"second stage" of sanctions. This idea was put to Governments on the 6th of 
November, and the Committee agreed to make a definite decision on the oil 
sanction by the 29th of November.63
In London, and to an even greater extent in Paris, this new proposal 
was greeted with apprehension. While an oil sanction was bound to have 
some effect on the Italian war effort (in contrast to the mild sanctions that 
had already been imposed), it was widely believed that such a provocative 
step would drive Mussolini to the "mad dog" attack that officials had been so 
afraid of. The Foreign Office had been in touch w ith the Italian General, 
Garibaldi, and had reason to believe that Mussolini would "go to war if oil 
goes on the list [of sanctionsI."64
No one in the Cabinet was anxious to go ahead w ith such a risky move. 
The League was set to discuss the oil sanction on the 29th, and in London 
various strategies to delay the Geneva proceedings were discussed. 
Vansittart warned Hoare not to "proceed or allow others to proceed at 
Geneva w ith measures against oil imports into Italy" without French 
cooperation. "To run the risk alone and unprepared would surely be 
unthinkable," he concluded.65 Sir Maurice Hankey warned Baldwin that an
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oil sanction "brings us within the danger zone of possible war w ith Italy."^^ 
On the 25th, Hankey went to the Foreign Office to give a similar warning to 
Hoare. Hankey was worried about the long-term strategic implications of a 
war w ith Italy, and on the night of November 25th he wrote in his diary:
Briefly my objection is that...an oil sanction brings us into the 
danger of an attack by Italy..,; that France cannot be relied 
on to help us, if  we are attacked; that, although we should 
probably beat Italy, we might sustain some serious losses of 
warships etc...: and that, in view of the obscure attitude of 
Japan in the Far East and the German rearmament in the 
West, we cannot afford to weaken ourselves by such a futile 
war, or to make a permanent enemy of a nation that lies 
athwart of our main line of communication to the Far East.^?
Hoare fully realized the dangers presented by the oil sanction, and he 
sincerely hoped that it would not be imposed. Unlike Hankey and those in 
the Cabinet who opposed the sanction outright, however, Hoare believed 
that "if the oil producing countries of the League are in favour of an [oil] 
embargo, we must Join in collective action." While he was "firmly 
convinced" that Britain "should take no initiative" in pressing the matter at 
Geneva, he believed that the Government would have to comply w ith 
whatever decision the League came to on the oil sanction. As the League 
was about to begin discussion of the oil sanction, Hoare and Walter 
Runciman, Minister for Trade, discussed a scheme that would involve the 
British delegates in Geneva using delaying tactics coupled w ith silence to 
prevent the sanction from going through. The plan involved the 
replacement of Eden, whose "presence in a discussion of this kind might be 
regarded as provocative by the Italians." thought Hoare. The Foreign 
Secretary suggested replacing Eden in the Geneva meeting w ith a 
representative of the Board of Trade who could "sit back and avoid taking 
any leading part in the discussions." Hoare told Runciman: "The Italians are 
in an excited condition and I wish to make our position as little provocative 
as possible."6S
In Paris Laval was also pressing for a postponement of the discussion 
on the oil sanction, and after some skilful manouevering, was able to induce 
the League to delay further discussion of the matter for a period of ten days. 
This initiative had full support from Hoare and the Foreign Office.^9 On the 
27th of November Hoare and Eden submitted a paper to the Cabinet giving
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details of the proposed oil embargo which, according to the paper, would 
"cripple the Italian Government and bring the war to a speedier end." 
Acknowledging the dangers of an oil sanction, the memorandum suggested 
that Britain obtain a definite assurance from the French Government 
promising French military assistance in the event of an Italian attack. On 
what British policy should be on the oil sanction, the paper stated:
[H.M.G.l should adopt the following attitude at Geneva. They 
should inform the League...that they would be prepared to 
participate in an loll] embargo...provided the producing 
States also co-operated. When the Committee meets they 
should, if  possible, avoid taking a lead in proposing the 
imposition of an oil sanction, but if  another country proposed 
it and the proposal led to practical action. His Majesty's 
Government would agree to participate if  Roumanie, the 
U.S.S.R. and the Netherlands also agreed.^o
While not enthusiastic about the proposed oil sanction, and unwilling to 
push for its approval at Geneva, Eden and Hoare nevertheless believed that 
Britain would have to follow in step with the League if  the other members 
approved the sanction. The British attitude had not really changed since 
August. After the paper was presented to the Cabinet the Ministers agreed 
to postpone discussion of the dispute until the 2nd of December.?*
In a private meeting in Neville Chamberlain's office in the House of 
Commons on the 29th of November, Hoare, Chamberlain, Simon, Eden and 
Runciman agreed "to hold up the [oil] sanction long enough to allow further 
conversations in Paris to test out the possibility of a general settlement."?^ 
British and French diplomats were in Paris exploring a number of possible 
solutions that would end the conflict through an exchange of territory, and 
the Ministers felt that more time was needed for these talks to succeed.?^ It 
should be noted, however, that Baldwin was not present during this private 
meeting. That five Ministers, meeting on their own and outside the Cabinet, 
could make a decision like this on foreign policy in the absence of the Prime 
Minister is nothing short of remarkable,?^
With the black cloud of the oil sanction on the horizon, the desire of 
Britain and France to find a quick settlement to the dispute increased 
dramatically. So urgent was the situation in the eyes of the French 
Government, that Laval asked to meet Hoare for special talks on the 
dispute. Laval proposed to come to London, but Hoare—who had just
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arranged to go on holiday in Switzerland—preferred to go to Paris himself; 
he would go on to Switzerland from there. He would travel to Paris on the 
7th of December, and would be accompanied by Vansittart. Maurice 
Peterson, the Foreign Office official who had been in Paris conducting the 
talks for the past few weeks, would be there to meet them.^s
On December 2nd the Cabinet met for a special discussion of the crisis 
and the oil sanction. It was the first time that the Cabinet had examined the 
problem since the election, and all twenty-three members were present. 
Hoare opened the discussion and reminded his colleagues that since they 
had fought the Election by pledging fidelity to the League, they could not 
"give any appearance of refusing our part in genuine collective 
sanctions...any other course of action would...be disasterous and 
indefensible." I f  the League approved the oil sanction, he saw no other 
course but to comply. Hoare also told the Cabinet about the negotiations 
going on in Paris, and about his planned trip:
We must press on w ith the peace negotiations as rapidly as 
possible, w ith a view to bringing the conflict to an end. Mr. 
Peterson, of the Foreign Office, was now in Paris engaged in 
conversations. Not much progress had been made as yet. He 
himself, however, had to go away for reasons of health for a 
short time, and he proposed on his journey to see M. Laval 
and to try and press on peace talks with him.
Hoare asked the Cabinet to consider whether an oil embargo "ought to be 
brought in at once when the League Committee met, or whether, to give a 
better chance to the peace negotiations, the fixing of a date should be 
adjourned for a decision at a later meeting." Hoare told them that "if the 
[peace] talks were going well, it would be wise to proceed w ith the 
embargo in two stages." After some discussion, Hoare's proposal was 
accepted.
The atmosphere in the Cabinet was as confused as ever. Baldwin 
asked for the opinion of every member of the Cabinet. Although the 
minutes rarely identify the speakers, it is possible to piece together some of 
the discussion. Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State for Air, and Eyres- 
Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty, thought that "The gap between our 
foreign policy and the state of our defense forces was too wide." They had 
no desire to press for an oil sanction:
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...our defense forces and defences in the Mediterranean were 
not in a proper condition for war, and from this point of view 
it was urged that an effort should be made to obtain peace, 
holding the threat of the oil sanction over Italy, and that the 
fixing of the date should not be decided until after the failure 
of peace discussions.
Some members of the Cabinet, including Duff Cooper, the new Secretary of 
State for War, thought that British defences were adequate and that the 
danger of an Italian attack had been exaggerated. Others disagreed, citing 
secret intelligence reports that indicated that Mussolini was prepared to 
respond with military force if  an oil embargo was imposed. Baldwin added: 
"It had to be remembered that in dealing w ith Signor Mussolini we were not 
dealing w ith a normal kind of intellect."
To guard against the possibility of an Italian attack, the Cabinet agreed 
to extend "the military conversations which had already begun between the 
Admiralty and the French Ministry of Marine" to include discussions of the 
Air Force and, if  necessary, the Army.
As the meeting was drawing to a close "The suggestion was made that 
a week was a very short time to establish whether the peace conversations 
were going well or not and to clear up the military point. It was hoped that 
the Foreign Secretary would take a generous view of the Italian attitude." 
Hoare responded by saying that he "agreed that the peace talks must be 
given the best possible chance."
The meeting was summed up by the Prime Minister. Baldwin laid 
special emphasis on the danger of war:
the situation for the Government would be a bad one unless 
everything possible had been done to avoid...Ihostilities], 
especially when the detailed facts of our defensive 
preparations became known...It had to be remembered that it 
was this country that would have to withstand the first 
shock of an Italian forcible reaction to sanctions. He himself 
was not w illing to be committed at this moment to...the date 
of the application of oil sanctions.
The Cabinet concluded that Hoare should bring the question back to 
London for further consideration: "If the peace talks did not offer any 
reasonable prospect of a settlement"; or "If the military conversations 
showed that France was not w illing to co-operate effectively."‘76
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This was the last Cabinet meeting before Hoare went to Paris, and 
according to the minutes of the discussion, it appears that in regard to the 
peace talks w ith Laval, his only instructions were "to take a generous view 
of the Italian attitude." Hoare's biographer has described this as a 
"diplomatic carte blanche ,"7? but it is more likely that Hoare's colleagues 
simply did not know what they were doing. As had happened so often 
before, their instructions were vague. They had no desire to impose an oil 
embargo or to do anything else that might lead to hostilities w ith Italy; 
given these fears, they placed great hope in the Paris talks. Where the 
Cabinet erred was in its failure to obtain details of the talks in Paris, or to 
give Hoare specific instructions. This, however, would have been out of 
character for the Baldwin Cabinet. Time after time, the Cabinet had 
consistantly acted with a "hands-off" style of management to the Italo- 
Abyssinian dispute. In this respect, the Cabinet meeting on December 2nd 
was little different from those that had gone before. The only difference 
was that the stakes were now considerably higher.
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Chapter 5
Diplomacy in Turmoil: What Went Wrong
British policy during the Abyssinian Crisis failed because the 
diplomatic machinery of the British Government was faulty. Indeed, the 
entire structure of British foreign policy—the decision making process, the 
question of responsibility, and the relationship between the Foreign Office 
and the Cabinet—was a bureaucratic behemoth that invited disaster. In 
short, the system was incapable of dealing effectively w ith an international 
crisis of this magnitude.^
The focus of this thesis has been on the Foreign Office during the 
Abyssinian Crisis; for it is my contention that if  we are to understand what 
went wrong w ith British policy during the crisis, we must first look at 
where policy was formulated and carried out. Because the Cabinet's role in 
the crisis was limited (by its own choosing) to approving policy 
recommendations rather than making policy itself, it is more important to 
look at the Foreign Office where policy originated. Ultimately, it is in the 
Foreign Office that the roots of the breakdown in British policy lie.
British policy during the Abyssinian Crisis can be divided into four 
phases. The first of these phases was the period from December 1934 to 
early February 1935, when the Foreign Office saw the Italo-Ethiopian 
dispute as a territorial problem and treated it as such. In the second phase, 
beginning in mid-February and lasting until late May, the Foreign Office 
recognized the seriousness of the dispute and tried to dissuade Mussolini 
w ith mild warnings. The third phase, from June to August, saw the Foreign 
Office trying to obtain French cooperation while pushing for a territorial 
settlement—first with the Zeila proposals, then w ith the Tripartite 
Conference. The fourth and final phase was the period between September 
and December, when Foreign Office policy seemed resigned to working 
w ith the League, though hope for a territorial settlement was kept alive. In 
each "phase" the Foreign Office tried to adapt its policy to the events that 
were developing around it. There was never a great turnaround in British
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policy, however; while policy moved in stages, the assumptions that formed 
the foundation of that policy remained the same.
The first phase of British policy was beset w ith problems. Chief 
among these problems was the failure to recognize the Wal-Wal incident as 
something more than a mere border skirmish. The stiff Italian line taken in 
the wake of the incident, and the despatch of fresh Italian troops to the 
region should have convinced the Foreign Office that the situation was 
more serious than had been originally thought. On December 12th an 
Italian official remarked that Abyssinia "was the only region in Africa" that 
held "any hope for Italian expansion," but this did not stir the Foreign 
Office.2 Sir Sidney Barton, the British Minister in Addis Ababa, was aware 
of the gravity of the situation but his warnings to London fell on deaf ears.3 
Even so, there were other opportunities for the Foreign Office to see what 
was really going on. The signing of the Rome Accord, and the comments 
Mussolini made to Drummond on the 15th of January should certainly have 
caused some alarm in the Foreign Office.^
In retrospect, the Foreign Office’s handling of the dispute between 
December and early February seems careless. Since similar border clashes 
had occurred in the area before, it is hardly surprising that British officials 
initially saw Wal-Wal as another such incident. That this view was 
maintained for seven weeks— despite numerous signs that indicated the 
contrary—is remarkable, however. It was a fundamental error of 
judgement, and the only plausible explanation is that the higher ranking 
officials who might have been able to correct this mistake, were 
preoccupied at the time w ith European problems and thus were unable to 
give serious thought to the matter. When this charge was levelled at the 
Foreign Office seven months later, Rex Deeper of the News Department 
used precisely this excuse.5 In any event, the mistake cost the Foreign 
Office dearly; by the time that British officials realized what was going on, 
almost two months had passed since Wal-Wal.
When the Foreign Office first realized the potential magnitude of the 
Italo-Ethiopian dispute, the second policy phase began. The policy that 
emerged from the Foreign Office during this period became the backbone 
of British strategy for the next ten months, and therefore requires a second 
examination. The seeds of this policy were contained in the policy 
memorandum prepared by Vansittart on February 25th. Vansittart wrote 
that Italy would have to be dissuaded "from going the full length" because 
she was needed in Europe to help contain Germany, and because an Italian
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attack on Abyssinia would deal a "deadly...blow...{toî the League." Vansittart 
believed that this would have to "be done in the quietest, most friendly 
way" since Britain could not afford to lose Italy as an ally; a "quarrel with 
Italy," Vansittart continued, might "drive her back into German embraces." 
He concluded his memorandum with a hint that a solution to the crisis 
might lie in a territorial settlement.^
Vansittart's memorandum contained the paradox that was to trouble 
the Foreign Office for the rest of the crisis. Britain could not lose Italy as an 
ally, but nor could she sit by and watch Abyssinia be devoured. On the one 
hand, Britain risked alienating Italy and driving her in the German camp; on 
the other, there was the danger that the League would be destroyed. It was 
a dilemma, and the Foreign Office tried to steer a middle course that 
involved mild warnings to Italy to minimize the risk of causing a rupture in 
relations while, at the same time, maintaining a policy that was compatible 
w ith Britain's obligations to the League Covenant. Anthony Eden was more 
inclined to emphasize the League side to this policy,7 but the basic 
principles of this dual-policy were never seriously questioned. (The r if t  that 
was to develop between Eden's policy and that advocated by Vansittart did 
not fully emerge until much later.) The idea that a territorial settlement 
was the best hope of a solution was a natural outgrowth of the Foreign 
Office's dual-policy. Such a solution offered the best of both worlds since it 
would not force Britain to make the difficult choice between Italy and the 
League.
During his last four months as Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon did 
not try to resolve the paradox in Vansittart's policy; instead, the Permanent 
Under Secretary's memorandum became the basis of British strategy. 
Simon may have been a weak Foreign Secretary, but he was certainly 
aware of the paradox later to become the double policy. Indeed, his 
memorandum circulated to the Cabinet on May 15th could not have been 
more clear on the matter.® Mild warnings were given to the Italians, and at 
Stresa no warning was given at all.9 Under Simon's leadership, British 
policy was allowed to drift along. When the Italians asked the Foreign 
Office to define British interests in Abyssinia, the Foreign Office had to 
hand the matter over to an independent committee headed by Sir John 
Maffey of the Colonial Office. By the time the Maffey Committee's report 
was ready (in June), it was too late: four months had passed and the 
question had been out-stripped by events. In any event, the Italian 
Government never received a response.*®
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The net effect of British policy during this second phase was 
destructive rather than constructive. Taken together, the mild warnings, 
the failure to respond to the Italian enquiry and the decision not to raise the 
matter w ith Mussolini at Stresa, conveyed a sense of weakness to the 
Italians. The Italians could hardly have received the impression that Britain 
was seriously planning to stop them.^* In one sense then. British policy 
actually encouraged rather than deterred Mussolini.
Foreign Office policy swung into high gear w ith the appointment of Sir 
Samuel Hoare as Foreign Secretary in early June, and the first attempt to 
reach a territorial settlement w ith the Zeila proposals. There was, however, 
no fundamental change in British strategy. While Simon had accepted the 
rationale behind Vansittart's double policy, it was Hoare who actually put it 
into practice. The Zeila proposals and later the Tripartite Conference in 
Paris were attempts by the Foreign Office to solve the dispute through 
negotiation. The Foreign Office had little room for maneuver, however, and 
the position that it took during these months had virtually no chance to 
succeed. From an Italian point of view, the warnings which tried to remind 
them of their obligations to the League Covenant, reeked of hypocrisy. 
Having just signed the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, Britain was in no 
position to brow-beat the Italians. 12 The Foreign Office was similarly 
hampered at the negotiating table. Because the Cabinet and the Foreign 
Secretary had decided not to allow the threat of League sanctions to be 
used to coerce the Italians into line, the British delegates at the Tripartite 
Conference were deprived of the one bargaining chip with any force behind 
it.i^ Reason alone, was not enough to persuade the Italians.
The Foreign Office still hoped to avoid having to make a decision on 
whether to side w ith Italy or the League. The diplomatic efforts launched 
by the Foreign Office during the summer of 1935 were thus attempts to 
find a way out of the dilemma. It is sadly ironic that these efforts were 
doomed from the start. At the time, however, the strategists in the Foreign 
Office did not have this benefit of hindsight.
Writing in his memoirs years later, Anthony Eden "dateldj our 
Abyssinian failure from these weeks ".i^ In his opinion, a strong warning at 
this time (as opposed to the mild ones that were being delivered) would 
have succeeded:
An unmistakable warning to Mussolini that we understood 
the choice which we had to make, between the League w ith
125
the peace of Europe on the one hand and his friendship on 
the other, that we knew what our decision must be and were 
determined to give effect to it. might have halted Mussolini 
even then, more especially if  given privately. 5^
Eden’s contention is hardly the whole story. At the time, the risks of 
such a move were simply too great. Not only was there the risk of driving 
Mussolini into an alliance with Germany, there was also the risk of 
alienating France who was anxious to maintain good relations with Italy, 
Without French cooperation such a move would not only fail, but would 
probably increase Britain’s isolation. With the added worry of the Royal 
Navy's vulnerability in the Mediterranean to a "mad dog" attack by the 
Italians, such a gamble was out of the question for the Foreign Office in the 
summer of 1935.*^
The fourth phase of British policy began in late August, when the 
Foreign Office and the Cabinet seemed resigned to using the League to stop 
Mussolini, While a first glance might give the impression that this was a 
departure from previous policy, closer scrutiny indicates otherwise. As we 
have seen, the decision to follow League procedure was taken w ith great 
reluctance.*^ Hoare. most of his Cabinet colleagues, and the Foreign Office 
staff realized that full cooperation from the French Government was the 
only way that the League could stop Mussolini. Without such cooperation, 
sanctions would not be effective and the danger of a "mad dog ” attack by 
the Italians would be greater. Unable to decide whether sanctions were 
wise or not, the British Government was willing to let the League decide 
the matter for them.
Deplorable as it was, this half-hearted and vacillating attitude towards 
sanctions was merely another manifestation of the double policy that the 
Foreign Office and the British Government had been following all along. 
The double policy had been born out of a desire not to have to make a 
choice between Italy and the League; now, faced with just such a decision. 
British officials were unable to make up their mind. They had not been 
prepared to face the choice in February, so it is not surprising that they 
were still unprepared come early September. This is not to belittle the 
choice or to suggest that British officials should have made the decision in a 
particular way. Given the weak state of the military, the danger of 
alienating Mussolini, the lack of cooperation from France, and domestic 
political pressure to abide by the League, the choice was an extremely
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difficult one. Moreover, the double policy that had been followed for the 
previous six months had been driven by the belief that a territorial solution 
could be reached which would save the Government from having to make 
the choice altogether; officials in the Foreign Office had grown accustomed 
to thinking along these lines. Thus when hopes for such a solution were 
destroyed in August, the Foreign Office found itself back where it started, 
facing the same dilemma and with almost no time left to decide. It is hardly 
surprising then that they acted as they did.
Harder to explain is Hoare’s speech to the League of Nations. By any 
reckoning, it was a major blunder. It was designed to reassure the French 
and to bluff Mussolini by a display of League fervour. While it stirred up 
League fervour, it neither reassured the French Government nor frightened 
Mussolini. In fact, the only thing that the speech did was to put Britain in 
the position of leader at Geneva—a position that both the Cabinet and the 
Foreign had sought to a v o i d . A t  the end of the day. the British 
Government found itself at the helm of the League amid the clamour of 
sanctions and without French assistance. It was the worst of all possible 
worlds, and the only explanation is that Hoare misjudged the effect that his 
speech would have while the League mistakenly assumed that Britain 
intended to lead the fight to stop Mussolini. Since Hoare made the speech, 
it is he who should take most of the blame. He stated that Britain was 
"opposed to all acts of unprovoked aggression." and although he qualified 
this w ith the statement that risks for peace would have to "be run by all," it 
was the former and not the latter that League delegates chose to hear.i^ As 
Vansittart later commented, Hoare’s tough-sounding speech was what the 
League "had been wanting to hear for sixteen drab years of retreat. ’^ o 
Hoare thought that he would be able to bluff Mussolini "by a display of 
League fervour." He aroused League fervour, but did not shake the Duce. 
It was a gamble that backfired.^t
The significance of Hoare’s speech would not be so great had it not had 
such unfortunate consequences. Hoare's speech inadvertently put a 
wavering Britain at the helm of the League where she was expected to take 
the lead on the question of sanctions. Given the lack of support from 
France Hoare, his colleagues in the Cabinet, and the Foreign Office staff 
had wanted to go slow on sanctions; now, w ith all eyes on them, they had 
no choice but to try and push them through the League. The British 
Government was in a dangerously exposed position, and Laval had no 
qualms about exploiting the situation. Laval deliberately played a game of
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cat and mouse w ith the British Government: he asked for a British 
guarantee of support against Germany knowing that no British Government 
could deliver such a promise; when his request was turned down, Laval had 
an excuse to withhold support for Britain against Italy. Thus Laval was 
able to dictate the pace of sanctions. The British did not mind imposing 
mild sanctions, but they hated Laval for exploiting their weakness.%2
Laval was also able to exploit the division between Hoare and Eden. 
He was aware that Eden was "un brave type"23 who was prone to tough 
talk in Geneva calling for stronger sanctions; Laval also knew that Hoare 
and the Foreign Office were more cautious than the young Minister for 
League of Nations Affairs. During the League discussions on sanctions in 
October, Laval skillfully played Eden and the Foreign Office against each 
other. He told Eden that he was prepared to back sanctions; then, having 
aroused the young minister's passion for stronger action. Laval turned 
around and told the Foreign Office precisely the opposite. Amid these 
conflicting reports and unsure of what France would do next, the r ift 
between Eden and his colleagues in London widened. Ultimately, Hoare 
was forced to put a clamp on Eden's activities in G e n e v a .2 4
It is interesting to read the memoirs of those in the British Government 
who were involved the fight over sanctions and see how they treated Laval. 
The bitterness is quickly apparent. Vansittart says:
Laval was troublesome and displeasing, as were the 
grubbiness of his white ties and chain-smoking swarthiness 
suggestive of sun rather than soap. He would not throw 
away his insurance on a minor affray.25
And Anthony Eden says:
Laval lived for the hour, at most for the day. He did not 
want to look ahead. Future troubles could be cared for by 
future devices. In this he was no worse than many 
politicians then and since; it was only in degree that his 
habits were unmatched.26
Hoare described Laval as a "cunning intriguer" who left the impression of 
being "the kind of gypsy who would be doing a deal w ith Jaspar Petulengro 
at Barnet Horse Fair."27
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Despite these lU-feelings, the British could only blame themselves, it  
was they, after all, who had put themselves in such an exposed position. 
That Laval exploited the weaknesses of the British diplomatic machine for 
his own ends was hardly surprising; he was a shrewd politician. Hoare, 
Eden, Vansittart and the rest of the Foreign Office staff knew what kind of 
a man Laval was; they also knew—as far back as July—that Laval would be 
reluctant to impose sanctions against Italy.2» Had they simply forgotten 
about this? Furthermore, it had been repeatedly emphasized in London that 
any action taken by Britain would have to be in step w ith France. When, in 
late October they found themselves out of step with France it was because 
of faults and blunders in their own foreign policy.
By the middle of November British policy was in shambles. 
Everything, it seemed, had gone wrong. Vulnerable in the Mediterranean 
w ith no support from France, and facing the problems posed by an oil 
sanction, the British were in a difficult position with few options open. To 
make matters worse, there were signs that Italy and Germany were 
drawing closer together.29 it  is not surprising then that the Foreign Office 
jumped at the opportunity to find a solution through an exchange of 
territories when approached by the French. Given the circumstances, they 
simply did not have any other choice. The double policy had come around 
in a full circle and was about to reach its logical conclusion.
Hoare-Laval was neither a betrayal of British principles nor a 
departure from previous policy, as some have contended.^o It was 
perfectly in keeping w ith the double policy that the Foreign Office had 
been following for the previous ten months. The double policy had rested 
on the belief that Britain could maintain her League commitments without 
alienating Mussolini. The problems caused by sanctions in October and 
November had exposed the inherent weaknesses in the rationale behind this 
policy, but the policy was not fully abandoned. The Foreign Office had 
never lost hope in the double policy because the alternatives—of either 
losing Mussolini or the League—seemed unthinkable. As long as the 
Foreign Office believed that a territorial settlement could be achieved, 
there seemed to be no reason why the double policy had to be discarded.
In studying British policy during the Abyssinian Crisis one sees a 
number of underlying assumptions behind that policy. Throughout the
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crisis, decisions taken by the British Government were taken w ith these 
assumptions in mind. The first of these assumptions was that Britain could 
not afford to lose Mussolini and drive him into an alliance with Germany; 
the second was that the peace of Europe was inexorably bound to the fate 
of the League of Nations. The Abyssinian Crisis brought these two 
assumptions into conflict, but the Foreign Office thought it could ride the 
narrow line between. In more peaceful times the British Government might 
have behaved differently, but in 1935 the spectre of a rearmed and 
belligerent Germany made caution a necessity.^* This then, was the origin 
of the double-policy.
At various times during the crisis, Vansittart and Eden chose to 
emphasize either of the two sides of the double policy. This became more 
pronounced during the autumn of 1935, with Eden laying stress on the 
League and Vansittart laying stress on relations w ith Italy. Differences 
between the two men reached their high point when Eden began leading 
the fight for sanctions in Geneva without the backing of the Foreign Office.
As we have seen, this prompted Hoare and Vansittart to intervene.
In his memoirs Eden says of Vansittart: "He did not discern that to 
appease Mussolini beyond a certain point in Abyssinia must break up the 
alignment [against Germany] which Italy was intended to strengthen. "3^  
Vansittart says of Eden:
Anthony...[was] not only correct but straight-forward in 
pinning faith on the League. That was our rightful policy, 
but I could never see the League's components tackling an 
aggressor of weight. So I laboured under a dualism which 
might look like duplicity ...My real trouble was that we 
should all have to choose between Austria and Abyssinia, if  
Mussolini stuck to his mania for fame and sand.^3
The differences between these two men were less significant at the time 
than they seem to suggest. Because Sir Samuel Hoare presided as Foreign 
Secretary and therefore had the final word on policy, the views of Eden
and Vansittart somewhat cancelled each other out. A synthesis of these j
views was found in Hoare, and it was his voice that echoed the double- |
policy most strongly. He says in his memoirs; I
i
IFrom the start I insisted that it was with this point [of )
German rearmament] always pressing upon us that we had |
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to make our plans for dealing with Mussolini. A double line 
of approach was essential. On the one hand, a most patient 
and cautious negotiation that would keep him [Mussolini] on 
the Allied side; on the other, the creation of a united front in 
Geneva as a necessary deterrent against German 
aggression.^'*
There were other factors which contributed to the failure of British 
policy during the Abyssinian Crisis. One of these was almost certainly the 
failure to recognize the seriousness of Wal-Wal and the implications of the 
Rome Agreement. Because of this mistake, the Foreign Office lost almost 
two months of valuable time. The failure to raise the question of Abyssinia 
w ith Mussolini at Stresa was also a blunder, and it is interesting to note that 
most of the British officials involved later singled out Stresa for special 
criticism.35 The signing of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty was another 
factor since it increased French distrust and undermined Britain's 
negotiating position. Also a factor was the weakness of Sir John Simon. His 
lack of initiative during the first six months of the crisis hardly conveyed a 
sense of resolve to Mussolini. Indeed, it appears that the Italians had little 
respect for the British Government and British foreign policy, which they 
believed to be feeble and unreliable. British wavering during the 
Abyssinian Crisis fueled this perception. In this sense then, the security 
leak in the British Embassy in Rome which gave the Italian Secret Service 
almost unlimited access to secret telegrams and memorandums was a 
disaster of the first magnitude. It gave Mussolini added confidence in his 
dealings with the British Government; he was able to see the inner- 
workings of British diplomacy, and could anticipate British initiatives in 
advance. In a game with such high stakes, Mussolini's advantage allowed 
him to hold the high ground; British diplomacy was always one step 
behind.3^
At the end of the day, however, it was the very structure of the British 
policy-making process which was responsible for the breakdown of British 
policy during the crisis. Long before the crisis even began, British policy 
had been built w ith one over-riding concern in mind: to defuse tension in 
Europe by reaching an agreement with Germany. Obtaining that 
objective, it was believed, rested on two factors: maintaining Anglo-French- 
Italian unity, and upholding the League of Nations. When the Italo- 
Abyssinian dispute broke out, the compatibility of these basic assumptions 
was challenged. With so much at stake, the Foreign Office found itself
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facing the difficult choice of either Mussolini or the League. Ultimately 
they did the only thing that seemed reasonable given the circumstances: 
they chose to steer a middle course, a double policy that offered the 
possibility of preserving the fragile system. Success of that policy could 
only be achieved by a territorial settlement acceptable to Italy, the League, 
and to Abyssinia.
And what of the Cabinet during the crisis? Under the leadership of 
first a senile Ramsay MacDonald, and then a disinterested Stanley Baldwin, 
the Cabinet allowed the Foreign Office to conduct policy on its own, w ith 
minimal supervision. The Cabinet never disapproved of the double policy.3^  
In fact, at its last meeting before Hoare departed for Paris, it had been 
repeatedly emphasized that Britain had to avoid hostilities w ith Italy. With 
an oil sanction on the horizon which many believed would provoke such a 
war, there seemed to be no choice but to try and achieve a settlement of 
some kind. The Cabinet knew this, but it did not give Hoare any specific 
instructions; nor did it ask Hoare for details of the discussions; it simply 
wanted an agreement that would end the present difficulties.)^
Ultimately, it is Baldwin who must bear responsibility for what 
happened to British policy. He was the Prime Minister, and it was he who 
should have kept control of what his government was doing. This, however, 
would not have been in keeping w ith Baldwin’s style. He had little interest 
in foreign affairs, and usually left such work to subbordinates. Vansittart's 
picture of Baldwin is succinct:
It is wrong to suppose that he had no care for foreign affairs; 
he had some but not enough...he could not find time to 
masticate the mass of our Foreign Office Papers. Seeing the 
limitations of time and himself, he preferred to leave detail 
to experts without authority.)*
Even favorable biographers of Baldwin have had to concede that this 
description by Vansittart is "accurate".'**
What could Baldwin have done, one is tempted to ask. He was an 
astute politician, and knew that the British public had a high regard for the 
League of Nations. Baldwin also knew, however, that the British public 
would not go to war for Abyssinia. The only option thus open to him in 
1935 was to try and re-educate public opinion and prepare them for a 
territorial settlement. Instead of choosing this course, however, Baldwin— 
in true fashion—decided to let events settle themselves.'**
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By the beginning of December, the British diplomatic machine was 
moving—very quickly—towards a breakdown. Events were reaching a 
climax, and the choice that the Foreign Office had evaded for six months 
could no longer be postponed. With a final decision on the oil sanction only 
a few weeks away, and w ith no support from France, the British position 
was desperate. The possibility of finding a solution was an opportunity 
that, given the circumstances, could not be passed up. For Hoare and his 
colleagues in the Foreign Office, there was no real need for deliberation; the 
decision to find a territorial settlement to end the crisis had been taken long 
before.
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* Gaines Post. Jr., "The Machinery of British Policy in the Ethiopian Crisis", 
International History Review, 1, 4 (1979), pp.522-41, also argues that the machinery 
of British diplomacy was faulty. His emphasis, however, is on the Chiefs of Staff, the 
C.I.D., and the D.P.R.C. and their relationship with the Cabinet. Post singles out 
military concerns and the influence wielded by expert advisors (namely, Hankey, 
Vansittart, and the C.O.S.) as the causal factors in the breakdown of British policy 
during the Abyssinian Crisis. While a useful study. Post's analysis sheds little light on 
the day to day running of diplomacy. James Robertson also argues that the British 
diplomatic machine was faulty. He points out—correctly—that mismanagement and 
administrative difficulties inside the Foreign Office made it impossible to prepare for 
an international crisis of this magnitude. Unfortunately, Robertson's analysis relies 
too heavily on Avon's memoirs. For example, he accepts at face value Avon's 
assertion that his February memorandum became a basis for British policy. No 
evidence for this can be found in the Foreign Office documents, however. Robertson 
also argues that the virulent anti-British campaign in the Italian press was a decisive 
factor in swinging opinion in the Foreign Office and in the Cabinet against Italy. 
While this certainly caused the British Government some irritation, it does not appear 
to have played such an important role. On the whole, however, Robertson's study is 
excellent. See J.C. Robertson, "The Origins of British Opposition to Mussolini over 
Ethiopia", Journai o f British Studies, IX, 1 (1969), pp. 122-142.
2DBFP,2,XIV, No.46; see p. 12 above.
^DBFP,2,XIV, No.32; see pp.13-14 above.
"^ DBFP.2,XIV, No.104; pp.16-17 above.
^British Museum, record of conversation between R.A. Leeper and a League of 
Nations Union official, Sept. 27, 1935, Cecil Papers, Add. MSS, 51171.; see also above, 
chpt. 2, pp.20-21.
6d BFP,2,XIV,No.175; see pp.28-30 above.
S^ee pp.30-31 above; this will also be discussed below, pp.130-131.
®See above, chpt. 4, pp.98-100.
S^ee pp.38-41 above.
*®See pp.20-21 above.
11 One story states that after Stresa Mussolini turned to his Ambassador, Dino Grandi, 
and remarked: 'You told me that on Austria the English answer would be 'yes', and on 
Africa no*. As it happens their answer on Austria was no', and on Africa 'yes'". 
(Quoted in George Baer, The Coming o f the Italo-Ethiopian War (Harvard University 
Press: 1%7), pp.128-29. The Italians certainly did not expect such strong British 
opposition later. For more on this see Robertson, op.cit., pp.136-37.
I2see p.53, and 60-61 above.
^^ See pp.70-71 above.
*"*Avon, op.cit., p.245.
*5lbid., p.244.
*^ See Vansittart, op.cit., pp.522-23. 
l*7See pp.77-79 above.
*^ See pp.81-82 above.
*^ See p.82 above.
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20Vansittart, op.cit., p. 533,
2i£ven Hoare had to admit that the "bluff failed to sway Mussolini. See Hoare's own 
account, Templewood, op.cit., pp.166-170.
22See pp.84-88 above.
23Quoted in Vansittart, op.cit., p.539.
'^^ See pp.89-90 above.
25Vansittart, op.cit., p.539.
2bAvon, op.cit., p.277.
^^ Templewood, op.cit., p.l68.
2SSee pp.63-64 above.
29See p.84 above.
O^See especially Avon, op.cit., pp.291-311.
^*There has not, to my knowledge, been a complete account of Germany's role during 
the Abyssinian Crisis. German diplomacy during the crisis was cautious and, on the 
surface, neutral. The German Government sold small arms to the Abyssinians (10,000 
rifles), but also sold coal to the Italians. The Germans were in an awkward situation; 
they did not want Mussolini to collapse under League pressure since that might 
establish a precedent; at the same time, however, they did not want Mussolini to score a 
quick victory since that would only minimize the rupture between the Stresa powers. 
Indeed, Germany had everything to gain from the diplomatic tension between Britain, 
France and Italy. Thus the German Government watched the crisis unfold from the 
sidelines. In March 1936, with the break between the Stresa partners complete, and 
the League sufficiently distracted by the Abyssinian problem, Hitler took a tremendous 
political gamble and ordered his troops to reoccupy the Rhineland. It was a successful 
move on his part, and in retrospect, one can only say that Hitler played his cards 
correctly. At the end of the day, Germany benefitted a great deal from the misfortune 
of her neighbors. For a concise (though by no means thorough) account of Germany's 
role during the crisis, see George Baer, T&stCàse, op.cit., pp.74-78.
2^Avon, op.cit., pp.241-42.
^^Vansittart, op.cit., p.522.
"^*Templewood, op.cit., p.l68.
^5Vansittart, op.cit., pp.518-21; Avon, op.cit., pp.179-180; Templewood, op.cit., p.l56. 
56For more on the security problem in the Rome Embassy see David Dilks, op.cit., 
pp.150-54.
^^ See p.113, also p.l20 above.
3*See chpt. 4, pp. 118-120 above.
^^Vansittart, op.cit., p.352.
'^ ^Middlemas, and Barnes, op.cit., p.721.
'Hpor the best assessment of Baldwin's role in the Abyssinian Crisis see Middlemas 
and Barnes, op.cit., pp.826-899; see also Hardie, op.cit., pp.239-244. Even Middlemas 
and Barnes who, on the whole, are quite positive about Baldwin, have a difficult time 
defending his handling of affairs during the Abyssinian Crisis. Hardie, on the other 
hand, makes a scathing indictment of the Prime Minister.
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Chapter 6
Hoare Laval as a Case Study
The deal worked out between Sir Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval in 
Paris on the 7th and 8th of December, later dubbed the "Hoare-Laval Plan," 
has received considerable attention from historians, i Little would be 
gained then from another exhaustive account of the sad affair.
Instead, I w ill examine Hoare-Laval as a case-study. Having looked at 
the Foreign Office and the way that British policy developed during the 
crisis, it is interesting to look at Hoare-Laval in this context. Indeed, it 
appears that in December 1935 events were beginning to converge. The 
impending oil sanction, an unreliable France, the danger of a "mad dog" 
attack by the Italians in the Mediterranean and the possibility of Italy 
moving into an alliance w ith Germany, combined to put the Foreign Office 
under intense pressure. When hopes for a territorial settlement were 
raised—by none other than the Italians themselves—the Foreign Office 
jumped at the chance. Thus the events around the Hoare-Laval affair 
present a miniature picture of some of the larger problems faced by the 
Foreign Office during the Abyssinian Crisis.
Hopes for a territorial settlement had been revived in the middle of 
October, less than two weeks after the initial Italian attack. While the 
League was considering the type of sanctions to impose, the Foreign Office 
received a report from its representative to the Vatican on October 16th, 
describing a new initiative sponsored by the Vatican apparently w ith the 
backing of the Italian Government. These new proposals consisted of 
cease-fire terms, and recommendations for the cession to Italy of all the 
Abyssinian territory under military occupation and an "Italian mandate for 
some or all of non-Amharic regions" under the umbrella of the League. 
Abyssinia, in return, would receive an outlet to the sea and a corridor.^ 
While the Foreign Office believed that these proposals were weighted too 
much in favor of Italy, it nevertheless hoped that steps could be taken to 
follow up this new initiative 3
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After discussing the proposals w ith the French Government, the 
Foreign Office sent the Head of the Abyssinian Department, Maurice 
Peterson, to Paris for negotiations w ith the French Foreign Ministry to 
explore possible solutions to the dispute through a territorial exchange. 
Peterson arrived in Paris on the 25th of October, and the negotiations began 
in earnest. Peterson and his French counterpart. M. de St. Quentin, made 
little progress during the first three weeks of talks. The Italian demands, 
strongly backed by the French, were repeatedly rejected by the Foreign 
Office as too extreme. Peterson was recalled to London during the British 
General Election, bringing the negotiations to a temporary halt, but on the 
21st of November he was sent back with fresh instructions.'^
On the 25th of November, Vansittart received a special Italian 
emissary. General Garibaldi, in his room in the Foreign Office. Garibaldi 
had been sent to London by Mussolini, and he began by telling Vansittart 
that an oil sanction might "drive Signor Mussolini to desperation...and lead
to the enlargement of hostilities." The Foreign Office had been aware of
this danger for some time, but coming directly from the mouth of Garibaldi, 
the warning took on added significance. As the conversation went on, 
Garibaldi elaborated on the real reasons behind his visit; he had been sent 
by Mussolini to urge Britain and France to find a reasonable territorial 
settlement.
It remained therefore to get out of the imbroglio as well and 
as speedily as possible. General Garibaldi said that for this 
purpose Signor Mussolini had authorised him to state 
categorically that Italy would be prepared to cease hostilities 
and come to Geneva again to put her case to the League...if 
she were assured in advance of some such arrangement as 
that sketched on the annexed piece of paper...
The piece of paper that Vansittart referred to was an Italian proposal for a 
territorial settlement presented to the Foreign Office by Garibaldi. These 
proposals closely resembled those put forward by the Vatican, but they 
"were..,not final and were subject to any reasonable modification." 
Vansittart warned Garibaldi that the proposals were still too extreme. 
Garibaldi replied by saying that he was willing to stay in London to wait for 
an official British response.5
The Foreign Office was quite willing to see if some sort of solution 
along these lines could be found. It was hoped, however, that the Italian
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terms could be modified. Both Hoare and Eden looked at the new Italian 
proposals. Hoare thought them "completely unacceptable" but he thought 
that "it would be well to show our hand to the General." Eden agreed that 
the terms of the proposals were "quite impossible," but he saw "no reason 
for further speech with the General." ^
Hoare himself saw Garibaldi on the 28th. The General told him that 
Mussolini "had shifted from the rigid position that he had at first adopted." 
He also told Hoare that "there was a chance of a reasonable peace, provided 
that action was taken quickly and the British Government took a more 
definite initiative in making proposals." Hoare responded by saying that the 
Italian terms were unacceptable as they stood. Garibaldi asked what sort of 
modifications Britain would agree to, but Hoare could only tell him that "it 
was impossible...to go into any detail until Mr. Peterson's return from Paris." 
He was. however, "impressed" by Garibaldi's "obvious sincerity and...fervent 
desire to find some basis of agreement.”^
Hoare saw Garibaldi again on the 2nd of December. Garibaldi had 
changed his plans and was returning to Rome. He asked the Foreign 
Secretary if  he could take a message with him back to Mussolini. In 
response to this, Hoare said:
I replied that my message was the need for making the most 
of the immediate future for a serious negotiation. If Signor 
Mussolini was prepared for a serious negotiation, we were 
prepared to cooperate.
According to Hoare, Garibaldi "expressed gratification at this answer," and 
told him that he would "let it be known [in Rome} that we were anxious for 
a serious negotiation in the immediate future." Hoare closed his account of 
the talk with the General w ith a message for his subordinates in the Foreign 
Office: "It would be well for the Office to take action to this effect." ^
In fact, the Foreign Office was already taking action. That same day, 
two members of the Abyssinian Department, Geoffrey Thompson and 
Patrick Scrivener, drew up a note based on the latest proposals from 
Peterson. Vansittart was to begin talks with the Italian Ambassador, Dino 
Grandi, the next day, and the Abyssinian Department's memorandum was to 
serve as a starting point for the discussions. It proposed that Italy receive 
Adowa, Adigrat, Danakil and most of the Ogaden; Abyssinia, in turn, would
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receive a port and a corridor, and also "a League plan of [economic] 
assistance."^
Meanwhile. Sir Samuel Hoare was busy making preparations for his 
visit to Paris. The talks in Paris had achieved a breakthrough, w ith the 
French finally agreeing to place the economic zone in southern Abyssinia- 
demanded by Mussolini—under League control.*o Laval had proposed to 
come to London to discuss the latest scheme, but Hoare preferred to go to 
Paris himself. He was planning to take a holiday in Switzerland anyway, 
and he thought that he could stop off in Paris for a few days on his way 
there.** He wanted to take Vansittart w ith him. but since it was unusual 
for a Secretary of State and a Permanent Under Secretary to be away at the 
same time he had to obtain permission from the King first. On the 2nd of 
December, Hoare wrote to Lord Wigram, the King's Secretary, telling him 
about his proposed visit to Paris and asking for permission to take 
Vansittart. Hoare thought the situation urgent, and he wrote:
...if I leave at the end of the week, I shall be passing through 
Paris and can accept M. Laval's urgent invitation to have a 
talk w ith him on Saturday [December 71. I f  1 postpone my 
departure, this talk w ill be impossible before the important 
meeting of the League on December 12th [to decide on the 
oil sanction).
So far as the Abyssinian controversy is concerned, it looks to 
me as though the next few weeks are going to be a period of 
intensive negotiation for a settlement. We intend to go all 
out for bringing the conflict to an end.
I f  agreement could be reached with Laval "upon a basis for a peace 
negotiation," Hoare concluded, then Vansittart could "clinch the d e ta i ls ." *2
This then is the origin of Hoare's trip to Paris. From the Foreign Office 
documents, it not clear when exactly the arrangements for the trip were 
made.*3 The essential question, is why Hoare decided to go to Paris 
himself; Peterson was already there, and presumably could have completed 
the negotiations on his own.*"* One can only surmise that Hoare saw a 
potential agreement as too important to be handled by expert advisers.
Events were developing rapidly, and it was becoming quite clear that 
if  an oil sanction was to be averted, then a peace settlement would have to 
be obtained. Reports from the British Embassy in Rome continued to 
suggest that the Italians would go to war if  the oil sanction was imposed;
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one report even stated that the Italians had prepared "suicide bombers" for 
this purpose.*) On December 4th the Chiefs of Staff produced another 
report outlining the vulnerable position of British forces in the 
Mediterranean.!^ Adding to the Foreign Office’s worries were reports from 
the British Embassy in Berlin warning that Germany and Italy were 
drawing closer together.*7 For the staff in the Foreign Office, pressure was 
mounting to find some sort of solution as fast as possible.
Vansittart began intensive talks w ith Ambassador Grandi on the 3rd. 
The discussions lasted three days, and covered most of the various 
proposals for a territorial settlement put forward previously. Although 
problems remained, these were mostly concerned w ith details of the 
exchange. Grandi s terms were still too steep, but the Foreign Office 
thought that there was a good chance that these could be modified.*^ 
Hopefully, it would be easier going in Paris.
In the light of what happened later (when the Hoare-Laval Agreement 
was criticized as a betrayal of the League), it would appropriate to pause 
here and describe the attitudes of the Foreign Office officials towards the 
League at this time. It is abundantly clear that Hoare, Vansittart and most 
of their staff endeavoured to keep the League in the picture at all times. On 
December 6th Vansittart had emphasized the League's role in any 
settlement in a conversation w ith the French Ambassador to London.*^ The 
Foreign Office was aware that the Paris negotiations might give the 
impression of going "behind the backs of the League and of the injured 
party," but it believed that Britain and France were merely carrying out 
their legitimate role as the two leading powers of the League. Indeed, on 
the 2nd of November the League had endorsed a suggestion by van Zeeland, 
the Belgian Foreign Minister, that Britain and France work to find a solution 
acceptable to all parties to end the crisis.20 Hoare told the House of 
Commons on the 5th of December that Britain and France:
were working w ithin the framework of the League, that we 
wished at the earliest possible moment to share our special 
responsibility w ith other members of the League, and that 
any proposals that might emerge from these or other 
discussions must be acceptable to the three parties to the 
dispute—the League, Italy and Abyssinia.
It may be that we are engaged in a hopeless task. It may be 
that it is impossible to reconcile the divergent aims of Italy,
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Abyssinia and the League.,.None the less, the French and we 
intend not only to go on trying but to redouble our efforts.. 21
For Hoare and the Foreign Office, the negotiations in Paris were fully 
compatible with Britain's obligations under the League Covenant.
Vansittart travelled to Paris on the 6th, and Hoare arrived the 
following afternoon. Before leaving London. Hoare had tried to talk to 
Baldwin again. The Cabinet had discussed Hoare's trip to Paris at its 
meeting on the 2nd, but had given the Foreign Secretary no specific 
instructions.22 Baldwin was equally vague, and Hoare's description of the 
Prime Minister's attitude during these last few days before the Paris 
meeting is illuminating:
Baldwin, who was fully occupied with the many details |
connected with the new Government, had little time for i|
discussing with me the implications of my Paris visit. His j
advice was very simple: ‘Have a good leave, and get your {
health back. That is the most important thing. By all means |
stop in Paris, and push Laval as far as you can, but on no 
account get this country into war.'2^
With this kind of guidance from the Cabinet, Hoare, for all intensive 
purposes, was left to fend for himself. He was to keep Britain out of war, 
which meant avoiding an oil sanction; there was only one course left open 
and that was to reach a settlement as quickly as possible. As Vansittart 
later commented, there was "no third way" in December 1935.2^
The negotiations in Paris began at 5:30 on Saturday afternoon (Dec,
7th) and lasted until late the next day. When the meeting began, Hoare 
managed to extract from Laval assurances for French military support in 
the event of an Italian attack on the British fleet; Laval also agreed to 
extend the Anglo-French staff talks, already underway, to include the army 
and a i r f o r c e .25 The talks then turned to the details of the territorial 
settlement, and Hoare and Vansittart succeeded in reducing the terms 
recently put forward by Grandi. In brief, this meant frontier rectification in 
the Danakil and Ogaden areas rather than outright cession. In addition to 
this, Italy would receive some of the occupied area in Tigre. The large zone 
in the south and south-west would be set aside for Italian economic 
development; it was agreed, however, that the League would have ultimate
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control over this area. Abyssinia, in turn, would receive an outlet to the 
Sea—either Zeila or Assab.^^
Whether the agreement was a good one can never really be 
answered.27 What is important, is that the British officials involved—Hoare, 
Vansittart, Sir George Clerk and Peterson—believed it to be a great success. 
The details of the settlement were not as important as the agreement itself; 
details could be settled later. As Hoare said in his memoirs: "What 
principally mattered at the time was Anglo-French agreement on the actual 
plan."2S When the talks were completed, Vansittart and Clerk congratulated 
Hoare "on having re-established the Anglo-French front."29 Valuable 
concessions had been obtained and, as a telegram from Hoare to London on 
December 8th stated, there had been "a real attempt on the part of the 
French to come into line.' o^ The joint communiqué issued at the end of the 
talks declared that Britain and France were "satisfied w ith the result...[that 
had been] reached.")*
Before leaving Paris, Hoare dictated a memorandum for the Cabinet. It 
was to be delivered by Peterson who was travelling back to London with 
details of the plan later that day. The memorandum described the contents 
of the settlement, and Hoare urged that action "should be taken at once." 
Hoare was enthusiastic about the plan, and he stated why:
The recommendations in my view have two great 
advantages. In the first place, they reduce the question of 
territorial cessions to a minimum. In the second place they 
bring back the League into the front of the picture and put 
the responsibility for the settlement where it should lie— 
upon the shoulders of the League rather than upon the 
French and ourselves.
Hoare certainly did not believe that he had betrayed the League in any
way.)2
There are numerous accounts of the uproar that followed, and there is 
no need for an extensive analysis of this side of Hoare-Laval here.)) Suffice 
it to say that when the Cabinet met to examine the Paris agreement on 
December 9th, it agreed to accept the plan with minor modifications. Hoare 
had asked that the meeting of the League Committee of Eighteen be 
postponed, and that a meeting of the Committee of Five take its place. Such 
a move would minimize the danger of the League adopting the oil sanction. 
The Cabinet decided against this, however, and also decided to inform
M2
Abyssinia and Italy of the plan simultaneously (Hoare had recommended 
that Italy be told first). On the whole, the Cabinet was satisfied w ith the 
agreement.)'*
The story of the leak of the plan in the Paris press, the revolt among 
Conservative back-benchers, and the Cabinet's subsequent abandonment of 
both the plan and Hoare (he resigned on December 18th) has been told in 
great detail many times before.)) Vocal sections of the British public were 
outraged at what they saw as a betrayal of the League and an example of 
realpolitlk. The League of Nations Union, the majority of the British press, 
and the Church of England were especially critical.)^ This sparked-off a 
revolt among Conservative back-benchers and, after a week of political 
wrangling, the Cabinet decided to abandon the plan. Rather than disown 
the Paris proposals, Hoare chose to resign.)^
Certain aspects of the storm that followed Hoare-Laval need to be 
singled-out for attention. Particularly important was the absence of Hoare 
during the critical days between December 9th and 18th. Unaware that the 
details of the plan had been leaked to the Paris press, Hoare travelled to 
Switzerland oblivious of the dangers on the horizon. Thus when the Cabinet 
met to discuss to the plan on December 9th, Hoare was unable to defend his 
actions. His absence enabled Eden to take command at this meeting and in 
the Cabinet discussions that followed over the next few days. Eden, who 
had been snubbed by Hoare more than once before and had everything to 
gain from Hoare's problems,)) chose to distance himself from the plans. At 
the meeting on December 9th, Eden told his fellow Ministers that some of 
the League members would find the proposals distasteful.)^ Two days 
later, Eden told the Cabinet that he hoped "he would not be expected to 
champion the proposals” in Geneva. With the tide of public opinion against 
the plan on the rise, other Cabinet ministers began to express reservations 
about the Paris proposals. Thus began the Cabinet's retreat from Hoare- 
Laval.^o
By the time that Hoare returned to England—on December 16th—it 
was already too late. To make matters worse, the Foreign Secretary had 
broken his nose in skating accident in Switzerland, and was confined to 
bed.^* Vansittart had returned from Paris a few days before, determined to 
save the plan. On the 12th, Vansittart and his private secretary. Clifford 
Norton, went to see the Prime Minister. "We’ll ride it out. I thought we did 
a pretty good job in Paris" he told Baldwin.*^^ Vansittart also urged Baldwin
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to stand firm and, if  necessary, to take the press into his confidence. 
Baldwin appeared to give in. but this was s h o r t- liv e d .^ *^
The storm that followed Hoare-Laval exposed all the weaknesses of the 
Baldwin Cabinet. Since the beginning of the crisis eleven months before, 
the Cabinet had avoided involvement in foreign policy matters. Hoare had 
been sent to Paris w ith vague instructions to keep Britain out of war. Hoare 
believed that he had done that, but the storm raised by the proposals put 
the Cabinet in a dilemma: they could stand by the plan, but that would 
involve going before the House of Commons and declaring that the 
proposals were the only alternative short of war. Hoare and Vansittart were 
convinced of this fact and were prepared to do this; the Cabinet was not. 
Unable to defend the plan, the Foreign Office was forced to sit on the 
sidelines and watch its work destroyed. Baldwin, for his part, gave one of 
the poorest performances of his career. Indecisive, he became increasingly 
withdrawn as the clamour began to mount.'^^ It was Chamberlain, in fact, 
who took control of the government during the storm.^5 in the end, Hoare 
and his policy were jettisoned by the same colleagues who—seemingly—had 
given him a mandate for action only two weeks before.
The agreement reached in Paris between Hoare and Laval was the 
natural conclusion to the double-policy that the Foreign Office had been 
following all along. Ever since the crisis began, the Foreign Office had 
sought a solution through a territorial settle-ment. The oil sanction, the lack 
of French cooperation coupled w ith British isolation, and indications that 
Italy and Germany were moving closer together, combined to create a 
sense of urgency for Hoare and his staff. In short, Hoare and the Foreign 
Office had no choice but to seek a settlement and as soon as possible.
This pressure on the Foreign Office to find a solution and the urgency 
attached to these efforts, cannot be overstated. In the Foreign Office 
documents, and in the memoirs of Hoare and Vansittart, a sense of near­
panic seems to have been present during these fateful days. It is as if  those 
involved acted under the fear that time was running out. Indeed, Hoare had 
told Clive Wigram before leaving London that he and his staff intended "to 
go all out for bringing the conflict to an end."*^^  Vansittart described the 
situation as "a bad mess," but he added that a "single-handed war [against 
Italy) was the only other way out of it."'*^ Given the difficulties of the
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situation, Vansittart reasoned, the Paris proposals were "the best that could 
be done."'^  ^ Before Peterson left Paris to take the plan to the Cabinet he was 
urged by Vansittart to emphasize to the government the need to close ranks 
"against the coming onrush of G e r m a n y F o r  both Hoare and Vansittart it 
was important to maintain the Stresa front; Italy could not be allowed to 
drift into the German orbit. As Hoare later commented:
The general public was ignorant of the past history and had 
not been able to follow the complicated details of the 
negotiation, nor was our military weakness taken into 
account. Perhaps even the Cabinet had not fully grasped the 
implications of any plan that had a chance of being accepted 
by Mussolini...Very few realised that the real danger to 
Europe was a Germany w ith Italy as an ally.50
Hoare added:
The so-called Hoare-Laval plan was the only practicable 
basis for a compromise to end the war that had already 
begun, and for the re-establishment of the Stresa front. The 
alternatives were either to do nothing or to face the 
possibility of war w ith Ita ly.51
As participants in these events, Hoare, Vansittart and Peterson's 
accounts must be used with caution. After all, it is only natural that they 
defend their actions. Their memoirs do, however, illuminate the dilemma 
that the Foreign Office faced in December 1935. Hoare says in his memoirs 
that his error did not lie in the agreement itself, but rather in his impatience 
to obtain agreement.52 in retrospect, Hoare's impatience is understandable. 
With a decision on an oil sanction less than a week away, there was little 
time left to lose. Only a few days earlier, Vansittart had warned Hoare that 
without cooperation from France and the other League powers, an oil 
sanction "would be s u ic id a l." 5 3
At the heart of the Hoare-Laval affair, and especially in the storm that 
followed, there occurred a fundamental breakdown in the relationship 
between the Cabinet and the Foreign Office. Did Hoare deliberately 
mislead the Cabinet about his talks w ith Laval, as Eden later suggested?54 
The evidence for this is flimsy. The problem was rather one of poor 
coordination. The Foreign Office had produced and carried-out the policy 
that resulted in Hoare-Laval; the Cabinet—by its very indifference—had
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given tacit approval to that policy all along. (This may help explain Hoare's 
surprise when he returned to London and found the Cabinet unhappy w ith 
the deal.) Instead of taking a firm lead in policy-making, the Cabinet 
allowed Sir Samuel Hoare and the Foreign Office to handle affairs. This 
pattern had been present ever since June, when Hoare took office, and the 
system had functioned reasonably well. When Hoare secured the deal w ith 
Laval he had done his job as he had understood it. Thus the collapse that 
followed was the result of poor management on the part of the Cabinet.
In the end, the gap between the Cabinet and the Foreign Office proved 
fatal, pealing with the intricacies of the crisis on a day-to-day basis, Hoare 
and his staff were all too aware of what was at stake. By December, they 
were desperate to find a solution. The Cabinet, on the other hand, had only 
dealt w ith the crisis from a safe distance. Not once during the crisis did 
Baldwin step into the breach to take command of policy. As December 
approached, the gap between the Cabinet and the Foreign Office widened. 
While Hoare and Vansittart redoubled their efforts to bring an end to the 
crisis, Baldwin and the Cabinet sat immoble, seemingly incapable of action. 
Just how wide the gap was between the Cabinet and the Foreign Office, 
was not really comprehended until after the storm broke. Either the 
Cabinet did not fully realize Hoare's desperation to find an agreement, or 
Hoare, in his search for a solution, had completely lost sight of perspective. 
The answer probably lies in between. What is clear, however, is that the 
working relationship between the Cabinet and the Foreign Office had, by 
December 1935, completely broken down.
The Hoare-Laval affair brought down a Foreign Secretary and left 
British policy in shambles. It was a disaster for British policy, but a disaster 
born out of the policy-making process itself. All the problems that had 
either remained hidden or had been ignored throughout the crisis, were 
exposed by Hoare-Laval. For the Foreign Office, this meant the realization 
of the limits of British policy; Britain could not maintain good relations with 
France and Italy while upholding the League Covenant and keeping an eye 
on Germany. The weakness of the Cabinet, and particularly Baldwin's style 
of "hands-off" management was similarly exposed. In the end. Foreign 
Office policy, combined w ith Cabinet indifference was a recipe for 
destruction. The final blow came when Baldwin's Cabinet decided to 
abandon the policy rather than face the rising tide of criticism in the House 
of Commons.
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*The best account of Hoare-Laval is probably that by James Robertson. See 
Robertson, "The Hoare-Laval Plan", Journal o f Contemporary History, 10 (1975), 
pp.433-464. See also Norton Medlicott, "The Hoare-Laval Plan Reconsiderd", in David 
Dilks (ed ). Retreat from Power, Vol. J (London: 1981), pp.118-138. Cross, op.cit., 
presents an excellent, though somewhat apologetic, account of Hoare-Laval.
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**Templewood, op.cit., pp.177-78.
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l^ Both Vansittart and Peterson later admitted that it would have been wiser had 
Peterson remained in Paris to complete the negotiations on his own. See Vansittart, 
op.cit., p.538, and Peterson, op.cit., p.ll9,
(5DBFP.2, XV, No.305.
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24Vansittart, op.cit., p.539.
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2bFor details of the agreement see DBFP.2, XV, No.336.
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27The coAventional view of the agreement is that it was a bad one, that it rewarded the 
aggressor (Italy) at the expense of Abyssinia. Likewise, Hoare and Vansittart are seen 
as having gone too far. Whether or not this judgement of Hoare-Laval is correct, is 
open to debate. Certainly the agreement went beyond the proposals put foward by the 
Committee of Five in September. It was not a "fair" agreement in any way, shape, or 
form: Italy was bound to profit at the expense of the Abyssinians. The British, 
however, had never reaUy indicated any concern about Abyssinia itself, only about the 
precedent of aggression and its consequences. In any event, the choice facing Hoare 
and Vansittart was whether all of Abyssinia would be lost, or whether losses could be 
minimized.
2&TempIewood, op.cit., p.181.
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Chamberlain, for example, who kept the bed-ridden Hoare informed of the Cabinet s 
activities. In the meantime, Baldwin became silent and withdrawn.
‘‘6DBFP.2, XV. No.293.
'^^ Vansittart. op.cit., p.540.
‘‘«Ibid.. p.543.
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In bis memoirs. Eden says that he warned Hoare that in Paris "Van can be more 
French than the French". According to Eden, Hoare replied by reassuring him: “I shall 
not commit you to anything. It wouldn't be fair on my way through to my holiday." See 
Avon, op.cit,, p.335. This is certainly a strange story and, unfortunately, one that 
cannot be confirmed. The Foreign Office documents indicate that Eden was well 
aware of what was going; momentum was gathering, and an agreement seemed only a 
few days away. It appears then, that Eden's story is merely an attampt on his part to 
distance himself as much as possible from the ill-fated affair.
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A Note on Research and Sources
Writing this thesis, I relied mostly on the second series of the 
Documents on British Foreign Poiicy. edited by Medlicott. Dakin and 
Lambert, and published by Her Majesty's Stationary Office. References to 
this series in my footnotes are abbreviated to DBFP. To supplement this 
research, I examined the Foreign Office files (FO 371) of 1935 dealing w ith 
Italy and Ethiopia, the Foreign Office files of Sir John Simon (FO 800/290 
and 291) and Sir Samuel Hoare (FO 800/295), and the Cabinet Minutes of 
1935 (CAB 23/81 and 23/82). All are located in the Public Record Office in 
Kew.
I also drew from the private papers of Lord Templewood (Sir Samuel 
Hoare), Lord Vansittart, Lord Hankey, and Sir Eric Phipps. The 
Templewood Papers are located in the Cambridge University Library, 
while the Vansittart, Hankey, and Phipps Papers are located in the 
Churchill College Library, Cambridge. For use of the Churchill College 
Library, I would like to thank the Master, Fellows, and Scholars of Churchill 
College in the University of Cambridge.
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